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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
CARTESIAN SKEPTICISM AS MORAL DILEMMA 
 
I argue that despite the fact that there can be no strong refutation of skepticism it 
remains that ignoring skeptical hypotheses and relying on one’s sensory experience are 
both sound epistemic practices.  This argument comes in the form of arguing that we are 
justified in ignoring skeptical hypotheses on the grounds that (1) they are merely 
logically possible, and (2) the merely logically possible is rarely relevant in the context of 
everyday life.  I suggest that (2) is true on the grounds that the context of everyday life is 
one in which our epistemic pursuit of truth is mixed with other pragmatic goals.  The 
result of this mix is that the pursuit of truth can conflict with our goal of avoiding error in 
such a way that we must choose to prioritize one goal over the other.   
 
The above choice implies that skepticism comes at an epistemic cost not 
acknowledge in the contemporary literature on external world skepticism.  This epistemic 
cost of skepticism means that the relative risk of error involved in relying on sensory 
experience is not as epistemically problematic as has often been assumed.   These 
considerations allow an anti-skeptical position in which relying on sensory experience is 
prima-facie justified despite the possibility of being a brain in a vat.  In this paper I 
explore what such a position might look like and what the implications of such a view 
might be for relevant alternatives positions, the closure debate, and the concept of 
differing epistemic perspectives in contemporary epistemology. 
 
KEYWORDS: Cartesian Skepticism, External World Skepticism, Relevant  
Alternatives and Skepticism, Epistemology and Skepticism,  
Skepticism 
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Cartesian Skepticism as Moral Dilemma 
 
 
“Introduction” 
 
 
1.1: Introduction to external world skepticism: 
 Generally, external world skeptics believe that we do not possess knowledge of 
the contingent aspects of the world around us.  Traditionally, such skepticism involves 
denying that sensory experience can ground knowledge.  However, it is possible on this 
particular kind of skepticism to allow knowledge of the external world via means other 
than sensory experience.  It might be possible, for example, to grant a priori knowledge 
of necessary truths via reason, and such a belief might constitute a kind of external world 
knowledge. If we look to the particulars of the argument that Descartes gave in 
Meditation I, concern about his external world beliefs stemmed from concerns about the 
reliability of the source of those beliefs; specifically, sensory experience.  Descartes did 
not question the notion of external world knowledge in principle.  Instead, he found that 
beliefs grounded in sensory experience fell short of counting as knowledge because the 
method by which the beliefs were formed admitted of too much doubt to yield 
knowledge.    
Descartes notes early in his Meditations that: 
 
All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the highest 
truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses.  I 
observed, however, that these sometimes misled us; and it is the part of 
prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even 
once been deceived.1 
 
                                                 
1 See Descartes, Meditations,  pg. 47. 
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In this moment Descartes set out that skeptical worry that has come to be known in the 
contemporary literature as Cartesian skepticism.  While Descartes’ skepticism is often 
thought of as grounded in the existence of uneliminated skeptical hypotheses, we can see 
in this quote that the fundamental question for Descartes was how we can be justified in 
relying on a source that has been found, at times, to be unreliable.  Of course, Descartes 
felt that he could not justify such reliance; that an even occasionally unreliable source 
cannot yield real knowledge.  This worry is particularly salient if we have no way for 
determining when the source in question is functioning reliably and when it is not.  The 
possibilities of dreaming or an evil demon embody instances in which our source seems 
to be functioning reliably, when, unbeknownst to us, it is not.  Descartes general strategy 
for analyzing the whole of his beliefs lies in evaluating sources of beliefs.  In light of the 
possible failure of the senses, in light of the evil demon and dreaming scenarios, and the 
occasional de facto failure of the senses, new foundations must be found if we are to 
possess knowledge.  The possibly and occasionally unreliable is not adequate to serve as 
a foundation for knowledge. 
While many in the contemporary literature have focused on the above skeptical 
hypotheses, it is helpful to remember that at its heart Cartesian skepticism expresses the 
doubt about the ability of sometimes or possibly unreliable mechanisms to produce 
knowledge.  If we reason along such skeptical lines we too might wonder how a source 
that might be massively unreliable can possibly yield knowledge.  Even worse, we might 
begin to wonder whether or not it’s rational or reasonable to rely on a source that we 
recognize might be deceiving us. The skeptic feels that since our sources have 
occasionally been locally unreliable, and might be globally and massively deceiving us, 
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we cannot possibly claim knowledge on such weak grounds.  These are the questions 
particular to external world skepticism, and these are some of the questions one who 
wishes to reject skepticism must grapple with. 
The concern over sensory experience in Cartesian skepticism seems to stem, 
primarily, from the existence of an array of skeptical alternatives such as the brain-in–
the-vat or the evil demon scenarios.  These skeptical scenarios expand the reason to doubt 
sensory experience from the classical examples of sensory illusions in which something 
looks one way but is another, to a worry about massive and general deception that can be 
neither confirmed nor refuted.  Skeptical alternatives are particularly worrisome if we are 
concerned with avoiding error because they embody scenarios in which the error is 
general, massive, and cannot be detected through the methods available to us for 
detecting error.   
This Cartesian skepticism undermines knowledge by attacking the justification 
that sensory experience provides for our beliefs. This kind of skeptic will argue that 
sensory experience can be mistaken, and that we cannot rule out the hypotheses that 
represent the possibility of error.  The argument is that since we cannot rule out 
hypotheses in which our sensory experience is mistaken, we fail to have grounds for 
preferring our ordinary beliefs about the world over rival skeptical hypotheses.  Given the 
above, the conclusion is that we fail to know what we take ourselves to know about the 
world.  That is, we will fail to know such ordinary things as “I have hands”, and that 
there are trees in the world, and that there are other people in the world.  This conclusion 
is so counter-intuitive that it tempts many to reject skepticism outright.  However, as 
4 
 
tempting as this response might be, it is important that we have more substantive grounds 
than a mere dislike of the conclusion for rejecting the skeptic’s argument.   
 The primary questions that come from this simplified skeptical worry are 
questions like how are we justified in relying on sensory experience when we have no 
general evidence that it is in fact reliable, how can we claim to know a hypothesis when 
we cannot rule out its competitors?  Are our grounds for our beliefs the arbitrary and 
psychologically convenient choice the skeptic claims them to be?  It is this particular, 
somewhat abstracted, skeptical puzzle that I have chosen, like many contemporary 
epistemologists, to focus my efforts on.  And I, like many epistemologists, am concerned 
with how the contemporary internalism and externalism debate is affected by this 
particular skeptical issue in epistemology.  
The current debate on internalism and externalism seems best characterized as a 
debate between epistemologists over whether or not that which serves as justification for 
knowledge must be accessible to the agent via introspection or not.  While internalists 
contend that justification must be accessible to the agent’s perspective, externalists deny 
that the accessibility requirement is necessary for knowledge.  Externalists are willing to 
count beliefs as knowledge even when that which justifies the agent’s belief is not 
accessible to the agent herself.  For many externalists, as long as the agent’s belief was in 
fact formed in a reliable way, the agent counts as knowing whether or not the agent is 
aware of the reliability of her belief forming mechanism.  On other externalist views, it 
might be that an agent exhibits certain epistemic virtues the possession of which confer 
the status of knowledge on her beliefs, regardless of whether or not she is aware of her 
virtuous epistemic practices qua virtuous epistemic practices.  Some externalists count 
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the latter as knowing that one knows, and make sharp distinctions between knowing that 
you know and mere knowledge, between knowledge and knowledge ascriptions.  Thus, 
we might think of the internalism and externalism debate as one in which internalists 
require the accessibility of the justifiers and externalists do not.   
While I will not address internalism and externalism in any explicit way in the 
argument to come, there are implications for this debate that can be extrapolated from the 
argument given. I must admit early on that the implication of approaching this issue from 
such a narrow standpoint is that my discussion will lack much of the detail and historical 
finesse that a comprehensive discussion of skepticism would involve.   
  My argument takes Duncan Pritchard’s work in Epistemic Luck as a starting 
point and focuses on the issue of knowledge ascriptions and skepticism.  Pritchard comes 
to the conclusion in this work that externalism goes some way towards addressing 
skepticism for knowledge but that such a solution leaves skepticism intact with regard to 
our knowledge claims.  My work here starts with this latter concern about skepticism as it 
applies to knowledge claims. 
 I utilize Bonjour’s concept of Epistemic Perspectives to both justify a strong 
distinction between the conditions for knowledge and knowledge ascriptions as well as 
provide a justification for treating skeptical hypotheses as irrelevant in most everyday 
contexts.  Because I focus primarily on knowledge ascriptions, and there tends to be more 
agreement on this score between internalists and externalists, I have aimed my discussion 
in a way that is meant to appeal to both sides of this debate.   While it may be that 
knowledge need not require access to the justifiers, as externalists contend, it seems less 
plausible to deny the accessibility requirement of internalism for knowledge ascriptions.  
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That is, it seems fairly counter-intuitive to allow one to truly claim knowledge without 
having any access to, or awareness of, the justifiers.  Duncan Pritchard is an example of 
an epistemologist who is an externalist with regard to knowledge but seems to require 
accessibility for knowledge ascriptions. 
 I will argue that skeptical hypotheses are generally only relevant in a 
philosophical context and that we have good epistemic reasons for treating them as 
irrelevant in most everyday contexts.  The aim of this argument is to defend the practices 
of everyday knowers without appeal to fancy philosophical argument.  Thus, my 
argument draws out and relies upon common sense attitudes that reject skepticism and 
defends those attitudes as epistemically justified.  The appeal of this approach is that it 
results in the defense of  assumptions we make about sensory experience in a way that 
justifies everyday knowers without appeal to a line of reasoning that it is unlikely 
everyday knowers have ever appealed to.  The line of reasoning given in the course of the 
argument to come could be applied more generally to justify assumptions of reliability 
for other methods of belief formation such as testimony and memory.     
 In “Skepticism and Rationality” Richard Foley argues that it is a brute fact about 
epistemic endeavors that they are fallible, and that we too, as possible knowers, are 
fallible, and that our methods of belief formation themselves are inherently fallible.  He 
states: 
To be sure, this involves a leap of intellectual faith.  It involves our having 
confidence in those intellectual methods that are deeply satisfying to us 
despite the fact that we cannot vindicate this confidence in a non-question 
begging way.  This may be regrettable but it is also undeniable.  The 
reality of our intellectual lives is that we are working without nets.  No 
procedure, no amount of reflection, no amount of evidence gathering can 
guarantee that we won’t fall into error, perhaps even massive error.  We 
are thus forced to choose between moving forward in a way that we, upon 
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reflection, would take to be effective and proceeding in a way that we 
would not take to be effective.  If we are rational, we opt for the former.2 
 
In his Epistemic Luck Duncan Pritchard talks about an “Epistemic Angst” that remains 
for our internalist justifications and for our knowledge claims even in light of a successful 
externalist solution to skepticism with regard to knowledge conditions.3  This epistemic 
angst is characterized by a necessary leap of faith; we are akin to “acrobats” who are not 
certain that the safety net that appears below is really there.   
 These views articulate a certain acceptance of our inherent fallibility, and they 
articulate what our epistemic endeavors look like amidst such fallibility.  It is difficult to 
deny such fallibility, and in the argument to come I will embrace this portrait of our 
epistemic lives.  We certainly must embrace a sense of fallibility for knowledge if we 
wish to maintain that such paradigms as science do in fact achieve and attain knowledge.  
Given the technologies and advances we have made on the heels of these epistemic 
endeavors it seems hard to account for such success if the fruit of that labor does not 
count as knowledge.   Yet, the nagging skeptical worry remains.  Indeed, the skeptical 
worry continues to have some bite to it.  
 The skeptic might be right to wonder if we are justified in claiming something as 
strong as knowledge in light of such profound fallibility.  Why is taking a leap of faith the 
right epistemic response to such fallibility?  Why shouldn’t the acceptance of our 
fallibility humble us in such a way that we refrain from claiming knowledge?   The 
skeptic might be right to wonder why such views act as though knowledge claims are 
justified even though they acknowledge that we might be in massive error.  Such a 
                                                 
2 See Foley, pg. 331. 
3 Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005),225-253. 
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skeptical worry questions whether or not it is rational to claim knowledge in light of 
uneliminated possibilities of error.  It is these skeptical worries that hold some weight and 
deserve further answer.  It is not so clear that the brute fact of fallibility implies that 
knowledge claims continue to be rational after we have recognized the myriad ways in 
which we might be wrong about some of our most basic external world beliefs.  Our 
stance towards sensory experience needs further justifying, and it is my sense that such 
justification can be given.  Thus, in the argument to come I will be looking to articulate 
how and why we continue to be justified in claiming knowledge in light of our inherent 
fallibility.   
It is important to note what I intend to accomplish in the coming arguments.  I 
intend to show that endorsement of sensory experience is not an instance of epistemic 
failure or an instance of irrationality.  For the skeptic, if we do not have sufficient reason 
to believe, then we are irrational if we do so.  I intend to show that this is not always the 
case; and it is not the case with regard to the general reliability of the senses.  What I am 
aim to show is not that non-skeptics are epistemically right and skeptics epistemically 
wrong.  Rather, I merely wish to deny that non-skeptics are somehow irrational for 
believing on what count as less than sufficient grounds for the skeptic.  Thus, what will 
come out of the arguments to come is that there is an epistemic stale-mate between the 
skeptic and non-skeptic.  Thus, the distinction between these views lies in the epistemic 
values each embraces and embodies.  These values are foundational in the sense that they 
are not epistemically driven by the evidence.   
The position of skeptic or non-skeptic reflects distinctions in where each places 
value for epistemic “goods and bads”.  I will argue that the best way to think of 
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skepticism is as an epistemic approach that endorses very high standards for knowledge 
because of a concern to avoid error.  The non-skeptic, on the other hand, or the mitigated 
skeptic, places value on truth while also placing value in avoiding error.  The evaluation 
of the skeptical versus non-skeptical positions needs to occur as an evaluation of the 
epistemic values they embrace.  In this light, I believe it can be shown that the non-
skeptic’s position is at least as epistemically appropriate as the skeptic’s.  Thus, I am 
aiming not to refute skepticism, but to take the sting out of some of the worries about 
rationality that arise out of taking skepticism seriously. 
 
 
1.2: The importance of knowledge and responding to the skeptic: 
We might ask ourselves, what is the importance of knowledge and why is it 
important that we defend it against skepticism?  Our first endeavor is to justify spending 
time on responding to skepticism in the first place.  Indeed, it may be tempting given the 
complexity of the problem to dismiss skepticism as a mere parlor trick rather than as a 
serious argument with an unlikable conclusion.   The strategy of dismissing skepticism as 
a sort of parlor trick is unappealing given the lack of explanation for its status as a mere 
trick, rather than as serious philosophical argument.  Surely, we do not want to endorse 
methodologies that allow us to throw off the requirements of careful argumentation 
whenever we see fit.  Giving a serious explanation about why skepticism is not a threat to 
knowledge amounts to a serious treatment of and response to skepticism.  Nonetheless, it 
may be helpful to explore in more detail what is the importance of knowledge as opposed 
to justified belief or true belief and what is the importance of responding to skepticism. 
10 
 
Since knowledge of the world is the focus of external world skepticism, I will 
focus my discussion on the value of external world knowledge. Further, I will take it that 
I am being asked to discuss the value of knowledge as opposed to merely justified belief, 
or as opposed to merely true belief. Roughly, to possess knowledge of the world is to be 
in an epistemically ideal state with regard to our cognitive relationship to the world. 
When we possess knowledge of the world we do so reliably and consistently rather than 
accidentally or haphazardly. Whether or not we regularly know when we possess 
knowledge, possessing knowledge implies that we have a better cognitive relationship to 
the world than possessing merely justified belief.  
In answering concerns about the value of knowledge, I do not want to restrict 
myself to the first person perspective. The first person might be characterized as the 
perspective in which we are generally making and assessing knowledge claims.  
Admittedly, from this perspective we may often function practically on the basis of the 
justifications for our beliefs. So for example, we claim to know often on the basis of the 
evidence we have for our belief, we feel entitled to communicate our beliefs on the basis 
of the evidence we have, etc. These practices make it look as though justified beliefs are 
all we need to navigate through epistemic practices in everyday life. In the course of this 
discussion I aim to make two general points: (1) attempt an answer at why knowledge is 
preferable to merely justified belief and why knowledge is preferable to merely true 
beliefs, and (2) establish that if the skeptic is right, not only do we fail to possess 
knowledge, we fail to possess any degree of epistemic justification for our beliefs. 
Establishing (2) is important to blocking the common argument that the skeptic employs 
unusually high standards of knowledge, and so it is possible to concede that we fail to 
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know in the skeptic’s sense but still possess some degree of epistemic justification for our 
beliefs.4 This move fails unless the requirements on what counts as evidence are 
reconceived. Unless we address the skeptic’s views on evidence we have to concede both 
that we fail to know, and that we fail to possess any degree of epistemic justification for 
our beliefs.   Further, many have found the skeptic’s standards and her argument as 
having some fundamental appeal.  Thus, we will need an explanation and understanding 
of how and why her standards are too high.   
Regarding the value of knowledge as opposed to justified beliefs, it is worth 
pointing out that justifications do not logically entail the truth of our beliefs, the 
connection between justification and truth is not that close.5 It seems that the connection 
between our justification and beliefs is to a large degree, at least when it comes to 
knowledge about the world, contingent. To this extent, our justifications may indicate the 
truth of our beliefs given that certain contingent facts about the relationship between the 
world and our cognitive faculties hold. However, our beliefs about the world will often 
amount to knowledge when a truth producing relationship holds between the world and 
our cognitive faculties. Thus, the value of epistemic practices involving justified beliefs 
will depend for their rationality on the same contingent factors that knowledge depends 
upon.  For these reasons, it does not behoove us in the skeptical debate to transition from 
                                                 
4 This amounts to the common line that the skeptic operates with unusually high standards and the only 
response we need to give to the skeptic is to simply say that we are interested in a level of justification 
that is lower than what the skeptic is operating with.  
 
5 In Putting Skeptics in their Place, John Greco suggests that the relationship between our epistemic 
justifications and our beliefs is not even quasi-logical, our justifications neither deductively nor 
inductively imply the truth of our beliefs, and that this is one of the lessons of skepticism. He argues, 
further, that if we are to address skepticism we must rethink the relationship between evidence and 
beliefs. 
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a debate on knowledge to justified belief.  As it stands, it seems to me that the skeptic 
attacks knowledge by attacking justification and that it is the justification element that is 
hard to defend against skepticism.  For this reason alone, it will not work to grant the 
skeptic knowledge while trying to maintain that we have epistemically justified beliefs 
even if they fail to amount to knowledge.  The skeptic aims to undermine both knowledge 
and justification. 
Knowledge is a better epistemic state to be in than the possession of an 
epistemically justified belief simply because the possession of knowledge implies the 
belief in question is true, whereas the possession of even an epistemic justification may 
not.6 There are two senses of justification I’ll be using and what I am calling epistemic 
justifications are justifications that do in fact increase the likelihood of the truth of one’s 
belief.7 By justified belief I mean a belief that from the agent’s perspective is likely to be 
true given her other beliefs and her evidence. The latter sense of justification amounts to 
something like whether or not it is understandable, or rational from the agent’s own 
perspective, to believe a certain proposition. As I have spelled out epistemic justification 
I cannot see, in the face of skepticism, any reason to prefer talking about it as opposed to 
knowledge as some kind of concession to the skeptic. 
                                                 
6 This may well depend on how one spells out epistemic justification, and whether or not requirements 
about defeaters are placed on one’s evidence in order for it to count as justification. These are not issues 
I want to go into, so I am talking about epistemic justification in the sense that it is either a reason or 
evidence that indicates the truth of one’s belief without any consideration of defeaters. This strikes me 
as okay, because defeaters are often spoken of as a fourth condition on knowledge as opposed to being 
built in at the level of justification. This is good, as defeaters may not be accessible from the first person 
perspective, and justifications are supposed to be.  
 
7 I have spelled out epistemic justification in a particularly externalist way, such that whether or not an 
agent possesses an epistemic justification may not be something the agent can access from the first 
person. 
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As far as the latter sense of justification goes it seems clearly less valuable than 
knowledge. Whereas both epistemic justification and knowledge depend upon the 
skeptic’s being wrong, the possession of merely justified beliefs does not. We may be 
justified in our beliefs even if we are unable to access the external world, and none of our 
justifications actually imply any likelihood that our beliefs are true.  For these reasons, it 
is much more preferable to possess knowledge or epistemic justification than it is possess 
merely justified beliefs.  Epistemic justification counts towards truth in some way, and 
knowledge implies it; since we are aiming for truth in the first place we are aiming to 
possess one of these two, and knowledge is clearly preferable because of its’ connection 
to truth. 
A quick example may help make the point. If an agent looks down, has the 
sensory experience of seeing her hands, and comes, on this basis, to believe she has 
hands; she is justified in this belief whether or not she is a brain in a vat. However, if we 
imagine that this particular agent is a BIV there is a sense in which even though she is 
justified in her belief her epistemic state is deprived- she possesses neither knowledge nor 
epistemic justification. Further, her belief that her sensory experience indicates the truth 
of her belief is false. Her belief that she possesses an epistemic justification for her belief 
is false, and, of course, her belief is itself false. Her justification doesn’t indicate what she 
takes it to indicate – that she has hands. On the other hand, the possession of epistemic 
justifications and knowledge do imply that we are successful in accessing the external 
world. In so far as this is important to us, and I think it is, knowledge is important to us.   
Knowledge implies the successful attainment of our most prized epistemic goal- namely, 
the attainment of truth.   
14 
 
Even more than the above, it seems that epistemic justifications and knowledge 
are what we are really interested in. When we communicate our beliefs to one another we 
are concerned with whether or not the belief is true, not with whether or not it is 
understandable that the agent holds the belief. It may well be that if we genuinely 
believed knowledge of the world impossible, then we would not treat justifications as 
epistemically relevant. We use justifications to show why we think our particular belief 
amounts to one of those produced by a good cognitive relationship to the world. So in 
some ways, these other practices are parasitic on our having a cognitive relationship to 
the world that makes knowledge possible, and does in fact often produce knowledge. 
While brains in vats may well justify their beliefs to each other in much the way we do, 
the depravity of their epistemic situation makes it such that their justifications are not 
epistemic justifications, and these are ultimately the ones we care for the most. 
To summarize, knowledge is valuable as the primary product of agents having a 
good cognitive relationship to the world. All of our epistemic practices depend, for their 
rationality, on this relationship holding. If such a relationship fails to hold, then it 
ultimately does not matter what we believe about the world and why. Agents in skeptical 
worlds are essentially cut off from their real environments. If the argument that 
knowledge is unimportant is that whether or not we possess it depends on things we 
cannot access, and we seem to be able to function only with those things we can access 
from a first person perspective, then these concerns hold not only for knowledge but for 
any sense of justification on which a justification is something that does in fact connect 
one’s belief with the truth.  
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It has also been argued that knowledge should not be the focus of the 
epistemologist’s inquiries because it is not a single, unified, analyzable concept. All I 
want to say in response to this is that we need not claim that knowledge is a single unified 
concept in order to maintain that the concept/s are important. Further, if we conclude that 
analyses of knowledge are unsuccessful, we can still utilize the concept in our 
epistemological projects.8 Further, even if it is the case that the concept knowledge is un-
analyzable, this would not be a reason to favor justification as it seems as difficult to spell 
out the conditions for epistemic justification as for knowledge (indeed, it is this aspect of 
knowledge that is difficult to analyze).  
Nonetheless, one may still make a case that epistemologists could focus only on 
justification rather than knowledge. The argument might go roughly as follows: from a 
first person perspective we just do not know (and there’s no way to find out) whether or 
not we have a good cognitive relationship with the world. Thus, the best we can do is to 
assume that we do and produce justifications that would indicate the truth of our beliefs if 
such a relationship held. I think this argument is perfectly fine when our focus is a first 
person perspective, and justifying our beliefs from this perspective. It may well be that 
there is no way to confirm that the world and our minds are such that knowledge is 
possible, or that our justifications are what we take them to be – epistemic justifications. 
However, I have two points to make in response to this argument: (1) this seems no more 
devastating for knowledge than it is the practice of giving and accepting justifications for 
our beliefs, because the rationality of these practices depends as much as knowledge does 
                                                 
8 Timothy Williamson does this in his book Knowledge and Its Limits. He argues that knowledge is a basic 
concept, and is more fundamental than justification.  See Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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on whether or not we have reliable access to the external world, and (2) even if it were 
true that focusing on justification for epistemic questions in the first person makes sense, 
this does not undermine that from a third person perspective, knowledge is the better 
epistemic state because in order to be in this state we must actually be in a good cognitive 
relationship to the world.  
I will contrast the benefits of possessing knowledge with that of merely 
possessing true beliefs only briefly before discussing the importance of the success or 
failure of skeptical arguments. The possession of knowledge is more valuable than the 
possession of merely true belief, because the possession of knowledge implies a 
successful connection between our cognitive faculties and the world that the possession 
of true belief does not. The possession of true beliefs need not inspire confidence in our 
ability to attain further true beliefs, nor inspire confidence in our abilities to successfully 
grasp reality generally. Granted, our ability to function with true beliefs may be similar to 
that of our ability to function with knowledge, but only at a very basic level. If I wanted 
to go to the grocery store and I accidentally, but truly came to believe there is a grocery 
store on 2nd street, I may well be as successful locating and utilizing the grocery store as I 
would be if I had known there was a grocery store on 2nd street.  However, Timothy 
Williamson makes a legitimate point in his Knowledge and Its Limits when he argues that 
our beliefs that amount to knowledge are safe.9 They are beliefs that we are more likely 
to hold onto in the face of evidence to the contrary. In a similar sense, beliefs formed in a 
way that is not generally successful but only accidentally truth yielding in a case or two 
are not likely to be beliefs that inspire the kind of confidence necessary to avoid being 
                                                 
9 Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Pess, 2000), 62. 
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easily misled by evidence to the contrary. For these reasons, the possession of knowledge 
is better than the possession of true beliefs.  
It may be thought that we need not care as to whether the skeptic is right because 
the skeptic’s demands are so unreasonable that they are impossible to meet, so who cares 
if we don’t? At this point it may be worth reviewing the structure of skeptical arguments. 
Where H is some skeptical hypothesis and O is a proposition one would normally take 
herself to know, the following is a characterization of the structure of skeptical arguments 
borrowed from Keith DeRose10: 
1. I don’t know that not-H. 
2. If I don’t know that not-H, then I don’t know that O. 
      C. I don’t know that O. 
The first premise is established by our usual inability to rule out skeptical hypotheses 
based on the evidence we possess. If we recall skeptical hypotheses such as the 
hypothesis that one is currently dreaming or the hypothesis that one is a brain in a vat, 
they are hypotheses that are consistent with any sensory experience we can produce in 
favor of our ordinary beliefs about the world.  
For example, given the above structure if H is the skeptical hypothesis that S is a 
brain in a vat, and S claims to know that she has hands (O), her evidence for O is her 
sensory experience of seeing her hands. However, her sensory experience of seeing her 
hands does not rule out the possibility that she is a brain in a vat, since brains in vats also 
have sensory experiences of seeing their hands. Further, it is true that if she is a brain in a 
                                                 
10 Keith DeRose, “Introduction: Responding to Skepticism,” in Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader, ed. by 
Keith DeRose et al (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 2. 
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vat, then she fails to have hands, thus she fails to know that she has hands. So the 
reasoning goes that since S’s evidence for O is consistent with skeptical hypothesis H, S 
is unable to rule out H (premise 1), and since she is unable to rule out H, she does not 
know O.  
On the skeptic’s standards in order to count as knowing O one’s evidence must 
rule out all hypotheses incompatible with O. Yet, there are many hypotheses consistent 
with the evidence one has for O and yet incompatible with it as well, thus for any 
ordinary belief about the world we fail to count as knowing it. Another way to put it is to 
say that the skeptic operates with the following epistemic principle: if the grounds for 
one’s belief that p is evidence e, then one is not entitled to believe anything stronger than 
what e indicates. If e is consistent with a set of possibilities, then one is entitled to the 
belief that one of the set of possibilities holds (given the assumption that we inhabit a 
particular world), but not entitled to believe (at least not on the basis of e) that any one of 
the particular possibilities holds. In other words, one is entitled to believe that one of the 
possibilities is the actual one, but not entitled to infer that any given possibility is the 
actual one.  
The skeptic’s standards are so stringent that there may be the inclination to say, if 
that is what it takes to possess knowledge, then who cares if we don’t have it. The skeptic 
demands our evidence rule out every logical possibility that is incompatible with our 
belief, yet this seems overly strict. Indeed it seems that we are rarely in such an ideal 
state, and yet we manage just fine. Further, we may even have the intuition that our 
inability to rule out ridiculous logical hypotheses fails to establish an epistemic 
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deficiency in either our evidence or the rationality of our belief. While I am sympathetic 
with this line, in a way I will articulate below, I think this kind of response, as it stands, is 
misguided.  
Implicit in the above reasoning is that the skeptic operates with ridiculously 
stringent standards on knowledge, and it doesn’t matter whether or not we reach those 
high standards because we often reach slightly lower standards in the justification of 
belief, or knowledge, and we manage just fine operating at the levels we do obtain. 
However, this line seems unsuccessful because the skeptic attacks our knowledge by 
attacking our evidence for our beliefs. As such, the skeptic undermines not only our 
knowledge but the justification for our belief, and perhaps even (assuming a voluntarist 
account of belief) the rationality of our beliefs.11 If part of belief is the stance or attitude 
that the belief in question is true, then, if the skeptic is right, this stance is entirely 
unjustified. Further, it would seem to be a cognitive defect on our part that we fail to 
appreciate that our evidence fails to establish or support the particular beliefs we hold. 
Indeed, if the skeptic is right the only beliefs we might be entitled to on the basis of our 
sensory experience are disjunctive ones (either I have hands or I am in a skeptical world 
in which case I fail to have hands, etc).  
If the skeptic is right, our epistemic situation is much worse than our lacking 
knowledge, the skeptic has ultimately questioned the rationality of our beliefs. If we 
concede the skeptic’s point, and continue to maintain our ordinary beliefs, we must 
                                                 
11 In “Contextualism and the Problem of the External World,” Ram Neta argues that the skeptic raises the 
standards for evidence not the standards for knowledge.  
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follow Hume in adopting psychological and pragmatic justifications for our beliefs, but 
we must admit that there are no epistemic grounds for our beliefs. So it is not just as 
though we fail to possess knowledge if the skeptic is right. Rather, if the skeptic is right, 
we fail to possess any degree of justification for thinking that our beliefs are true.12 So, to 
conclude, it is not just knowledge that is at stake with the skeptic; rather, the rationality of 
all our epistemic practices is undermined if the skeptic is right.13  
 
1.3:  Skepticism as a distinctly epistemic issue: 
In the previous section I articulated the reasoning behind taking skepticism 
seriously.  Additionally it should be noted that I will be approaching skepticism 
specifically as an epistemic issue.  I will work within the confines of the epistemic aspect 
of skepticism.  There are a few recent responses to skepticism that are in some sense 
distinctly non-epistemic.  That is, they address the skeptical issue by addressing some 
necessary but non-epistemic assumptions on the part of the skeptic.  I think of these 
responses as rejecting the framework for skepticism that the skeptic has set up.  While I 
do not deny the possibility of such responses, I have minimal interest in addressing the 
efficacy of these responses.  The reason is that to my mind even if such a response pre-
empts the skeptical problem, thereby providing a solution, epistemic worries remain in 
                                                 
12 This needs a little qualification as it is a bit too strong as is. Our beliefs would possess a higher likelihood 
of truth than beliefs that are inconsistent with our sensory experience, they would not however possess 
any higher likelihood of truth than any other hypotheses within the set of hypotheses consistent with our 
sensory experience, i.e. our beliefs would no more likely be true than skeptical hypotheses.  It should 
also be pointed out that Bonjour gives an argument in which he attempts to show that our ordinary 
beliefs are more likely to be true than their skeptical counter-parts.  This is an argument that we will 
look at later. 
 
13 In light of these points, I am much more sympathetic to Williamson’s position that justification cannot be 
separated from knowledge, and is the more basic concept.  
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the face of such responses.  Therefore, part of taking skepticism seriously is to take 
seriously the idea that the skeptic has gotten a hold of something substantive and 
distinctly epistemic.  This is so even if her conclusion is not fully warranted. 
 Despite the above, there is a need to say more about such responses.  The two 
primary responses I have in mind here are a move to block skepticism via semantic 
externalism and an attempt to block skepticism via various positions on the nature of 
perception.   Both of the above responses have evolved many distinct forms and have 
generated distinct sub-topics in skepticism.  Since our primary concern is skepticism and 
its implications for the internalist and externalist positions in contemporary epistemology, 
I will be addressing the above responses in their most basic form.   
 Hilary Putnam initially and most persuasively argued that skepticism can be 
blocked on the basis of semantic externalism.  Putnam advanced the argument that the 
statement “I am a brain in a vat” is a self-refuting statement.14  The reason is that the 
conditions that would make such a statement true would also change the meaning of the 
statement making the statement false.  In other words, it is impossible for a brain in a vat 
to actually refer to things like brains and vats.  Putnam states that “Although people in 
that possible world (referring to brains in vats) can think and ‘say’ any words we can 
think and say, they cannot refer to what we can refer to.”  Thus there is the peculiar 
conclusion that there is no possible world in which the statement “I am a brain in a vat” 
will turn out true.  We, therefore, have the reason to reject the brain in a vat hypothesis on 
the grounds that it is necessarily false.   
                                                 
14 Hilary Putnam, “Brains in a Vat,” from Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader, ed. Keith DeRose et al 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 31-32. 
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Any actual brain in a vat cannot refer to brains and vats and therefore cannot truly 
utter that statement.  In the brain in a vat’s world the words “brains” and “vats” will refer 
to whatever usually causes the internal sensory experience associated with brains and 
vats, but in a brain in the vat world it won’t actually be brains and vats that causes 
utterances of “brains” and “vats”.  So this move rejects the problem of skepticism on 
purely semantic grounds.   
 What is interesting about this move, and the many articulations of it, is that it 
addresses skepticism without addressing what I take to be the core epistemic issues 
touched on by skepticism.  In other words the above response does nothing to assure us 
that we are not actually brains in vats, or that we are not massively deceived, or that 
knowledge is possible in the face of the possibility of massive error.  And while it may 
insure that our beliefs are (by and large) true, it does so in a superficial way.  It is 
superficial in my mind, in the sense that our beliefs may be true, and, yet, if we were 
brains in vats we would have absolutely no knowledge of the nature of what our words 
refer to, or, for that matter, would we posses any knowledge of the nature of the world we 
live in.  We would be uttering true statements but not have any genuine understanding of 
the world around us.  Such a deficiency is surely an epistemic one and signals to my mind 
that the response from semantic externalism does not respond to this core epistemic issue. 
Thus, to my mind the skeptical problem remains even in light of such an interesting 
attempted solution.   
 The second response that side-steps skepticism is a response based in a rejection 
of the skeptic’s view of perception and sensory experience.  Many skeptics seem to be 
worried over what many have called the problem of the criterion, or the problems 
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associated with such a representationalist view of perception as that seen in Locke’s 
writings.  In the Meditations Descartes goes from worrying about fairly innocuous 
instances of error such as the occasional instance in which he views an object from a 
great distance and incorrectly infers various properties of an object, to more widespread 
concerns about error, such as the possibility that he is dreaming and the possibility of an 
evil demon.   At root in these worries is the assumption that sensory experience is 
somehow detached from what it purportedly represents, thereby introducing a possibility 
of error.  If sensory experience is merely representational, then we might wonder how we 
know that it faithfully represents in the way we take it to.  
 Of course, we recognize that our beliefs are not beliefs about sense-data; rather 
they extend beyond subjective and mental sense-data to the external world.  Our beliefs 
are aimed at what we take to be mind independent objects rather than the ideas of such 
objects.  Such a view of sensory experience and perception inevitably leads to questions 
about whether or not sense-data is representational in the way we think it is.  Since there 
is no way to get outside ourselves and access the external world in a way other than 
sensory experience, we have no way to check and confirm that sensory experience 
proximally represents the world in which we live.  The evil demon scenario is one among 
countless possibilities in which sensory experience is misleading.  Since there is no way 
to confirm the reliability of sensory experience skeptics will argue that we have no 
justification for relying on it as a method of belief formation, and we, thereby, are not 
justified in beliefs that are founded in sensory experience.   In other words, we will not be 
justified in the vast majority of our ordinary beliefs about the world because they involve 
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an inferential leap from sensory input to the external world that is not epistemically 
justified.  
 If we question this approach to perception and replace it with a direct theory of 
perception in which sensation is not merely representational in its nature but is, instead, 
some kind of direct contact with objects in which the content of belief is not inferred or 
indirect, but directly contained in the sensory experience, then we have closed the gap 
between sensation and belief.  Without the gap, the skeptic does not have reason to worry 
about whether or not sensory experience does indeed represent the world.  Nor does she 
have grounds to question the inferential leaps made from sensation to beliefs about the 
world, for there are no inferential leaps.   
 Bonjour uses something like the above as a response to skepticism.  The view of 
sensation that he puts forward grounds his foundationalism with regard to sensory 
experience.  In his Epistemic Justification, he states, “Thus contrary to many recent 
critics of foundationalism, the idea that reality is in some circumstances simply given to 
the mind in a way that makes the truth of claims about it directly and unproblematically 
apparent is, after all, not a myth!”15  When seen as a response to skepticism, it seems best 
to treat this kind of response as rejecting the first premise of the skeptic’s argument; the 
premise that states “I don’t know that not-H” , where H is some skeptical hypothesis.  
The second premise of the skeptic’s argument is that if we don’t know that not-H, then 
we don’t know that O.  This premise is a distinctly epistemic one and seems to have no 
relationship to the issue of perception.  However, the skeptic establishes the first premise 
on the basis of her interpretation of our lack of evidence against H, and her claim that our 
                                                 
15 Laurence Bonjour and Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 75. 
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evidence equally favors O and H.  This is precisely what the direct perception theory 
attempts to deny.  Our evidence for O is our sensory experience, and it is somehow 
directly connected to the belief O.  Direct perception will deny that there is an inferential 
leap between the sensory experience that grounds O and the belief that O.  Further, the 
direct perception theory will maintain in some way that that the content of O is somehow 
directly apprehended in the sensory experience that grounds O.  Thus, on such a view 
there are in fact reasons to rule out H.  Such reasons will be grounded in sensory 
experience that distinctly favors the content of our ordinary belief O over its’ skeptical 
rival H.   
 While I do not want to claim to have reason to dismiss such responses with such a 
short and generic discussion of this substantive issue, I do wish to present some reasons 
for side-stepping this issue in the discussion to come.  Two things strike me about the 
above response via direct perception theory.  First, there is something that seems correct 
about the response.  The skeptic operates with and seems to get her argument going on 
assumptions about perception that may well be worth questioning.  In fact, in everyday 
life we seem to operate with a view of perception akin to direct or naïve realism that the 
above positions attempt to do justice to.  The second thing is that the sensory experience 
would have to be quite loaded in terms of cognitive content in order to fully get around 
skeptical worries about the veracity of sensory experience, and this seems problematic 
and unlikely.   There would have to be a very tight connection between the content of our 
beliefs and what is directly apprehended in sensory experience.  In fact, the connection 
would need to be so tight as to almost provide certainty in order to avoid skepticism this 
way.  If there is any gap between what is apprehended in perception and the cognitive 
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content of our ordinary beliefs about the world, then the skeptic’s argument can get 
going.16  She can again imagine that sensory experience is misleading and that we make 
inferential leaps from the experience to beliefs that are unwarranted.17  Lastly, it seems to 
 
                                                 
16 Admittedly, Bonjour notes this worry in his argument and tries to show that if the fundamental properties 
of an object are directly apprehended in experience, then that alone seems sufficient to ground a preference 
for our ordinary beliefs about the world.  This move seems plausible but it involves an assumption that 
fallible and less-than-certain evidence is sufficient.  However, his view does not articulate how or why we 
might claim to know in light of the possibility of error that persists even on his view.  This latter move is 
what is doing the bulk of the anti-skepticism work on his view, and, yet, it is not articulated explicitly nor 
defended.  To my mind, it is this latter position – the view that less than definitive evidence is fine enough 
that has to be defended on epistemic grounds if we are going to refute skepticism. 
 
17 I have Hume’s skeptical arguments in mind here in particular, because he particularly goes after those 
gaps between sense data and the content of our ordinary beliefs about the world.  Also, I want to note that I 
do not mean to assert an inferential relationship between beliefs about the world and sensory experience.  
In fact, it seems unlikely that the relationship is inferential; rather the relationship between sensory 
experience and beliefs about the world seems to be causal.  I am speaking this way though, because 
skeptics such as Hume have treated the relationship as inferential and questioned whether the inferences are 
justified.  Further, it does not seem to help any to point out that the relationship seems to be causal because 
it is difficult to see how such a causal relationship could confer justification in a way that is of interest to 
the skeptic.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 me that such a tight connection between what is apprehended or given in sensory 
experience and the content of our beliefs does not seem to fit with ordinary experience.  
We do seem, in many instances, to be wary of sensory experience.  This indicates that 
there is not such a tight relationship as would be needed to circumvent skepticism via the 
above kinds of views on perception.  
The core of the skeptical problem is the possibility of not knowing the nature of 
the external world; the possibility of being grossly in error about our environment.  This 
possibility is in itself deeply worrisome to most people and poses an epistemic problem 
because it challenges the idea that knowledge is possible in the face of such fallibility.  
While I won’t argue for this here, I will venture to say that in my mind a solution to 
skepticism needs to come in the form of explaining how knowledge is possible in the face 
of the possibility of such error and needs to explain why we are justified in assuming that 
we are not brains in vats.  What I am interested in is the fundamental epistemic worry that 
skepticism raises and possible epistemic responses to the problem.  Therefore, I will 
largely be working within the traditional epistemology framework despite the relatively 
recent appearance of solutions to skepticism that step outside that framework.  
  
 
1.4: Another look at the skeptic’s argument: 
 Skeptics establish their claims by attacking the evidence that our claims to know 
rest upon.  It is this aspect of the skeptic’s argument that makes skepticism relevant to the 
contemporary and ongoing internalism/externalism debate in epistemology.  If we go 
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back to Keith DeRose’s characterization of skeptical arguments where H is some 
skeptical hypothesis and O is an ordinary belief, then the skeptic argues that we do not 
know on the basis of our inability to rule out H.  We cannot rule out H because our 
evidence is consistent with it. Thus, according to the skeptic we have a number of 
hypotheses consistent with the evidence and no reason for preferring our ordinary beliefs 
about the world over the skeptical hypothesis H.  
 We should note that in such a situation, often the appropriate move is to suspend 
belief and wait until the evidence gives us reason to prefer one hypothesis over another.  
However, we should also note that in many such circumstances we widen our body of 
evidence to include pragmatic reasons as well as other non-epistemic factors.  One of the 
things I will argue is that the skeptic’s claim that we do not have reasons for preferring 
our ordinary beliefs over their skeptical competitors is not as strong as it initially seems. 
Further, if we take an externalist approach to knowledge, then internalist justifications no 
longer play the role of the primary grounds for knowledge.  Instead, they play a role as 
the grounds for knowledge claims. This slightly weaker epistemic role allows us to 
provide somewhat pragmatic justifications for preferring our ordinary hypotheses over 
their skeptical competitors that would not be strong enough to ground knowledge, but are 
strong enough to ground knowledge claims.  This view will be outlined in chapter 5.    
 Admittedly, the skeptic is simply right in her argument that our evidence, as 
long as it is restricted to sensory experience (and characterized in a subjective 
fashion), is perfectly consistent with any number of skeptical hypotheses.   If our 
challenge is to find the evidence that shows we are not brains in vats, then the skeptic 
has set forth an impossible task that cannot be fulfilled. Rather than look for evidence 
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that justifies us in preferring our ordinary beliefs about the world, we will look at 
various reasons we might have for preferring our ordinary beliefs about the world 
over skeptical hypotheses.   
Arguments for skepticism that occur from deductive closure seem, to my 
mind, to involve the issue of evidence.  Briefly summarized, skepticism based on 
deductive closure may be characterized as Stine did in her work on skepticism and 
closure, “The skeptical argument goes: If you know it is a zebra, and you know that it 
being a zebra entails it's not a painted mule, then you know it is not a mule painted to 
look like a zebra.  But you do not know the last, so you do not know the first- i.e., you 
do not know it is a zebra.” 18  While there are unique issues revolving around closure 
and skepticism, the skeptical argument based on closure still rests on a claim about 
evidence.  When the skeptic argues that we fail to know that the zebra is not a 
cleverly disguised mule, she is making that claim that we do not have any evidence 
for that belief.  The kind of evidence we have for the belief that x is a zebra usually 
does not involve the kind of evidence one would have for the belief that x is not a 
cleverly disguised mule.   
 
 
1.5: Outline of remaining chapters: 
 In the remaining chapters I will argue that we can justify an assumption that 
sensory experience is reliable without appeal to an overly technical argument.  Everyday 
knowers assume that sensory experience is reliable and I will argue that such an 
                                                 
18 Gail Stine, “Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure,” from Skepticism: A 
Contemporary Reader, ed. Keith DeRose et al (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).  
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assumption is epistemically rational because it is truth-conducive in important ways.  The 
assumption that sensory experience is generally reliable, later referred to as AR, is 
rational in the sense that it is epistemically sensible in light of all of the information we 
have available to us.  Yet, this is not to claim that we have epistemic justification for AR.  
Epistemic justification would amount to reasons or evidence that counts toward the truth 
of AR.    
If we can show that the endorsement of AR need only be rational, then it is 
possible to highlight an anti-skeptical position that concedes to the skeptic that we fail to 
possess something as strong as epistemic justification in favor of AR while at the same 
time maintaining that our knowledge claims are justified.   The argument that rationality 
is the appropriate requirement will rest on the notion that AR functions more like a 
presupposition than an explicit premise in the defense of our knowledge claims.  Thus, I 
will conclude that since AR is not directly justification-conferring, it is only necessary 
that our endorsement of AR be rational.  The notion of rationality here is such that it 
allows pragmatic and value oriented reasons to count as justification, whereas epistemic 
justification has traditionally been that kind of justification that necessarily speaks to the 
actual truth of the claim involved.  Additionally, the requirement of rationality is weaker 
than that of epistemic justification.  Epistemic justification requires reasons or evidence 
that speaks to the truth of the claim involved.  Alternately rationality, while allowing for 
other kinds of justification, only requires that there be no evidence or reasons against the 
claim involved.  Establishing the claim that an agent’s reliance upon her sensory 
experience and her rejection of skeptical hypotheses need only be rational is the first step 
in an anti-skeptical position that admits the philosophical strength of skeptical arguments 
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while maintaining that the epistemic practices of everyday knowers are nonetheless 
epistemically justified.   
The above somewhat subtle position seems most promising against the various 
realities that a truly coherent anti-skeptical position seems to face.  Thus, I begin this 
discussion admitting that skeptics seem to be right about the fact that we fail to have 
compelling epistemic justification for our wholesale endorsement of sensory experience.  
They also seem to be right that if we had epistemic justification for our assumption about 
the reliability of the senses in general, then we would have epistemic evidence that 
excludes skeptical hypotheses.  Of course, notoriously, we are unable to produce such 
evidence to silence the skeptic once and for all.  The challenge of facing skepticism 
despite these admissions is the challenge of trying to make a fallibilist position about 
knowledge coherent despite a long tradition against fallibilism about knowledge.   
I will begin by asking how it is possible that we might be justified in our external 
world knowledge claims while at the same time admitting that skeptical hypotheses may 
in fact be actual.  Let me clarify that we are not aiming to defend the very counter-
intuitive claim that it makes sense for one to say in one breath I know that I have hands, 
while in the next admitting that it may be true that I am a brain in a vat.  Rather, we are 
seeking to find reasons to dismiss skeptical hypotheses that do not rest upon having 
evidence or reasons for thinking they are false; such evidence would amount to epistemic 
justification that defends our reliance on sensory experience.  Instead, we want reasons to 
reject skeptical hypotheses that are sound, yet, do not ground knowledge claims about 
their falsity.  The end of our argument will not be that we know that skeptical hypotheses 
are false.  Rather, the end of our argument will be that we have good reasons for relying 
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on sensory experience whether or not skeptical hypotheses are true.  Such reasons, 
admittedly, do not amount to epistemic justification.  But if our assumptions about 
sensory experience are not justification conferring, it is not clear that the skeptic has any 
reason to require epistemic justification.  Indeed, it does not seem that we operate with 
such standards in everyday life with regard to assumptions that are not directly 
justification conferring.   
 After articulating why rationality seems the more appropriate standard for AR, 
then we will look at whether or not we meet this standard.  Namely, it must be shown that 
we are in fact rational to rely on sensory experience in a general sense.  If we are rational 
to endorse sensory experience in general, this will imply that we are rational to ignore 
skeptical hypotheses.  Thus, this aspect of our argument will focus on grounding the 
claim that the everyday practice of treating skeptical hypotheses as irrelevant is in fact a 
justified and sound epistemic practice.  Again even if we are rational to ignore skeptical 
hypotheses, it will not follow that we know they are false.  Rather, it will simply follow 
that we are rational to ignore them unless and until there is epistemic justification that 
indicates such a hypothesis is in fact likely.   Thus, if it were to turn out that at some point 
we stumble upon evidence that directly indicates that we are in fact brains in vats, that it 
is no longer a mere possibility, then we would no longer be rational to ignore such a 
hypothesis.   
 In the next chapter, we will look at Laurence Bonjour’s and Duncan Pritchard’s 
work, as well as others, to give a sense of the specific way in which we are approaching 
the skeptical problem.  This approach will involve focusing on the subjective questions 
that skepticism raises: questions such as, am I rational to rely on sensory experience, are 
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any of us ever justified in claiming knowledge of the external world, etc.  Our brief 
discussion of Pritchard’s work should lend some clarity as to why the focus of our 
discussion will be knowledge ascriptions when the skeptic thinks of herself as attacking 
knowledge rather than merely attacking claims to know.   
 The next step will be to outline in more detail the ways in which we might defend 
mere rationality as the appropriate standard regarding our reliance on sensory experience.  
The rationality criterion is to be defended against the skeptic’s more traditional 
requirement that in order to be justified in our knowledge claims we must possess 
epistemic justification for our reliance on sensory experience. 
 After defending the notion that rationality is sufficient in order for us to count as 
justified in our claims to know things about the external world, we will explore the idea 
that we are in fact rational to rely on sensory experience.  Since it is admitted that we do 
not have epistemic reasons to rule out skeptical hypotheses, this claim may be formulated 
as the claim that we are rational to ignore skeptical hypotheses even though it is logically 
possible that they are true.  We will perform a thought experiment formulated initially by 
Henderson and Horgan in order to show that we are rational to rely on sensory experience 
even though we do not definitively know that sensory experience is in fact reliable.  Prior 
to the thought experiment, we will look at the pursuit of truth in the context of everyday 
life in order to begin to articulate the sense in which we are rational to rely on sensory 
experience even though we do not know from our first person perspective which world is 
actual.   
It has been said of the skepticism debate that one man’s modus ponens is 
another’s modus tollens, or that skeptics embody the pessimist’s position, and non-
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skeptics, the optimist’s point of view.  There is a sense in which the discussion to follow 
will acknowledge in some ways a kind of stalemate with the skeptic.  Rather than pursue 
a traditional solution to skepticism that involves showing some way in which our 
ordinary beliefs are more likely to be true than skeptical alternatives, I am aiming 
specifically to undermine the skeptical challenge that our endorsement of sensory 
experience is irrational.   
A concern of irrationality arises in the face of skepticism if we reason in the 
following way: beliefs maintained on sufficient epistemic grounding are rational, and 
those maintained in light of an awareness of insufficient grounds are irrational.   Next, 
the skeptic might argue that given her skeptical argument, we have been made aware of 
how our external world beliefs are insufficiently grounded.  Our claims are, according to 
her, insufficiently grounded because the assumption upon which they rest, the assumption 
that sensory experience is generally reliable and that we are not brains in vats, has not a 
shred of epistemic evidence in its favor.  Thus, she might argue that our knowledge 
claims are not sufficiently grounded and that we ought to abandon such claims.  She 
might argue further that if we do not abandon such knowledge claims in light of their 
poor epistemic standing, then we are irrational believers.   
To summarize I aim to highlight an anti-skeptical position that concedes to the 
skeptic that we fail to possess epistemic justification for our reliance on sensory 
experience as opposed to her skeptical hypotheses.  This reliance is tantamount to 
operating with the assumption that we are not brains in vats and that we in fact exist in a 
normal world.  The skeptical challenge, as conceived here, is to understand how we 
might be justified in operating as though we live in a normal world while acknowledging 
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that skeptical hypotheses might be true.  This is not to say that I aim to defend the idea 
that knowledge claims are consistent with such an admission.  Rather, I aim to articulate 
how we might be justified in rejecting and ignoring skeptical hypotheses on grounds that 
do not amount to showing they are less likely to be true than their non-skeptical counter-
parts. 
The second part of the strategy highlighted above is to show that we are in fact 
rational to endorse sensory experience.  In other words, we are rational to behave as 
though we are in a normal world even though we might in fact be brains in vats.  It will 
be argued that we are rational to behave in such a way in the sense that doing so allows 
us more and better epistemic goods than to behave in a skeptical fashion.  Thus, the aim 
of this argument is to defend the optimist against the pessimist’s claim that she is 
irrational when she thinks she knows such basic things as that she has hands, or that there 
are trees in her front yard, or that she sees a cat in her living room, etc.   
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Cartesian Skepticism as Moral Dilemma 
 
“Skepticism and Epistemic Perspectives” 
 
 
Chapter 2.1: Laurence Bonjour and Epistemic Perspectives: 
In Epistemic Justification, Laurence Bonjour argues in favor of internalist 
foundationalism as the center of his anti-skeptical position.19  He favors an account of 
justification in which justifiers must be accessible via introspection, and argues justifiers 
grounded in sensory experience play a foundational role.  The foundational nature of 
perceptual experience stems for Bonjour from the direct and unmediated role that 
perceptual experience plays with regard to external world beliefs.  While the bulk of 
those arguments do not interest us here, some of what he develops regarding the notion of 
epistemic perspectives is of interest here.  In this chapter, we will explore and build upon 
Bonjour’s notion of epistemic perspectives and take a look at what he took to be the 
relationship between the first person perspective and skepticism.  We will be interested in 
Bonjour’s distinction between first and third person perspectives to both illustrate what 
aspect of the skeptical argument is of import here, and to highlight how many everyday 
epistemic practices differ from those found in the philosophy classroom.  The distinctions 
between the two contexts reach beyond the mere play of pragmatic versus epistemic 
concerns.  It will be argued that the context of everyday life yields epistemic concerns 
distinct from those that may be found in more philosophical contexts.  The distinctions 
between these two contexts are not precise, or without overlap, but they are significant 
enough to play a role in justifying the practices of everyday knowers.   
                                                 
19 See Bonjour and Sosa, Epistemic Justification,1.   
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For our purposes here, we are interested in Bonjour’s idea of first person versus 
third person perspectives on epistemic issues.  The distinction between these perspectives 
stems from the nature of epistemic inquiry in each.  In the first person perspective what 
concerns us in epistemic inquiry is the de facto status of our beliefs.  Thus, I might be 
worried about whether or not my external world beliefs are truly justified, or may worry 
as to whether our external world beliefs are justified.  In contrast, the third person 
perspective generally involves concerns about the nature of justification in general, or the 
nature of knowledge in general.  The third person approaches questions of knowledge and 
justification from the perspective of an outsider looking in.  Bonjour characterizes the 
first person perspective in epistemology and its’ relationship to skepticism as follows: 
In contrast, the internalist approach becomes essential, I suggest, when the 
issue is, not the third-person question of whether someone else’s beliefs 
are true or reliably arrived at, but instead the first-person (singular or 
plural) question about the truth (or reliability) of my own or our own 
beliefs, especially the relatively global version of this question in which it 
is all of a person’s beliefs that are in question.  In relation to this global 
question, no externalist approach is available to the person or persons in 
question without begging the very question at issue (though some other 
person or persons could, of course, conduct such an investigation from the 
outside).20 
 
As we see here, Bonjour characterizes the first person as the stance we take when we are 
concerned about determining the status of our beliefs.21  Thus, we might anticipate that 
the first person perspective relies heavily on justifications available to us via 
introspection.  Additionally, we might anticipate the first person perspective to involve 
                                                 
20 See Bonjour and Sosa, Epistemic Justification, 37. 
 
21 It should be noted that others have made very similar distinctions.  Richard Foley talks about what he 
calls an “ego-centric” rationality, and as mentioned in the last section of this chapter, Audi talks about the 
process of justifying versus the state of being justified.  These distinctions are very similar to Bonjour’s 
notion of first and third person justifications.   
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many norms governing belief formation and justification.   This is likely due to the fact 
that the first person perspective is the perspective we take when we are judging our 
beliefs and the beliefs of others and attempting to determine which beliefs are justified, 
and amount to knowledge, and which beliefs do not. 
A third person perspective, on the other hand, approaches knowledge and 
justification from the perspective of an outsider.  Thus, we might anticipate a third person 
perspective to focus largely on the following kinds of questions: what does it take for an 
agent to possess knowledge, what makes a belief (in general) justified, and what kinds of 
methods of belief formation are reliable?  When we are in the perspective of an outsider, 
we can set the criteria for justified belief and the possession of knowledge, without 
addressing or answering questions about the de facto status of our own beliefs.  
  A third person perspective, according to Bonjour, involves “employing the 
various methods from the outside and assessing their success from that perspective”.22  
So a third person approach to knowledge would look at the various methods used in 
belief formation and assess which methods are most successful.  Consequently such an 
approach to knowledge will involve criteria for the possession of knowledge that are 
likely to be external to the agents’ conscious or reflective awareness.   For example, from 
the perspective of an outsider it might seem plausible to suggest that if our sensory 
experience is in fact reliable, if we are hooked up in the right way to our world, then we 
often gain knowledge from our sensory experience.  However, it is a very different and 
much more difficult question to figure whether or not my sensory experience is actually 
reliable. 
                                                 
22 See Bonjour and Sosa, Epistemic Justification, 37. 
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 Because the first person perspective involves asking questions about our own 
beliefs, answering questions in this perspective will often involve an appeal to what is 
available to us via introspection. Therefore, Bonjour argues, internalist approaches to 
justification are relevant when our concerns are in the first person, and an externalist 
approach to justification is helpful when our questions are formed in a third-person way.  
However, it seems plausible that the internalist is posed to answer the general questions 
of the third person perspective as much as the externalist.  It is less clear that an 
externalist account is helpful when we want to know whether or not we in fact possess 
knowledge, i.e. we seek to know whether or not we know.  Such high order beliefs 
involve a reflective process, and require transparency of the epistemic status of our 
beliefs in a way that is likely involve distinctly internalist type justifications. 
 Before going on, it is worth taking another look at the issue of whether or not the 
first person maps onto an internalist approach to justification, and how well the third 
person perspective maps onto externalism.  While it seems true that these two 
perspectives fit the internalism/externalism distinction, we should note that it is not a 
perfect fit.  For example, it seems possible, if not likely, that we may be concerned in the 
first person, for example, about evidence that is not immediately available to us via 
introspection, and, therefore, requires some investigation.  Such instances may undermine 
the sense that the first person perspective always takes an internalist approach to 
justification.  For these reasons, I will largely avoid claiming that the first person 
perspective maps onto internalist type justifications.  Instead, it seems important to follow 
Bonjour here and stick with the weaker claim that the first person perspective lends itself 
40 
 
to an internalist approach to justification, and avoid thinking of this relationship as 
stronger than that.  
It seems the same can be said for trying to map the third person perspective onto 
the notion of an externalist approach to justification.   However, perhaps this should not 
surprise us.  These perspectives, while distinct epistemic concerns, and distinct 
approaches to the questions of justification and knowledge, are not entirely separate.  It 
seems somewhat obvious that we move between these perspectives and can bear in mind 
concerns and interests from one perspective when we are in the other. 
 Such a blurring between these perspectives seems to raise the question of whether 
or not the distinction between these perspectives holds clearly enough to be of interest.  
My own sense is that interest in the distinction between these epistemic perspectives lies 
in the explanatory power of the distinction, and less in the notion that these perspectives 
are perfectly clear and distinct.   The distinction allows for an explanation of the role and 
importance of both internalist and externalist approaches to justification.  As Bonjour 
argues, both perspectives are important and each lends itself better to either an internal or 
external approach to justification.  Building upon Bonjour’s notion of epistemic 
perspectives, we may also see a way to explain such “epistemic phenomena” as 
Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions, and epistemic issues with deductive closure.  And, as I 
will attempt in the following chapters, to use this notion of epistemic perspectives to 
explain why the skeptic goes awry by arguing that some alternatives are not relevant.  
Prior to moving on to these arguments though, let us return to developing the notion of 
epistemic perspectives as articulated by Bonjour. 
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 Bonjour argues that an internalist approach is essential in addressing the primary 
concern stemming from skepticism about the status of our beliefs.  Such an internalist 
approach is required because an externalist approach in this instance will inevitably beg 
the question.  Since a third person approach involves looking at belief formation and 
justification from the outside, such assessment over the success of an agent in forming 
beliefs will involve the very methods at question in skeptical arguments.  In other words, 
any third person assessment of the reliability of the senses will involve the senses 
themselves.  Therefore, Bonjour argues, the third person perspective is of limited use to 
us if we are concerned with skepticism as it pertains to the issue of the status of our own 
beliefs about the world.   
Of course, we will note that a third person approach to skepticism can be of 
tremendous help, as many externalists have argued, if our concern in skepticism is to 
block the skeptic’s anti-knowledge conclusion.23  Such a third person approach to 
skepticism may allow us to block the skeptic’s conclusion by arguing that one need not 
possess a reason for thinking that the senses are reliable in order to have knowledge via 
sensory experience.  Such a move is clearly grounded in a third person perspective 
because it involves spelling out conditions for the possession of knowledge versus 
claiming any particular beliefs do in fact amount to knowledge.  Since we might see the 
skeptic’s argument as formulated on the grounds that we need a reason to think that 
sensory experience is reliable in order to have a justification for preferring our ordinary 
beliefs over their skeptical counter-parts, we may avoid skepticism by taking such an 
externalist approach to justification and knowledge.  Yet, we might note along with 
                                                 
23 For an example of such externalist type moves, see Ernest Sosa’s argument in Epistemic Justification, 
John Greco’s Putting Skeptics in their Place, as well as Timothy Williams’ Knowledge and Justification, 
and Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Luck. 
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Bonjour, that such a response really does not do much to squelch the worry we might 
develop about the status of our own beliefs in light of skepticism.   
The externalist response to skepticism gives us a conditional solution to 
skepticism.  If our sensory experience is reliable, then our true beliefs formed on the basis 
of sensory experience likely amount to knowledge.  Yet, we cannot confirm in a non-
circular, non question-begging way, whether or not our senses are in fact reliable. Nor 
does the externalist articulate reasons that would justify our reliance on sensory 
experience.  As the skeptic notes, we have no non-question begging reason to think 
sensory experience is reliable in general.  Thus, solutions to skepticism grounded in such 
third person moves as those outlined above, may well leave us with worries and concerns 
revolving around the first person question about the status of our beliefs.  Following 
Bonjour, we will focus on this distinctly first person worry about the status of our beliefs.   
To summarize, it is highly likely that any third person or externalist attempts to 
show the reliability of the senses is likely to involve sensory experience itself.  A third 
person approach might be able to stipulate that knowledge is attained when reliable 
methods are used, yet it cannot show which methods are in fact reliable without using the 
very methods in question.   
 So, along with Bonjour, we might conclude that an externalist approach to 
skepticism is of some help from the fact that externalists do not require agents to possess 
an internalist justification for their beliefs.  Thus, we might expect the following from an 
externalist approach to skepticism: if sensory experience is in fact reliable, then we 
possess knowledge of the external world whether or not we have any justification for 
thinking that sensory experience is reliable.  Such an answer might seem to offer some 
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relief in the sense that we no longer need to find some evidence that favors our beliefs 
about the world over skeptical hypotheses.  Such has often been thought to be the crux of 
skepticism.  However, Bonjour rightly concludes that such an account does not offer us 
non-question begging reasons for thinking sensory experience is in fact reliable, nor does 
it seem able, in principle, to do so. Bonjour claims that one of the primary epistemic 
concerns stemming from skepticism is the first-person question of whether or not my 
beliefs are justified.  This concern is distinct from the question of what it takes to possess 
knowledge or have justified beliefs – I want to know whether or not I possess knowledge 
or whether or not my beliefs are justified.  To answer that question, I must look to the 
reasons I have for my beliefs.   
  Bonjour and others who have argued similarly seem to be right about this issue.  
Even if an Externalist approach to knowledge addresses some of the skeptical problem 
and seems to win the day as an approach to knowledge, there are deep epistemic issues in 
skepticism that remain in light of such purported solutions. I will look at this issue a little 
further in chapter 3, however, for now, we can see the reasons for approaching skepticism 
in this more first-person fashion.  Thus, it is the first person question of whether or not 
our beliefs about the external world are justified that we will focus on in the discussion 
that follows.   
 
2.2 Epistemic Perspectives and Skepticism 
 Let’s turn now to the issue of diagnosing skepticism.  We should remember that I 
have chosen to focus on the under-determination characterization of skepticism.  I have 
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focused on this characterization of skepticism because it seems to be the core of 
skepticism and it is the most pernicious version of skepticism.   
 On this characterization of skepticism, the skeptic argues that our ordinary beliefs 
about the world do not amount to knowledge because we lack evidence that favors our 
ordinary beliefs over other various skeptical hypotheses.  Since we have no reason for 
preferring our ordinary beliefs over skeptical hypotheses, we fail to have sufficient 
evidence and fail to count as knowing.  Alternately, you might give a slightly different 
version in which a skeptic argues that we fail to count as knowing our ordinary beliefs 
because we fail to possess any (non-question begging) evidence that our sensory 
experience is reliable.   
 What I will argue is that the skeptic is pointing to a more significant and general 
epistemic problem.  If we keep in mind Bonjour’s distinction of the first and third person 
I think we can assess external world skepticism as a version of a more general epistemic 
issue.  The more general epistemic issue is the gap between first person, internalist type 
justifications and externalist requirements for knowledge.  Such a gap has long been 
recognized.  Indeed, philosophers have addressed this issue in the form of articulating 
how knowledge is possible in the face of our intrinsic fallibility, the fallibility of the 
evidence upon which we base our beliefs, and the problem of the criterion.   
Alternately, philosophers have wrestled this issue in the problem of Gettier -type 
examples.  In such examples an agent possesses a belief that is both justified and true and 
yet fails to count as knowledge because, unbeknown to the agent, their evidence does not 
connect up to the truth in the right way. A well worn example is of an agent who looks at 
the clock in her office and notes that it says 4 o’clock, and she forms the belief on that 
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basis that it is 4 o’clock.  As it turns out, unbeknownst to the agent, the clock has a dead 
battery and is not working.  It also turns out that her belief is true – it just so happens to 
be 4 o’clock.  The intuition in such an example is that her belief was justified and it was 
true, but she did not possess knowledge because of the accidental nature of the 
connection between her justification and her belief being true.  It turns out that we tend to 
think that justification must be connected to truth in such a way that excludes knowledge 
as the result of a lucky guess. 
Indeed, we can see Gettier cases as showing that the gap between justification and 
truth is greater and more epistemically problematic than previously thought; so much so 
that the traditional account of knowledge as justified true belief seems insufficient.  I will 
argue that the best way to understand skepticism is fitting into this larger epistemic issue.  
My aim is to attempt to articulate this issue in a clear way and to address what it might 
look like to attempt to solve this issue.24  In the context of first person justifications, 
Gettier concerns and skeptical worries in general are prevalent and pernicious.  As 
suggested though, this ought not to count against internalist type justification, since it 
plays such a pivotal role in our first person epistemic endeavors.  Regardless of whether 
or not one might embrace externalism as an account of knowledge, it remains that we are 
interested in assessing the actual epistemic status of our beliefs.  And we only have what 
is available to us via introspection to make such judgments.   
Before moving on, let’s spend a moment talking about the first-person perspective 
and skepticism.  One very pertinent way to see skepticism involves looking at it as a 
                                                 
24 Additionally, though I don’t want to argue for this, it is my sense that epistemologists have addressed this 
issue in a fragmented and insufficient way – in the sense that this epistemic problem has not been spelled 
out or brought to the surface in a way that allows it to be addressed head on.   
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challenge posed to our beliefs and our evidence by an imagined “skeptic”.  This way of 
thinking of skepticism makes the challenge that the skeptic puts forward against our 
beliefs very immediate and personal.  The challenge put forward by the skeptic is one 
against our own beliefs.  Thus skepticism seems, for many, to cause a first-person worry 
about the status of one’s own beliefs.   If we unpack this worry a bit, we feel a charge of 
irrationalism leveled against us by the skeptic.  According to her, we believe without 
sufficient grounds for believing.  We buy into the reliability of the senses without any 
evidence that epistemically justifies such faith.  This latent charge of irrationality 
embodied in the skeptic’s argument is the focus of the discussion to come.   
 Characterized in this way, we can understand why skepticism has lured so many 
thinkers to engage this particular paradox about knowledge.   Additionally, it seems right 
to think that this first person worry is one of the most potent worries arising from 
skepticism.    
 What I would like to suggest here and spell out in more detail later, is that 
skepticism actually arises out of our ability to shift from the first to the third person 
perspective combined with the fact of fallibility for first person evidence and reasons.  In 
chapter 4 I will attempt to fill in some of the detail of this view.  For now though I would 
like to look at how we might characterize skepticism as rising out of shifting epistemic 
perspectives and fallibility.  Admittedly though such a conception is rather vague and 
general and I will ultimately only be able to outline such a view.  However, since it seems 
to my mind to be a part of the larger picture in defending a fallibilist view of knowledge, 
it seems worth hinting at or bearing in mind even if working out the details is beyond the 
scope of this work.  The bulk of the argument here is that the assumption that we are 
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agents in a normal world and that sensory experience is reliable need only be a rational 
assumption.  The second portion of the primary argument is that assuming the reliability 
of the senses is in fact rational.  However, we might bear in mind that part of the 
argument that rationality is the appropriate requirement will implicitly involve the notion 
that first person justifications are limited in the sense that they do not definitively connect 
us with truth.  Since they do not so connect to truth, it seems appropriate that the primary 
assumptions involved in first-person justifications need only be rational.   
 In order to see how skepticism might arise as a result of shifting perspectives we 
might consider how an imagined skeptic might come to worry about skepticism, and how 
ordinary believers might also come to see skeptical worries.  First though let us state the 
view briefly.  In a third person way, when we look from the perspective of an outsider at 
what it takes to know, we feel that justification is connected to truth.  It must be that 
justifiers indicate the truth.  It is this connection between the justifier and truth that 
prevents a lucky guess from counting as knowledge.  Thus, our JTB understanding of 
knowledge has always implicitly endorsed the view that the justification must be 
connected to the truth of the belief.  Similarly, in a good argument, the truth of the 
premises must support the truth of the conclusion; they must have the right relationship to 
one another.  However, when we move into our first person perspective, what we have 
access to via introspection is not sufficiently connected to truth, as the skeptic is happy to 
point out.  The skeptical challenge is really a challenge about resolving the standards for 
knowledge set from the perspective of an outsider with what we actually have available 
to us through introspection.  If we are to solve the skeptical challenge we must conceive 
of what we have access to in the first person as consistent with the possession of 
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knowledge.  This challenge is likely a challenge of conceiving of fallible knowledge at 
the theoretical, third person, level.   What the skeptic does is take her conception of what 
it takes to know from the perspective of an outsider and concludes that we do not meet 
those criteria in the first person – that is, we fail to meet the standards of adequate 
justification.  However, it is possible to do the opposite.  Rather than take the standards 
set from the third person as definitive, we might begin with our first person intuition that 
we do in fact know many things about the external world, and ask ourselves what must be 
changed about our theoretical conception of knowledge in order for what we possess in 
the first person to count as adequate in the third person perspective.         
 Prior to moving on, we should note that characterizing skepticism as an epistemic 
worry or crisis that results from shifting epistemic perspectives allows us to explain why 
skepticism seems to be so difficult to maintain as a positive belief system in the course of 
everyday life.  If skepticism really results from looking at knowledge in a third person 
way and then applying that to our first person perspective, we should expect skepticism 
to be difficult to maintain or practice in the first person.  So the skeptic is a skeptic when 
looking at her beliefs about the world from a third person point of view but she struggles 
to maintain her skepticism when she shifts more firmly into her first person point of view 
(in which she is again processing the information at hand).  She quits viewing sensory 
experience with suspicion as soon as she shifts back into a first person perspective and 
goes about her daily life.  It is only the perspective of an outsider that tells her she is not 
warranted in relying on sensory experience, yet her first person drive continues to be that 
of pursuing truth and a strong sense that sensory experience is the only avenue for doing 
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such.  Such conflict is more than psychologically interesting; it is philosophically 
interesting as well.   
 
2.3: Nagel’s View From Nowhere: 
 Nagel’s conception of moving perspectives, and characterizing this move towards 
objectivity as a matter of taking “up a new, comprehensive viewpoint after stepping back 
and including our former perspective in what is to be understood” may be helpful to us 
here.25    In theoretical reasoning, as we shift from a more self-focused perspective to one 
that incorporates ourselves as components but is neutral in the sense that it does not 
represent any one person’s point of view, we may form a new set of beliefs.  Bonjour’s 
concept of epistemic perspectives is part of a larger aspect of reasoning in general.  When 
we talk about the third person perspective in epistemology I think it may be helpful to 
have in mind Nagel’s idea of a neutral or objective viewpoint.  On the other hand, the 
first person perspective represents a given agent’s particular epistemic viewpoint. 
 One way to think about Bonjour’s claims is that we have distinct epistemic 
perspectives, and that these distinct perspectives result in different conceptions of 
justification.  The resulting aspects of justification will, roughly, match the internalist and 
externalist approaches to knowledge.  While Bonjour’s primary concern is to see how 
skepticism is primarily a first person concern and, thus, is best handled by an internalist 
approach to justification, my interests lie in the epistemic relevance of these differing 
                                                 
25 Thomas Nagel, “Value: The View from Nowhere, ” in Ethical Theory, ed. Louis Pojman (Wadsworth 
publishing 2007), 169.   
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perspectives and how these different perspectives might play a role in generating the 
global skeptical worry exhibited in skepticism.   
 What we might glean from Nagel is the sense that this third person and objective 
viewpoint is distinctly more theoretical than our subjective viewpoints.  That is, the 
objective viewpoint more readily allows for systematic knowledge.  For the purpose of 
our discussion to come I find Nagel’s view of objective viewpoints and theoretical 
knowledge interesting because we may want to make an association between first person 
epistemic practices and everyday life, and third person practices and philosophical 
endeavors.  
 It need not be the case that the first person coincides perfectly with our everyday 
epistemic practices while third person questions coincide with the distinctly more 
philosophical.  However, what I would like to suggest, in part, in the chapters to come is 
that skepticism is easier to accept in the third person and more philosophical contexts 
than it is in everyday life.  This is so because the theoretical implications of skepticism 
are less immediate and less concrete than the first person implications.  Thus, making it 
significantly easier to be a skeptic in the Philosophy classroom than it is as a pedestrian 
on the street.   
The above claim is not as unusual as it might initially seem; both Descartes and 
Hume admitted as much in their skeptical writings.  However, both attributed the 
difficulty of maintaining the skeptical attitude to psychological or instinctual influences 
rather than to legitimate epistemic ones.  Thus, one of the projects of this paper is to 
outline a sense in which the difficulty in maintaining skepticism as a coherent practice 
lies in legitimate epistemic concerns rather than the merely psychological.   
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We might see this particular issue as the challenge to explain a certain bit of data.  
That bit of data is the overwhelming fact that there are very few practicing skeptics in the 
world.  Many are non-skeptical in the sense that they operate on a day to day basis with 
the assumption that sensory experience is in fact reliable.  As we well know, the skeptic 
feels this assumption is not warranted.  The skeptical explanation for the lack of 
practicing skeptics is that we are psychologically compelled to believe in sensory 
experience, or that we are simply not critical enough in our assumptions.  Whatever the 
explanation the skeptic might opt for, her explanation involves a denial of legitimate 
epistemic reasons for embracing sensory experience.  In the discussion to follow I would 
like to suggest that the skeptic is mistaken when she leaps from the fact that we have no 
epistemic justification for relying on sensory experience to the conclusion that there are 
no epistemic reasons for relying on sensory experience.   
As part of the argument to follow, I will argue that there are concerns both 
epistemic and pragmatic that are unique to the first person perspective.  Since I will 
generally assume that it is safe to contend that this is the primary perspective we take in 
everyday life it will turn out on my view that skepticism is epistemically more difficult to 
embrace in everyday life than it is to embrace in the philosophy classroom.  Thus, unlike 
Descartes and Hume my sense is that the difficulty with maintaining one’s skeptical 
position after the philosophizing is done is that there are important epistemic distinctions 
between the two contexts.  These distinctions are such that even those who might be 
sympathetic to skepticism in the philosophy classroom will find it an unwise position in 
the course of everyday life.   
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2.4: Audi and the Structure of Justification: 
In his “Justification, Truth, and Reliability” Robert Audi talks about two quite 
different strands of justification.  He characterizes these distinct strands of justification as 
deontological and ontological, or as the process of justifying versus the property of 
justified.   
In this paper, Audi argues that it is important in epistemology that a theory 
illuminates the relationship between justification and truth; that it illuminates the 
relationship between the property justified and the process of justifying.   Looking at 
Audi’s view in more detail, he argues that an ontological approach to justification will 
involve the claim that “when something justifies a belief, then, in a suitable range of 
relevantly similar possible worlds, notably worlds like ours where the same sorts of 
things is believed on the same sort of basis, this belief is true”.26   In distinction, the 
teleological view of justification involves tying “justification to seeking truth and makes 
the practice of justification, above all the giving of justifications, fundamental in the 
connection between concepts of justification and truth”.27 
Roughly, we can say that these two aspects of justification will mirror the 
internalist and externalist distinctions in approaching justification and knowledge.  At 
least in the under-determination version of skepticism, the skeptic seems to approach 
justification from the teleological perspective.  Challenging others to provide evidence 
for their ordinary beliefs over skeptical hypotheses, the skeptic asks others to go through 
                                                 
26 Robert Audi, “Justification, Truth and Reliability” in The Structure of Justification, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1993). 
27 See Audi, “Justification Truth and Reliability”, 301. 
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the process of justifying their beliefs, and, when they are unable to do so, she concludes 
that they fail to possess knowledge.   
Audi contends that epistemologists have failed to take into account the 
relationship between the property of justification and the process of justifying.  He talks 
about a need to articulate further the relationship between truth and justification.   Audi 
proceeds to propose a number of principles for prima facie justification for different 
belief forming processes (e.g. perception, memory, etc.).   
What is interesting for our purposes is that while Audi’s distinctions and positions 
are similar to the view being developed here, I am more inclined, perhaps along with 
Bonjour, to see these two strands of justification as stemming from different epistemic 
perspectives.  In Audi’s language, I am exploring the idea that not only do we need to 
further explore the relationship between justification and truth, we need to further explore 
what epistemic obligations we may have in light of these different ways of thinking about 
and approaching justification.  Skepticism exemplifies instances of shifting epistemic 
perspectives and the myriad ways in which core epistemic issues actually arise from 
shifting epistemic perspectives.   
In the context of skepticism, it seems that the skeptic begins by focusing on 
justifying ordinary beliefs and shifts to an objective perspective in which she asks herself 
about justification as a property, as it relates to truth, and in that perspective she notes 
that the evidence that serves as justification for our ordinary beliefs fails to imply truth 
(she notes this via the consistency of our sensory experience with being a brain in a vat, 
for example).  While I do not want to contend that the skeptic’s shifting perspectives is 
necessarily problematic, I do think it raises the general and very deep epistemic question 
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about the connection between justification and truth.  Further, it raises deep epistemic 
questions about shifting perspectives in general and what potential epistemic issues that 
may arise from shifting perspectives.  Prior to looking at a solution to skepticism, we may 
note the way in which I acknowledge skepticism as raising important and deep questions 
in epistemology.  The skeptic is asking precisely the questions Audi thinks are the 
deepest in epistemology; she challenges the connection between our justifications that 
serve in our processes of justifying with truth.   
Skepticism raises the very deep epistemic question about how we are to handle 
justification in the first person perspective in light of the fact that we can see that 
justification fails to imply truth in the vast majority of cases.  In a sense, we might even 
see skepticism as noting that many of our usual justifications fail to imply truth.  And 
while we might be inclined to address skepticism simply by rejecting the skeptics 
standard that justification ought to imply truth (i.e. that our evidence ought to speak 
against skeptical hypotheses), Audi is right to claim that we fail to possess an adequate 
conception of how justification is connected to truth, if it fails to imply it.  It does seem, 
as Audi claims that it is “at least partly constitutive of justification that, in some way, it 
counts toward truth”.28   
While we will not address the issue of the connection between justification 
andtruth in any explicit way, one of the ways we may think about the distinction between 
epistemic perspectives is that it tends to involve different aspects of justification.  Thus, 
one way to approach the question of justification and truth may by outlining the 
                                                 
28 Audi, Structure of Justification, 301. 
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relationship between a first and third person perspective.  Unfortunately, there is only 
room enough in this discussion on skepticism to explore this issue briefly in chapter  4.   
 
2.5: Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Luck: 
In his Epistemic Luck Duncan Pritchard characterizes the heart of skepticism as 
concern over the tension between the possession of knowledge and various kinds of 
epistemic luck.  Epistemic luck in an extreme variety is that phenomenon of guessing and 
getting the right answer. While Pritchard notes several varieties of epistemic luck, the 
two kinds that pose the most problem for the possession of knowledge are what he calls 
veritic and reflective epistemic luck.  Veritic epistemic luck is that kind of luck such that 
it is a matter of luck that the agent’s belief is true.29  Veritic epistemic luck is the kind 
involved in Gettier style examples.  In the clock example we talked about previously, it 
was enormously lucky that the agent’s belief that it was 4 o’clock was true.  It was 
enormously lucky in the sense that in most possible worlds, a belief formed on the basis 
of a broken clock would not yield a true belief about what the time is.  Pritchard contends 
that while an externalist account of knowledge that embraces some version of a safety 
principle will address or eliminate veritic epistemic luck, reflective epistemic luck 
remains in light of such views, is difficult to remove, and makes a prima facie case for an 
internalist epistemology.    Safety based externalist positions eliminate veritic luck as 
consistent with knowledge because they require that a belief must be safe if it is to be 
knowledge.   Pritchard develops roughly the following safety principle: that in all nearby 
worlds where the agent forms her belief in the same way as the actual world, she only 
                                                 
29 Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 146.  
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believes when the belief in question is true.30  It is clear that Gettier cases will fail to 
cases of knowledge on such an account.  Such a safety based view does not, however, 
eliminate reflective epistemic luck. 
Reflective Epistemic Luck is that brand of luck in which from the agent’s own 
perspective it is a matter of luck that her belief is true.31  It seems as though this is the 
kind of luck that is involved in skeptical arguments and is not helped by a safety based 
account of knowledge.  Pritchard states of reflective luck that “Significantly, this type of 
luck can remain even if we stipulate that the agent in question has a true belief that is 
safe.”32  Thus, it might be the case that in most nearby worlds the agent only believes in 
those instances in which her belief is true, and, yet, from her own perspective it is a 
matter of luck that her belief is true.  Thus, we might imagine an agent believes that she 
has hands.  We might also imagine that in most nearby worlds she only believes that she 
has hands in those instances in which it is true that she has hands. Thus, we might 
imagine that her belief is in fact true because she is in a normal world, and her belief is 
safe.  However, it seems to remain that from her own perspective it is a matter of luck as 
to whether or not her belief is true because she does not know that she is in a normal 
world (as opposed to a brain in the vat world).   
Thus, in the above example reflective luck remains and seems inconsistent with 
the agent claiming that she knows she has hands.  How can she know she has hands if for 
all she knows she doesn’t have hands and is a brain in a vat?  This is the heart of the first 
person worry that skepticism raises.  Skepticism narrows in on the issue of reflective 
                                                 
30 Pritchard, Epistemic Luck, 163. 
31 Pritchard, Epistemic Luck, 173. 
32 Pritchard Epistemic Luck, 173. 
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epistemic luck.  Further the skeptic feels that in order to rule out the sense of luck we 
must have evidence that allows us to rule out skeptical hypotheses.   
Both skeptics and internalists are worried about epistemic luck to such an extent 
that they require “full cognitive responsibility” in order for an agent to count as knowing.  
An agent is fully cognitively responsible when her belief is immune from even reflective 
epistemic luck.  What skeptical arguments do is note that agents are not and cannot be 
immune in this way.  In other words, the skeptic notes that despite the internalist’s 
requirements on knowledge, our beliefs are subject to a certain amount of reflective 
epistemic luck.    
Pritchard characterizes the problem posed for internalist justifications by 
skepticism as an issue that occurs at the level of knowledge ascription.  Thus, an 
externalist account of knowledge will save knowledge, but we cannot ascribe it to 
ourselves or assert it of anyone else in a skeptical context.  Skeptical arguments 
undermine the epistemic practices occurring in the first person.  Any purposive, 
conscious and deliberate epistemic projects we undertake are particularly affected by 
skepticism.  As it stands, the skeptic has undermined these practices by undermining the 
epistemic value of the internalist type justifications that we use to carry out all of these 
practices.  The skeptic has shown that sensory experience, for example, is not necessarily 
indicative of that which we take it to be (i.e. of a world full of three dimensional objects).  
This problem posed by the consistency of internalist type justifications (sensory 
experience in particular) with various skeptical possible worlds impacts all of the 
epistemic practices that use these kinds of justifications to navigate and assess our 
epistemic situation from the first person perspective.   
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 The only way we have of saving the integrity of these practices is to resist the 
skeptic's assumption that internalist justifications need to speak against skeptical 
hypotheses in order to have epistemic value enough that we can rely on them for 
evidence.  This is difficult, however, because it just is the case that our usual evidence is 
consistent with many skeptical hypotheses.  So we cannot hope to avoid the skeptic's 
conclusion by claiming that we have reason for rejecting skeptical hypotheses in the 
sense of having evidence that favors our ordinary beliefs.  We do not.  Indeed, it seems 
that we have no more reason for rejecting skeptical hypotheses than the skeptic does for 
putting them forward in the first place.  
 Pritchard argues that skepticism essentially attacks a kind of “fine grained” 
internalist knowledge.  Since the skeptic launches a successful attack on this kind of 
knowledge, all of our practices that involve the first person are damaged by the skeptic’s 
argument.   Duncan characterizes the skeptic’s argument as pointing out how our beliefs 
are subject to a certain amount of reflective epistemic luck.  This, he argues, does not 
imply that we fail to possess knowledge. That the skeptic has undermined internalist 
justification is something to take seriously though.  Duncan Pritchard winds up with the 
position that there is a certain epistemic angst that arises when we reflect on our 
epistemic position.  As he puts it, “Our epistemic position is thus akin to a high-wire 
acrobat who is unable to be sure that the safety net has been erected below.  For sure, it 
looks as if it has, but it would look that way even if it hadn’t been erected”.33 
 Pritchard’s characterization of our epistemic situation from the first person 
perspective strikes me as quite on target.  What I would like to do in the rest of this 
chapter is explore in just a little more detail what exactly the concerns are for internalist 
                                                 
33 Pritchard, Epistemic Luck, 248. 
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type justification given skepticism.  I will urge that while Pritchard’s account is accurate, 
we should not surrender to the skeptic entirely on the issue of knowledge ascriptions.   
 Pritchard uses Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions as a way of accounting for why it 
is in the course of our everyday epistemic practices that certain propositions do not admit 
of evidence.  Certain propositions act as hinge propositions from which the entire practice 
of giving and asking for reasons presupposes and depends upon.  The evidence we 
possess for our everyday ordinary beliefs about the world does not support these hinge 
propositions.  Hinge propositions are characterized as propositions that are held without 
grounding.34  The entire practice of giving and assessing reasons depend upon these 
assumptions holding, if we doubt them then we cease to play the game of giving and 
taking reasons at all.   
 What this account is lacking is an explanation of why the hinge propositions, 
propositions that serve to justify in a given context but are not themselves justified, are 
hinge propositions.  The account claims that they are necessary for the entire enterprise 
and must be presumed in order to even begin; however, we might be to say a little more 
than this.  One of the things we will look for in the next chapter is a little more 
substantive explanation of why these propositions are indeed hinge.   We will largely 
agree with the notion that general assumptions of reliability about sensory experience are 
generally required in order to make sense of the give and take of justifications regarding 
sensory experience in the first place.  This notion may well ground the idea that AR acts a 
presupposition acts in an argument much more than it acts as an explicit premise.   
Instead of conferring justification as premises confer justification on a conclusion, 
general assumptions of reliability function more like presuppositions in an argument.  
                                                 
34 Pritchard, Epistemic Luck, 226. 
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Once the general assumption is accepted, sensory experience gains a foundational and 
direct evidential status on its own that is not epistemically dependent on the grounds for 
the assumption itself.  Thus, the role of assuming the reliability of sensory experience is 
not a justification conferring role.  Since our general assumption is not justification 
conferring, it is not necessary that we possess something as strong as epistemic 
justification in favor of it.  Rather, it is sufficient for the assumption to simply be a 
rational assumption.   
Thus, this is the starting point of our inquiry into responses to this kind of 
skeptical worry. 
 
2.6: Summary 
 In light of our discussion thus far, we can characterize the first person 
perspective along with Bonjour as the perspective that we are particularly concerned 
about here. Alternately, the third person perspective, according to Bonjour, is the 
perspective in which we ask from an outsider’s perspective what it takes to possess 
justification or knowledge.  As we gleaned from Nagel, we can think of the first person 
perspective as involving our individual perspectives to a greater degree, whereas the third 
person perspective can be characterized as a more neutral perspective.  Additionally, we 
looked at other ways to potentially characterize the notion of epistemic perspectives.  To 
this end, we looked at Audi’s discussion of the aspects of justification and the distinction 
between focusing on justification as a property versus the state of being justified.   
There are still a couple of key distinctions that need to be made about the first and 
third person perspectives.  For our discussion in the next chapter, it will be important to 
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bear in mind some concrete ways in which the first person perspective is distinct from the 
third person perspective.   
Next we want to note a number of things about the first person perspective.  In the 
first person perspective we are actively engaged in assessing our own beliefs, assessing 
evidence presented in a specific context, or judging methods of belief formation, etc.  In 
this context, and within this perspective, we are actively forming beliefs as well as 
attempting to determine the status of our beliefs.  Thus the practical pressures of forming 
beliefs in the context of going about our everyday lives are more apparent in the first 
person perspective.   
It is in the first person perspective that we can see how everyday knowers may 
fail to be epistemically ideal.  Everyday knowers are forming beliefs and assessing 
evidence in contexts with practical and pragmatic concerns that compete with and 
constrict the pursuit of truth.  Indeed, when focused on the first person perspective, we 
must recognize other epistemic values than the goal of truth.  It is also an epistemic value 
that we form beliefs in a way that meets the concrete and practical concerns of the 
context.  So we seek not only to form true beliefs, but also to form beliefs that allow us to 
successfully navigate our environments.  So even though this is a rough way of 
characterizing the first and third person and one that requires some qualifications, we 
may think of the first person as distinctly more everyday life and the third person as a 
distinctly philosophical perspective.35   
 
                                                 
35 Though I do not mean “philosophical” in an academic sense; the third person is philosophical in the 
sense that it a perspective in which we contemplate the nature of fundamental concepts – what is it to 
possess justification, what is it possess knowledge, etc. 
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2.7: Strategy for Handling the Skeptic: 
This distinctly first person and, thus, largely internalist concern raised by 
skepticism pertains not only to the internalist but to any externalist for whom internalist 
justification plays a role in knowledge ascriptions.  While many find an externalist 
approach to knowledge viable and appealing, it is less clear that an externalist account 
works equally well for knowledge ascriptions.  To imagine that an agent could justifiably 
claim knowledge without any reasons for thinking she possesses knowledge is 
significantly more counter-intuitive than claiming that an agent can in fact know 
regardless of whether or not she has reason to think she knows.  Thus, unless we are rabid 
externalists, a serious and significant problem remains for knowledge ascriptions even in 
light of an externalist solution to skepticism regarding knowledge possession.  
Thru out the discussion to follow, I will focus on this specific worry about 
whether or not our claims to know are justified in light of our inability to rule out 
skeptical hypotheses.   There may well be many issues of epistemological significance 
arising out of skepticism; we may be concerned to understand how knowledge is 
possible, we might wonder if and how knowledge is consistent with fallibility, or we 
might struggle to articulate a view of knowledge that is immune to skepticism.  However, 
at the heart of the skeptic’s criticism is the implicit claim that those who claim knowledge 
are somehow irrational, or in some way deficient in fulfilling their epistemic duties.  
Implicit in many skeptical arguments is the claim that the skeptic’s position, the skeptic’s 
reluctance to claim knowledge, reflects the epistemically appropriate position in light of 
our inability to rule out skeptical alternatives.   
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This last worry, the above criticism from the skeptic, is the challenge that is at the 
heart of the first person worry about the status of our knowledge claims.  I am concerned 
in this discussion to address this specific question; I will not give a full treatment of all of 
the issues rising out of skepticism.  Thus, our primary concern will be to address the 
worry that somehow our knowledge claims are not justified.  If they are not justified then 
those who make such claims are somehow epistemically deficient; they claim knowledge 
when it is not appropriate, and, as the skeptic claims, they ought, as she does, to refrain 
from doing so.   
This portion of the skeptic’s challenge is going to boil down to a claim that we are 
not justified in endorsing or relying upon sensory experience as a method of belief 
formation.  Specifically, the skeptic will argue that we have no evidence that sensory 
experience is reliable in general.  One of the arguments I will give in a later chapter is 
that there are no clear reasons to accept the skeptic’s requirement that we possess some 
evidence that sensory experience is generally reliable in order to be justified in relying 
upon it.  While it is counter-intuitive to imagine knowledge claims as not requiring an 
internalist justification, there is little to persuade us that this internalist requirement 
should pertain for the entire chain of justifying reasons.  Thus, if our grounds for our 
ordinary claims about the world are our various sensory experiences, it is not clear that 
we need to accept the view that in order to be justified in our knowledge claim we must 
also possess evidence accessible via reflection that justifies our grounds meant to justify 
the first order belief about the world.   
That the skeptic’s first person challenge boils down to whether or not we are 
justified in relying on sensory experience can be seen in the following reasoning.  In 
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general we meet the skeptic’s challenge that we have reasons we can produce in favor of 
our claim that we have hands.  For example, I might cite my sensory experience of seeing 
and feeling hands as good reason to think I have hands, and I might ground a knowledge 
claim in such experience.  The skeptic’s challenge is to point out that our sensory 
experience may not be reliable in general.  The challenge has shifted from a defense of 
our belief that we have hands to defending our belief that sensory experience is reliable; 
she will point out that for all I know I could be a brain in a vat.  Since I have no reason to 
think that sensory experience is generally reliable, then my belief that I have hands is not 
well founded.  Therefore, this particular debate in skepticism will turn on whether or not 
agents are entitled to assume that sensory experience is reliable, and this is how I will 
frame the skeptical problem about knowledge ascriptions in the discussion to follow. 
If we allow this debate to be framed in the way the skeptic would like, then it is 
over before it has begun.  If the skeptic is right that we must have actual evidence to 
indicate that sensory experience is generally reliable in order to be justified in relying 
upon it, then the skeptic has won this debate.  However, it is not clear what might 
motivate us to accept this requirement.  The primary argument to follow will be that we 
should not accept this requirement of the skeptic’s.  One could argue that such a 
requirement leads to an infinite regress, and, therefore, is in principle and theory a 
skeptical position.  Such a position lands in skepticism in theory in the sense that it leads 
to skepticism prior to even taking account of our particular epistemic circumstances.  
Such a theory would land in skepticism for any finite and fallible knower.   
Rather than push this tactic against the skeptic’s requirement, my strategy will be 
to evaluate this requirement on its own merits.  I will evaluate what such an approach in 
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epistemology looks like, what it would look like to practice this view, and evaluate what 
might motivate this view.  Thus, we will be able to see and make explicit the implications 
and deficiencies in the skeptic’s approach that are not so explicit in the skeptic’s 
argument.  In doing so, we should be able to find some strong motivation to reject the 
skeptical position.   
However, we should not anticipate finding a refutation to the skeptic’s position.  
This is not the strategy I have in mind nor do I find it a promising strategy for any who 
think it is the one we ought to take.  The skeptic is ultimately articulating a standard for 
rationality, and, thereby, articulating standards for claiming knowledge.  We cannot 
appeal to a definition of knowledge or to some other technicality to refute what is 
essentially a value claim.  The skeptic is articulating standards that embody what she 
takes to be the norms for responsible belief formation and the claims that are appropriate 
in light of such standards.   
If we look at the contemporary literature in epistemology and skepticism, it is 
clear that what many want is a refutation of skepticism.  The responses from semantic 
externalism, contextualism, and externalism all offer ways to avoid the skeptic’s 
conclusion; each, of course, has its strengths and weaknesses.  None of these approaches, 
however, addresses the skeptic’s most stringent criticism that claiming knowledge in light 
of uneliminated possibilities is not appropriate or rational.  The contextualist admits that 
it is not appropriate to claim knowledge in a skeptical context, and the externalist leaves 
our claims to know as justified in a merely conditional manner.  We are justified in 
claiming knowledge if we in fact know, and whether or not we know will be determined 
based on whether or not sensory experience is in fact reliable.  This last concern does 
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little to guide us on what is appropriate in the first person.  Is it appropriate to claim 
knowledge despite that we have no evidence to indicate that sensory experience is in fact 
generally reliable?  This fundamental first person worry remains in light of these many 
contemporary responses to skepticism, and it is this issue that I will be concerned with in 
the following discussion of skepticism. 
The solution to follow will essentially be grounded in claims that the skeptic is 
wrong about the values she articulates in the standards she endorses.  The strategy is to 
make explicit what values the skeptic’s standards embody and to evaluate those in a 
normative fashion.  Thus, the argument to follow will defend the claim that agents who 
assume the reliability of the senses embody better epistemic values than the skeptic does.  
I will grant now that such an argument may not feel definitive for some, but I believe it is 
the kind of argument that is needed to address this particular first person worry stemming 
out of the skeptical argument.  It is important to note that this worry stems from the 
normative elements involved in the first person perspective.  We are particularly 
concerned with responsible and rational belief formation in the first person.   
A worry might rise out of skepticism that our knowledge claims are not justified- 
that they are epistemically lacking or even irresponsible in light of the competing un-
eliminated error possibilities.  It is this particular worry or charge I intend to evaluate in 
the discussion to follow.  While I will not give a solution that provides us definitive 
grounds for ruling out skeptical alternatives, I will give a discussion that takes the sting 
out of the skeptic’s particular charge that our knowledge claims are irrational in light of 
skeptical hypotheses.    
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A significant first step in the strategy I have outlined is to substantiate the claim 
that our reliance on sensory experience need only be rational.  This step may well involve 
the most theoretically substantive aspect of the proposed strategy, and, yet, I will only be 
able to outline general reasons in favor of this position.  I suspect that endorsing a looser 
requirement on assumptions of reliability than the skeptic has in mind is a move towards 
the fallibilist position that the skeptic does not embrace.   Further it seems that such a 
move is a reflection of where one places the bulk of what has epistemic value.  As in the 
case of many disagreements occurring at a fundamental level, it is unclear that this 
disagreement with the skeptic boils down to anything more than a massive conflict of 
intuitions.  Nonetheless, I would like to offer some measure of justification for the 
position that assumptions of reliability need only be rational rather than supported by 
direct evidence of their truth which is the skeptic’s position.   
We have boiled the skeptical problem down to a problem about determining the 
nature and status of the reasons we have for relying on sensory experience.  As the 
skeptic will point out, after all, we could be massively deceived.  This particular skeptical 
problem will require that we produce some reasons or evidence that indicate that sensory 
experience is in fact reliable.  To the skeptic, such evidence must directly rule out the 
possibility of massive deception.  In other words, we must produce evidence that speaks 
against massive deception and in favor of the overall reliability of the senses.  Such 
evidence then serves to justify our reliance on sensory experience.  Further, without such 
justification, the skeptic will argue, that we cannot hope to ground knowledge claims in 
sensory experience. 
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It does not seem though that we embrace the skeptic’s standards in everyday life.  
Rather, we seem to operate with assumptions of reliability for most of our major methods 
of belief formation (memory, testimony, sensory experience, etc).  For example, while I 
have been able in many instances to verify the reliability of my memory, there have been 
a few instances in which my memory has been shown to me to be faulty.  However, 
despite these few instances of error I have found via other methods of belief formation 
that my memory is generally quite reliable.  However, I must admit that I have absolutely 
no confirmation that my memory has not been subjected to a skeptical scenario.  If it 
were the case that a skeptical scenario involving massive and general deception were 
true, then my memory would be faulty and I would have no way to discern such massive 
error.  In general skeptical scenarios, information fed to the agent in the scenario coheres 
in such a way that error is not detectable.  What this shows is that I can’t say with 
certainty that my memory is reliable, and, yet, I must admit that on many occasions I in 
fact continue relying on my memory knowing full well that is a fallible method of belief 
formation.  There is a sense in which the skeptic is right, I do not know for sure that my 
memory is reliable, and, yet, on many occasions I use my memory to ground a knowledge 
claim.  The skeptic is right that I tend to assume that my memory is generally reliable; I 
tend to assume that I am not a BIV.   If we hope to do justice to the epistemic practices of 
the everyday believer then we must do justice to such assumptions of reliability. 
First we must admit that the skeptic is right in thinking that we have no evidence 
to indicate that skeptical scenarios are false; that they do not in fact hold.  Thus, we must 
admit that assumptions of reliability regarding sensory experience are just that- 
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assumptions.  How is it that assumptions can play a pivotal part in justified knowledge 
claims?  This is the fundamental challenge posed to the non-skeptic as I see it.   
While I tend to agree with the skeptic that we cannot claim to know that we are 
not BIVs, I do not agree that our assumptions of reliability are not motivated at all.   
Thus, our defense of assumptions of reliability regarding sensory experience will involve 
a claim that admits that we are not epistemically justified in such assumptions, but that 
they are rational assumptions and as such can play a role in justified knowledge claims 
about the world.  So even though we may not know that our senses are generally reliable, 
we are rational to assume so unless there is evidence to the contrary, and such 
assumptions are not inconsistent with claims to know. 
Why might I think that assumptions of reliability need only be rational?  The first 
reason is that assumptions of reliability are not directly justification conferring in our 
knowledge claims about the world.  Particular instances of sensory experience are 
directly justification conferring.  For example, my justification for believing that I have 
hands and my knowledge to that effect is my sensory experience of seeing and feeling my 
hands.  Notice in many instances it is sufficient to ground a knowledge claim to the effect 
that such and such that I saw such and such.  In the courtroom, no one questions that 
general veracity of sensory experience.  Rather, it is sufficient to cite the relevant sensory 
experience.   
Notice that what the above shows is that our assumptions of reliability regarding 
sensory experience operate as assumptions in our knowledge claims.  We do not claim a 
stronger status than that.  This is important.  If we were masking assumptions as 
epistemically justified belief we would be in worse epistemic waters than we in fact seem 
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to be.  We tend to treat assumptions of reliability as presuppositions in an argument, or as 
hinge propositions in a given context.  The particular sensory experience is relevant to 
justifying a particular external world belief; the general assumption of reliability is not.  
Rather, the assumption is a presupposition to such a knowledge claim, but not that which 
directly justifies it.  
 So the view might be one that assumptions of reliability act as presuppositions 
that once in place allow the particular method of belief formation to act as foundational 
justification.  Such a view has the benefit of explaining why it is only in philosophical 
contexts that such fundamental assumptions of reliability are called into question when 
defending a belief that is more widely defended by citing the particular experience 
involved in forming the belief.  If particular instances of sensory experience enjoy a 
foundational status in the sense that they alone are sufficient to ground knowledge claims, 
then it is not clear what reason we have for thinking that the particular external world 
belief requires evidence in favor of the general assumption in order to be justified.  In 
other words, if the particular sensory experience of seeing and feeling my hands is 
sufficient to ground my knowledge claim that I know I have hands, then it seems the 
skeptic’s claim that my particular belief is not justified without further evidence in 
support of my acting assumptions is motivated at all.  If the particular sensory experience 
is sufficient, then it seems that no further evidence is required in order to support the 
particular belief.   
Instead of being in need of epistemic justification, assumptions of reliability only 
need be treated like any other presupposition in any critical thinking endeavor.  That is, it 
need only be rational to have made said assumption.  Since the assumption is not directly 
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justification conferring in the argument, it need only be a plausible or understandable 
assumption.  More specifically we’ll want to embrace the standard for all 
presuppositions.  Presuppositions should be questioned only when we have reasons to 
think they are false.  To criticize a presupposition on the grounds that it might be wrong 
are standards not in sync with the vast majority of our knowledge gaining and defending 
endeavors.  This shows that the skeptic is stepping out of sync with the norm.  This is 
relevant to us because the skeptic would like to think that she has taken the standards we 
ourselves claim to adhere to and shown that we in fact fail to meet those standards.  She 
is right that we generally require justification to defend knowledge claims, but we do not 
require that all presuppositions required for the claim to be true must also be backed with 
evidence.    There are long lists of necessary conditions that must hold for any given 
belief to be true.  To require that everyday agents hold in their hand evidence that each 
and every necessary condition is true is to require even in theory that everyday agents are 
not capable of possessing true knowledge.   
What I want to show here is not proof that the skeptic is wrong.  Rather I want to 
more carefully show the nature of her insistence that knowledge is only consistent with 
complete certainty.  What the skeptic demands is beyond the scope of the first person.  
Our epistemic practices and the methods of belief formation that we have been given 
cannot be verified from within our first person perspective, and, clearly, we cannot step 
beyond that perspective.  For these reasons there is an inherent fallibility in our endeavors 
to seek truth and attain knowledge.  The skeptic reminds me of someone who refuses to 
seek something so essential as food or love because she may not attain it, or even worse 
she may be fooled into thinking she’s attained with no way of knowing for sure that she 
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has gotten hold of what she seeks.  I want to defend the common sense and practical view 
that the pursuit of truth and knowledge is worth the inherent risk.  Because the risk is 
inherent the start of the pursuit of truth involves ignoring error that might be only 
possible.  We know from the get go that we do not have absolute certainty.  But this 
admission is not tantamount to saying that we do not ever have reason to think we have in 
fact gotten hold of the truth.  Our knowledge claims are not about claiming absolute 
certainty, they are direct claims to have the truth and they are founded on reasons to think 
we have attained the truth.  Such reasons need not be infallible in order to be rational.  In 
what follows I will attempt to defend the notion that assumptions of reliability are 
rational, they are not the epistemically irresponsible and psychologically convenient 
beliefs the skeptic makes them out to be.  Further, I will try to articulate a sense in which 
such so called mere assumptions do not require us to give up our knowledge claims. 
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Cartesian Skepticism as Moral Dilemma 
 
“Belief Formation in the Context of Everyday Life” 
 
Chapter 3.1: Introduction 
 
In this chapter we are going to apply the concept of epistemic perspectives 
towards a solution to external world skepticism.  This solution is best characterized as a 
version of a relevant alternatives solution.  Alternately, the solution could be 
characterized as a charge that the skeptic has committed the fallacy of accident.  We will 
explore both characterizations in this chapter.   Cartesian skepticism contends that an 
assumption about the reliability of the senses is not justified and is shown in the existence 
of skeptical hypotheses we cannot rule out.   The argument in this chapter is that the de 
facto practice regarding sensory experience is that we are entitled to assume reliability 
and that such assumptions are epistemically sound and only dislodged given evidence to 
the contrary.  Skeptical hypotheses are merely possibilities of error, and, thus not strong 
enough to dislodge our assumption of reliability.   If our assumption of reliability for 
sensory experience is epistemically justified, then preference for our ordinary beliefs over 
their skeptical counter-parts is also justified. 
It should be noted that the solution to be offered in this chapter will be derived 
from a discussion of the normative aspects of assumptions of reliability.  As mentioned in 
earlier chapters, this discussion is aimed particularly at the worry that assumptions of 
reliability are not epistemically justified.  Thus, we are taking aim at the skeptic’s 
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contention that the epistemically responsible, or the epistemically honest, position is that 
of the skeptic’s.  Those of us concerned with skepticism might worry that upon reflection, 
particularly in a philosophical context, the skeptic’s argument seems to win the day.  We 
might then wonder if the skeptic’s position is the more intellectually honest position. 
These are the worries we are aiming at in this chapter.   
The solution to be offered is not going to give a definitive solution in the 
traditional sense.  The traditional approach demands that we give some evidence or 
reason that epistemically justifies a preference for our ordinary beliefs about the world 
over skeptical hypotheses.   We are not seeking a solution in the form of refutation.  
Rather, I aim to show that the skeptic’s position is not the only epistemically responsible 
position.  The difference between the skeptic and non-skeptic seems largely to be a 
matter of differing epistemic values as much as anything else.  The position of the non-
skeptic is at least as defensible as that of the skeptic.   
The above is the sort of solution being sought in this chapter.  While such a 
solution might not rise to the level of a refutation of skepticism, it is also immune from 
the futile nature of attempting to refute skepticism.  Many solutions have aimed to find 
the holy grail of philosophical arguments: a firm and sound refutation of the skeptic.  
Such refutation involves locating the much sought after evidence that shows ordinary 
beliefs are more likely to be true than their skeptical counter-parts.  Yet, such arguments 
are notoriously flawed and often quite weak.  Thus, rather than refute the skeptic, rather 
than attempt to quiet the skeptic, I aim to give those who are not skeptics a better sense of 
how and why their position is highly intuitive and epistemically defensible even in light 
of uneliminated skeptical hypotheses.   It is likely that much of what I have to say will not 
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be compelling to the skeptic.  However, I will draw out the epistemic implications of the 
skeptic’s position and these consequences of skepticism should provide some relief from 
some of those pernicious first person worries that rise out of skepticism.   
It might be useful to look at the discussion thus far. First, I have chosen to focus 
on one specific aspect of skepticism.  Namely, our focus will be on the worry that 
knowledge claims are not justified in light of uneliminated skeptical alternatives.  The 
charge behind this worry is that agents who claim knowledge are somehow epistemically 
irresponsible or epistemically irrational.  Knowledge ascriptions have been characterized 
as “loose” ascriptions that are not literally true, or that knowledge in an everyday context 
represents “weak” knowledge.36  It is this concept of skepticism I wish to poke a few 
holes in. 
 Next, it was decided in the introduction that skepticism has a distinctly epistemic 
aspect to it that is not addressed by stances on perception or theories in the philosophy of 
language.  For the reasons given in those previous chapters I have chosen to approach 
skepticism within the traditional framework in epistemology.  Additionally, the notion of 
epistemic perspectives articulated by BonJour and filled out in the previous chapter 
serves to offer some concrete distinctions between the context of everyday life and the 
context of the philosophy classroom.  While the distinction between everyday 
life/philosophy classroom and the first/third person perspectives is not precise it serves to 
illustrate some specific epistemic distinctions between belief formation in everyday life 
and the philosophy classroom.     
                                                 
36 For an example of this sort of view see Peter Unger, Philosophical Relativity, selections from 
Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader, ed. by Keith DeRose et al (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 
247.   
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For our purposes in this chapter we will want to keep in mind that everyday life 
usually involves first person concerns.  Bonjour makes the distinction between first/third 
person perspectives by articulating what epistemic questions we tend to be concerned 
with. It also happens that when we are in an everyday context we tend to ask the same 
questions that define the first person and when in a philosophical context, we tend to be 
concerned with the questions that define the third person perspective.   In everyday life, 
we are concerned primarily to ascribe knowledge and justification, and to assess such 
claims.  A shift to the third person involves shifting to concerns such as the conditions for 
knowledge in general or justification in general and from the perspective of an outsider 
looking in, such a shift also often marks a shift into a distinctly philosophical perspective.  
The philosophical perspective is one in which the concrete parameters and the time 
limitations of everyday life have been put aside in order to pursue questions in a more 
thorough, systematic, and involved way. 
In the next chapter, we will turn to the issue of epistemic closure and take a more 
detailed look at the issue of warranted assertability in relation to the view put forward in 
this chapter.  It will turn out on the view to be articulated in this chapter that closure 
holds in a third person sense, but it sometimes fails in particular instances.  The 
distinction is to be accounted for in the fact that closure in the third person is grounded in 
knowledge, but first person instances involve knowledge ascriptions.  If the conditions 
for knowledge are distinct from those of knowledge ascriptions, it should not be 
surprising if closure holds as an abstracted third person form of reasoning but fails in 
many applications in the first person.  Much of the next chapter will be devoted to 
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defending Dretske’s claim that closure is a matter of the transmission of evidence and 
holds if the evidence for p is sufficient to claim knowledge of q, and fails if not.37     
Lastly, the focus of this chapter and much of the rest is to establish that we are in 
fact rational to rely on sensory experience.  In this chapter, I will aim to develop the sense 
in which the pursuit of truth requires that we ignore some error possibilities.  If we pay 
attention to any and all error possibilities, such practices often involve sacrificing the 
pursuit of truth.  I will put forward the view that it is epistemically rational to assume 
reliability and treat as relevant only those error possibilities that are deemed sufficiently 
likely to warrant concern.  An epistemic practice that allows prima facie assumptions of 
reliability to count as warranted epistemically seem most likely to be practices that 
maximize truth while avoiding too much error.  The skeptic’s position on the other hand, 
I will suggest, is an epistemic practice whose requirements on evidence are so strict and 
concern for error so deep that the skeptic sacrifices pursuing truth all because she is not 
certain of her faculties.  Essentially I will suggest that truth is worth a leap of faith.  The 
value of pursuing and attaining truth is so epistemically foundational that it warrants what 
is properly considered an epistemically rational leap of faith.  Such a leap of faith is the 
beginning of pursuing truth and possibly attaining it.  It is proper to deem the skeptic one 
who gives up possible truth out of her worry for possible error.  The non-skeptic, 
alternately, allows for possible error because of the extent to which she values even 
possible truth.   
In this chapter I will suggest that the constraints of everyday life and the realities 
of actual belief formation are such that we cannot entertain every possible error scenario 
                                                 
37 See Fred Dretske, “The Case Against Closure.” Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, ed. by Matthias 
Steup et al (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005) 13-25. 
78 
 
without sacrificing in a significant way our pursuit of truth.  In the next chapter, I will try 
to show that relying on sensory experience is justified regardless of which possible world 
is the actual one.  Specifically, I will aim to establish that since we do not know which 
possible world is actual, and we value truth, it is epistemically prudent or rational to rely 
on sensory experience even though it could be the case that we are in fact brains in vats. 
Let us recall the version of skepticism discussed in the Introduction.  Where H is a 
skeptical hypothesis and O is some ordinary belief about the world, Keith DeRose 
characterizes skepticism as follows: 
P1:  I don’t know that not-H. 
P2:  If I don’t know that not-H, then I don’t know O. 
C3:  Therefore, I don’t know that O.38 
 
Thus, on this version of skepticism, our failure to count as knowing our ordinary beliefs 
about the world stems from (1) the fact that we don’t know that not-H, and (2) the claim 
that our failure to count as knowing not-H implies that we fail to know that O.  While 
some have attempted to derive a solution to skepticism by rejecting P1 and claiming that 
we do in fact know that not-H, we are going to focus on P2.39   
Notice, though, that attacking P2 via a relevant alternatives approach is a little 
awkward.  Roughly, the relevant alternatives approach in epistemology is the view that 
only some competing alternatives need to be addressed by an agent claiming to know. To 
use a well worn example of Dretske’s if one is at the zoo, looks in a pen and sees what 
appears to be a Zebra, then one might claim to know that there is a Zebra in the pen.  
Such a claim though is thought to be made against the backdrop of a limited set of 
alternatives.  Thus, one would claim to know that the animal in the pen is a zebra as 
                                                 
38 See DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” 2. 
39 See Gail Stine, “Relevant Alternatives, Skepticism, and Deductive Closure” for an example of such a 
solution.   
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opposed to a donkey or a horse, but not necessarily be claiming to know that the animal 
in the pen is not a mule cleverly disguised to look like a Zebra.  Relevant Alternativists 
will argue that it is not part of the knowledge claim being made to claim to know that.   
The kind of relevant alternatives approach found in Gail Stine’s “Skepticism, 
Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure” will refute skepticism via a direct denial 
of P1.  The argument roughly goes that since “S knows that” is indexical the truth of the 
claim is relative to a particular set of contextually determined relevant alternatives.  Once 
the set of relevant alternatives is considered, and, given closure for known entailment, it 
will follow that we do know that not-H.  A more common strategy for attacking P2 is to 
deny epistemic closure under known entailment.  My argument generally will go along 
the lines that skeptical alternatives are not relevant, but they are not relevant for epistemic 
reasons in the context of everyday life.  Such a response amounts to ruling out skeptical 
alternatives on epistemic grounds.   
Thus, it might seem that my argument involves a denial of P1.  However, I do not 
wish to deny P1.  Instead of denying P1 my argument involves the claim that we de facto 
treat skeptical alternatives as irrelevant in everyday life, and when evaluated in more 
depth this everyday practice is epistemically defensible, and, yet, the grounds of this 
defense are not sufficient to warrant claiming knowledge of not-H.  Rather, the grounds 
for ruling out skeptical alternatives are sufficient to rule out skeptical alternatives, but not 
sufficient to ground a knowledge claim.  Thus, on the view being advocated here what is 
required for ruling out an alternative is weaker than knowledge.  The details of this issue 
will be explored some in the next chapter. 
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Thus, my argument, despite its being in the spirit of a relevant alternatives 
approach, will at heart involve some denial of closure.  In the next chapter I will evaluate 
the relationship of my view to P1 and its implications for closure.  It will turn out on my 
view, for reasons to be articulated later, that we know that O, and we know that O entails 
not-H, yet we do not know that not-H.   
 Let us begin by re-framing the skeptic’s argument.  The skeptic generates P2 by 
applying a certain principle or standard for evidence that we need to elucidate prior to 
evaluating.  Let us call this principle the Rule of Exclusion.  The rule governs 
justification in the context of forming beliefs when competing hypotheses are involved.  
We can characterize the Rule of Exclusion (E) as follows: 
(E):  For any phenomena P, if there are two competing hypotheses A and  
        B and both are consistent with the evidence E regarding P, then an                      
        agent must have some epistemic reason for preferring either A or B  
                                over the other in order for her belief in either A or B to be                      
                                epistemically justified. 
 
Our intuitions regarding E seem to be as follows: if an agent prefers either A or B in a 
context similar to the one spelled out in E, then she prefers A or B for reasons that are 
non-epistemic and, therefore, her belief in A or B is arbitrary. Since beliefs that are 
preferred for non-epistemic reasons are epistemically arbitrary, they are not justified.  
Another way to think of this intuition is that we tend to regard beliefs that are not 
grounded in truth-conducive reasons or justifications as not epistemically justified.  An 
agent that prefers A or B when they are both consistent with the evidence does so for 
something other than epistemic reasons.  According to skepticism, it is counter-intuitive 
to ascribe knowledge to an agent when there is a competing hypothesis that she has yet to 
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rule out.  If she cannot rule out H, then she does not really know that O.  In fact, for all 
she knows, it could be that H.   
 Now we may spell out two scenarios, Scenario A and Scenario S, involving the 
application of E and re-characterize skepticism in the following way.   
 Scenario A:  S is choosing between hypothesis A and B and her evidence E is  
         consistent with both A and B.  S chooses A for non-epistemic                
         reasons.   
We should conclude that S does not really know A, because S cannot rule out the 
possibility of B.  In the context of skepticism the Rule of Exclusion may be applied in 
Scenario S in a way that is seemingly analogous to Scenario A: 
 Scenario S: Our ordinary beliefs O are in competition with a given skeptical  
        hypothesis H, and agent X chooses O.   
 
According to the Rule of exclusion, since X prefers O for non-epistemic reasons, she fails 
to count as knowing it.  Given these two scenarios we may re-characterize skepticism.  
We can think of this version of skepticism as skepticism via an argument from analogy.  
We might characterize the argument from analogy as follows: 
 S1:  In most cases like Scenario A, the agent fails to know because she has  
       violated the Rule of Exclusion.   
S2:  The scenario of our ordinary beliefs competing with skeptical alternatives  
       creates a scenario, Scenario S, that is relevantly similar to scenario A.  
S3: If S fails to count as knowing in Scenario A, then X fails to count as knowing  
       in Scenario S. 
S4: S fails to count as knowing in A. 
S5: Therefore, X fails to count as knowing in S. 
S6: Since X fails to know in S, any agent relevantly similar to X fails to count as  
       knowing. 
S7: Ordinary believers are relevantly similar to X.   
         SC8: Thus, ordinary believers fail to count as knowing their ordinary external  
       world beliefs that are grounded in their sensory experience.    
 
The crux of this argument is S2, the premise that claims that Scenario A is relevantly 
similar to Scenario S.  Given the above characterization of skepticism, we can attempt to 
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reformulate the skeptical problem as a question about what, if any, relevant differences 
exist between Scenario A and Scenario S.  I want to explore the idea that there are some 
relevant differences between A and S such that applying the rule of exclusion in A is 
appropriate, but doing so in scenario S is a fallacy of accident.   
 
3.2: Are there Relevant Disanalogies between Scenario A and Scenario S? 
Even though we will look at a number of distinctions between A and S, the crux of 
my argument here will be that there are relevant distinctions between A and S that are 
particular to the first person perspective.  The result of this argument will be a relevant 
alternatives solution in which we have some non-question begging reasons for dismissing 
skeptical hypotheses in many everyday contexts.  In other words, I will argue in this 
chapter that there are norms in the first person perspective that (1) allow us to reject 
skeptical hypotheses and (2) have the result that the contemplation of skeptical 
hypotheses can actually result in the violation of epistemic norms that govern belief 
formation in the first person.   
The primary thesis to be defended here is that error possibilities that are merely 
logically possible are appropriately irrelevant in the context of everyday belief formation.    
In other words, the merely logically possible is almost always irrelevant in everyday life.  
This conclusion follows in light of considerations involving the epistemic goal of truth 
and the concrete parameters of belief formation in everyday life.  Thus, if this view is 
correct it should follow that treating the merely logically possible as relevant in the 
context of everyday life will result in the loss of true beliefs.  One of the theses of this 
chapter is that such loss of truth for the sake of contemplating or avoiding merely 
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possible error is epistemically backwards.  Such an approach is the result of prioritizing 
the avoidance of error over the pursuit of truth to such a degree as to sacrifice the pursuit 
of truth to the avoidance of error.    
The argument in this chapter is going to rely on a number of considerations.  First, the 
pertinent concrete parameters in everyday life are those involving time constraints driven 
by practical concerns that require beliefs be formed in a timely manner.  The result of 
these concrete parameters is that the goals of pursuing truth and avoiding error conflict in 
the context of everyday life.  Just as we have to sacrifice one moral duty to another in 
contexts in which two or more duties conflict, we often cannot fully pursue both of these 
two epistemic goals. Because these two epistemic goals conflict, we must sacrifice one to 
pursue the other, and we must balance the two concerns.  This is the sense in which I am 
characterizing Cartesian Skepticism as a Moral Dilemma. 
While there may be a number of things we can say about skeptical scenarios that 
make them distinct from other usual relevant alternatives, we are going to focus our 
discussion on two things in particular:  (1) the concrete constraints in the first person that 
are in conflict with the contemplation of mere logical possibilities, and (2) the distinctly 
normative elements of justification in the first person perspective.  Consideration of the 
first will generate the conclusion that it is for the sake of attaining truth that we focus on 
hypotheses that are likely and ignore alternatives that merely point out the possibility of 
error.  In other words, it is for sound epistemic reasons that we operate with assumptions 
of reliability.  Such assumptions of reliability are in place for most, if not all, of our 
fundamental mechanisms of belief formation.  Thus, it will turn out that the argument 
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given here will be broader in scope and more general in its application than merely 
defending assumptions of reliability regarding sensory experience.   
Considerations regarding (2), the considerations of the normative aspect of first 
person justifications, will offer a justifying account of everyday practices regarding 
sensory experience in the sense that agents are not blameworthy for their preferring their 
ordinary beliefs over skeptical alternatives.  This subjective sense of justification will 
allow me to conclude, as have numerous others, that agents living in normal worlds and 
their skeptical counter-parts are not blameworthy for relying on their sensory experience.  
Thus, the arguments given here will offer a defense in both a subjective and objective 
sense of the epistemic practices of everyday knowers regarding sensory experience.  This 
defense will ultimately need to be threefold.  First, I will defend the everyday practice of 
treating skeptical alternatives as irrelevant.  Second, since everyday agents are not 
epistemically neutral with regard to sensory experience, a justifying account of this 
practice is necessary.  Third, we must defend the notion that agents are not blameworthy 
for relying on sensory experience.  Defense of the first will be on the grounds that it is for 
good epistemic reasons that we are only concerned with alternatives that are probable and 
not merely possible in everyday life.  Establishing the second will involve defending 
assumptions of reliability in general as conducive to our epistemic goals.   
One way to think about the argument to follow is that it stands in contrast to 
Stroud’s argument in “The Problem of the External World”.  Stroud argues that the 
standards the skeptic employs in a philosophical examination of our knowledge are no 
higher than those used in the course of everyday life.40  The skeptic, according to Stroud, 
simply invokes the standards that are at use in everyday life to get her skeptical 
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conclusions.  The question about the general reliability of our senses stems from 
Descartes desire to assess all of his seeming knowledge, and the best route for this is to 
assess those general sources or methods by which one forms beliefs.  If those sources are 
found wanting, then our beliefs themselves cannot amount to knowledge.  Stroud gives 
an analogy: “If I found good reason to doubt the reliability of the suspect’s alibi, for 
example, and that was all I had to go on in my belief that he was in Cleveland, then what 
I earlier took to be my knowledge that he was in Cleveland would have been found 
wanting or called into question.  Its source or basis would have been undermined.”41  In a 
similar way, if the sources of our beliefs are found wanting, then our “knowledge” has 
been undermined.   
I accept the above line of reasoning in the argument to follow, and it seems 
correct to think that the crux of skepticism lies in our reliance upon sensory experience; 
this primary source of information about the world is under review and found wanting in 
the skeptic’s mind.  There are two challenges posed to this line of reasoning in the 
argument to follow.  First, we are going to reject the notion that skeptical hypotheses 
constitute a “good reason” for questioning sensory experience.  Let’s grant Stroud, that if 
we have a “good reason” for doubting the source of a belief, then the belief itself is 
undermined.  However, I will argue that it is not as clear as the skeptic would like that 
skeptical hypotheses constitute “good reasons” for doubt that in fact undermine the 
source in general.  The heart of this argument will center on the claim that skeptical 
hypotheses are merely logically possible, and possible error is not the same as likely 
error.  Thus, my argument will go that the better analogy lies not in comparing having a 
                                                 
41 Barry Stroud, “The Problem of the External World,” Epistemology, ed. by Ernest Sosa et al (Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2008) 9. 
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good reason to doubt an alibi, but in recognizing the logical possibility despite the quality 
of one’s evidence that the alibi is not good.  Thus, the appropriate analogy is between 
recognizing the possibility of error in relying on an alibi and the possibility of error in 
relying on sensory experience. 
Second, the argument to follow in later chapters will reject the notion that we 
must have reasons or evidence to indicate the reliability of a method of belief formation 
in order to be justified in relying on it.  Thus, I will be arguing that skeptical arguments 
like the one characterized above are based on two less than clear premises: the first is the 
claim that skeptical hypotheses constitute good epistemic grounds for doubting sensory 
experience, and (2) that we must have some positive reason to rely on a method of belief 
formation in order to be justified in doing so.  Premise (1) is clearly stated in Stroud’s 
argument.  Premise (2) is the premise that would be needed to get a skeptical line of 
reasoning going if we reject (1).  The remaining argument in this chapter will argue 
against (1), and the arguments in later chapters will aim more specifically at (2) - the 
assumption that we need some positive evidence in order to be justified in relying on a 
method of belief formation.   
 
3.2.1: Skeptical Alternatives are irrelevant because the merely possible is almost 
always irrelevant in the context of everyday life: 
 
Notice that in most contexts in which there are competing hypotheses, we usually 
have some reason to think the alternatives are either plausible or true.  Additionally, in 
most scenarios like Scenario A we rely heavily on our background beliefs to help us 
determine which of the hypotheses seem most likely.  Skeptical hypotheses and our 
ordinary beliefs are not equally supported by the evidence – they are so equally supported 
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only if all other beliefs are taken out of account.  There is some precedent in the literature 
for thinking that what it takes to get into a philosophical context is relatively simple.  If 
someone raises a skeptical hypothesis, then we are in a skeptical context.  While it does 
seem that there are contexts that are distinctly skeptical,  contexts in which  a skeptical 
alternative is under consideration, what it takes to be in such a context is arguably more 
stringent than often recognized. 
 Lastly, that skepticism does not fit well into the context of everyday belief 
formation- that it is so difficult to practice this philosophy indicates that it is a concern 
appropriate only for the philosophy classroom.  It is possible to take skepticism seriously 
only when we have removed ourselves from the context of making decisions and 
judgments about what we immediately have in front of us.  Another way to make this 
claim is that even for philosophers and skeptics it only seems appropriate to contemplate 
skepticism in a philosophical context.  While it might be in the tradition to assume this is 
so because of psychological reasons beyond our control, I am inclined to think of this 
response as an ad hoc recovery attempt on the part of the skeptic.  It seems our attitude, 
rather, is that it is not epistemically appropriate to take skepticism too seriously in the 
context of everyday life.  This everyday attitude warrants further evaluation, because it 
lies at the heart of the skeptic’s attack on our claims to know.  If we are to truly defend 
everyday knowers from the implicit charge of irrationality, we have to defend the 
practices of everyday knowers in a way that is consistent with their actual epistemic 
practices.  It is for this reason that we cannot jump to the arguments contained in the final 
chapter and ignore the arguments given here.  Fancy philosophical reasoning that 
everyday knowers have never appealed to does little to defend their claims to know.   
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The view that we rely on sensory experience because we are hardwired to do so 
does not capture a prevalent attitude towards skeptical alternatives.  The prevalent 
attitude is that skeptical alternatives are not relevant and that everyday agents are not 
under any epistemic obligation to respond to these possibilities.   Thus, the 
“psychological compulsion” explanation of our everyday attitude to skepticism does not 
fit the data to be explained.  The explanation needs to involve some account of why we 
tend to think it is epistemically inappropriate to take skeptical hypotheses seriously in the 
context of everyday life.  One of the aims of this paper is to explore and defend this 
attitude towards skeptical hypotheses.   
To see the former, let us perform a thought experiment- call it thought experiment 
G.  Let’s imagine that a government is attempting to assess evidence regarding the 
activities of a rival nation in order to assess the threat level to national security.  There is 
a body of evidence that has been amassed regarding the activities of the rival nation, and 
intelligence agents are developing hypotheses and scenarios that explain that body of 
evidence.  So each agent develops a hypothesis about the activities and motives of their 
rival that explains the data that has been accumulated.   Now let us imagine that one of 
the agents develops a hypothesis that is merely a logical possibility.  The agent has no 
reason to think her hypothesis is likely, the hypothesis does not fit any of her background 
beliefs about the rival, and yet she presents her scenario as a contending hypothesis.  
When asked if she herself believes, or prefers (if belief is too strong), this scenario she 
states that she does not.   
To make our example more concrete we might imagine the agent’s hypothesis is 
that aliens have created and faked the amassed data and disconcerting evidence with the 
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goal of creating strife on Earth. Of course, she is then asked to defend her presentation of 
this scenario and her defense is that her hypothesis is consistent with the evidence, and it 
is in fact logically possible.  The only appropriate response is not only to dismiss her 
scenario as having a very small degree of likelihood, it would be appropriate to be 
angered about her presentation.  Valuable time and money and effort have been wasted.  
These agents are in a context in which decisions must be made and made within a certain 
framework.  They are in a context in which mere logical possibilities are not only 
irrelevant but inappropriate and destructive to the epistemic constraints and goals in the 
context.  They are concerned with what is likely, not what is possible, and, thus, in order 
for the agents to fulfill their epistemic duties in this context they must develop hypotheses 
that they themselves prefer and believe to be likely.  They must have some reason for 
thinking their alternative is the most likely explanation. 
The agents in the above example are focused primarily on arriving at truth, and 
the standards for adequate evidence are relatively high given the serious nature of the 
inquiry.  It is the concrete time limitations that prevent them from entertaining every 
possible explanation, not their pragmatic or non-epistemic goals whatever those might be.   
It is because of such time constraints and the goal of arriving at a well-founded 
hypothesis that they ignore the merely logically possible.  They cannot both entertain 
every option and come to a likely conclusion within the given time frame.  So, it is for the 
sake of pursuing truth that some possibilities are ignored.  One way to formulate the 
thesis of this argument is that the skeptic is like the agent in this example.  She presents 
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mere possibilities in contexts that require contending alternatives to be on stronger 
epistemic grounds than merely logically possible.42   
The above is the sense in which the skeptic commits the fallacy of accident.  She 
has applied the Rule of Exclusion to a set of alternatives for which it was never meant to 
apply.  In general the rule of exclusion requires agents to have evidence or reasons to rule 
out contending alternatives in order to be justified in preferring one over the other.  And, 
in general, one is required to have evidence that speaks against the contending 
alternatives.  However, it is also true that the Rule of Exclusion is meant to apply for 
well-founded alternatives.  The reason for this is clear.  First, we tend to think that agents 
who ignore well-founded competitors are doing so for non-epistemic reasons; this 
motivates the worry that such agents are indeed being irrational and irresponsible in their 
belief.  However, it also seems to be true that we do not apply the Rule of Exclusion to 
each and every alternative hypothesis; we do quickly reject alternatives that we deem far-
fetched or insufficiently grounded.  This latter phenomenon characterizes skepticism 
better than the scenario in which an agent presents a well-founded alternative only to be 
dismissed without sufficient reason.  
Notice that I am not making the contentious claim that skeptical hypotheses are 
unlikely.  Nor am I committed to the contentious claim some relevant alternatives 
solutions have used to ground their arguments. The contentious claim is that skeptical 
alternatives are not relevant because they are unlikely, and they are unlikely because they 
                                                 
42 However, to be fair, this is too hard on the skeptic.  My own sense is that skeptics do not actually present 
skeptical hypotheses in everyday life – they are presented in philosophical contexts.  The mistake is made 
when we philosophers go along with the skeptic in thinking that raising relevant alternatives is as simple as 
mentioning them - with the result that skeptical hypotheses can easily become genuine competitors to our 
everyday beliefs.  The result of this hasty move is that we philosophers develop the worry that our everyday 
beliefs have been undermined by skepticism.  The argument being pursued here is that such is not the case.   
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occur in remote possible worlds.  Such a view is seen in Keith DeRose’s claim that he has 
hands is sensitive betrays his conviction that skeptical worlds are remote possible worlds, 
thereby allowing him the conclusion that his claim to have hands is sensitive with regard 
to all relevant possible worlds.43  If we include our background beliefs in the assessment 
of skeptical alternatives, then it seems we are justified in treating them as unlikely 
contenders.  They are unlikely because our background beliefs tell us such a hypothesis is 
far-fetched.  However, such a move involves allowing biased beliefs to factor into 
rejecting skeptical alternatives.  The skeptic has a legitimate criticism of begging the 
question if we were to make such a move.   
Rather, my argument is grounded in the claim that skeptical hypotheses are 
logically neutral – they are neither likely nor unlikely.  There is no reason or evidence to 
believe that skeptical alternatives, such as the BIV hypothesis, do in fact hold, nor is there 
any reason or evidence to believe that it does not hold.  Skeptical hypotheses, therefore, 
are merely logically possible, and, as such, they are ignored in the context of everyday 
life.   My argument is that such an attitude towards the logically possible is both 
warranted epistemically and required pragmatically.   
In order to substantiate this position further, a little should be said about why the 
skeptic’s sense of what is relevant is not appropriate.  What we are concerned about here 
is the possibility that the skeptic can claim that we should be concerned about her 
skeptical scenarios, and that we should be so concerned, regardless of what she takes to 
be the merely practical constraints of the context.  In order to address this we need to 
establish two things: (1) what the skeptic takes to be merely practical constraints are 
epistemic as well, such that the norms stemming from the practical constraints are 
                                                 
43 Keith DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” 18. 
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epistemic rather than pragmatic, and (2) that knowledge is possible within the first- 
person context of everyday life.  Arguing for (1) and (2) should allow us to block the 
above possible move on the part of the skeptic. First, the skeptic might contend as many 
have been inclined to that our reasons for ignoring skeptical alternatives are grounded in 
the non-epistemic, and, therefore, cannot serve as epistemic justification.  To argue for 
(1) we need to show as I have argued thus far that our reasons for ignoring skeptical 
alternatives are epistemic.  However, the argument as it stands offers some kind of 
subjective sense of justification.  The latter part of this chapter and the bulk of a later 
chapter will focus on substantiating the claim that an assumption of reliability regarding 
sensory experience results in the attainment of more truth.   
Secondly, the skeptic may want to argue that the practical constraints of the first 
person context prevent the attainment of true knowledge.  The skeptic might be inclined 
to say in response to the argument above that since we cannot fully avoid error, then we 
cannot pursue or attain true knowledge in the context of everyday life.  I have presented 
the skeptic as requiring that we must rule out all possibilities of error in order to count as 
knowing.  However, I have argued that to adopt such a standard will amount to avoiding 
error at the cost of pursuing truth with the conclusion that the skeptic’s standards are 
obviously too high and too stringent.  If we must choose between avoiding all possible 
error or the pursuit of truth, we should choose the pursuit of truth.  However, there is 
nothing to prevent the skeptic from arguing the other way.  She could very well argue 
that if we cannot avoid error to the degree she thinks necessary in order to count as 
knowing, then she may be inclined to conclude that true knowledge is not possible in the 
context of everyday life.    
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The bulk of this chapter and the next are spent offering an epistemic defense of 
our assumption that sensory experience is reliable.  Therefore, I want to address this 
second potential response on the part of the skeptic before returning to the rest of the 
argument at hand.  Admittedly, this second potential move on the part of the skeptic is 
more difficult to address.  In terms of the semantics of the verb, a skeptic might be 
inclined to argue that “to know” is an example of a term that might apply loosely in 
certain contexts but whose truth-conditions are never literally met.  If this is the crux of 
skepticism as it may well be, then we might find ourselves at a loss for ways to respond 
on the approach I have taken here. If the skeptic simply stipulates that knowledge 
requires certainty, this will imply that an agent must be able to rule out all possibilities of 
error for definitive reasons, which will include the ability to rule out skeptical 
hypotheses.  Clearly, on such a definition of knowledge, knowledge in everyday life will 
be fairly unlikely.  On such a definition, knowledge, if possible at all, will be the result of 
much thought and work outside of the constraints of everyday life.  So that it will be 
mathematicians and philosophers (on occasion) that will count as possessing knowledge.  
The disagreement we might have with the skeptic here will stem from fundamentally 
different intuitions on what knowledge is.   
However, there are a few things we can say in response to such a move.  It is 
possible to make arguments to the effect that the skeptic’s intuitions are out of line with 
how most use the term “knowledge”.  There is a large body of evidence that indicates that 
as a matter of fact we accept knowledge as consistent with the possibility of error.   
Nonetheless, there have been philosophers who have notoriously rejected this standard of 
knowledge in favor of more stringent standards.  Having said this, I still have a strong 
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sense that if philosophers or skeptics stipulate that knowledge implies certainty, which 
itself implies having strong grounds for ruling out skeptical hypotheses (after they have 
been introduced), then we have the right to question such a stipulation. Such an 
epistemology dismisses by definitional fiat much of what is of interest in epistemology 
and reduces a concept that appears to have fundamental importance in our real lives to a 
classroom novelty.  To my mind, there is enough that is unappealing in this approach to 
justify trying to avoid it.  Such a response will require that we not allow or not get on 
board with a skeptic who insists that knowledge implies certainty.44   
Notice that such a skeptic will be committed to a much broader skepticism than 
external world skepticism.  If the argument that drives the skeptical conclusion regarding 
sensory experience is that sensory experience is not the kind of evidence that allows one 
to rule out all error possibilities with evidence that speaks against them, then such 
skeptical reasoning will apply to most of our methods of belief formation if not all of 
them.  Descartes reasoned along these lines for much of the first Meditation, and if we 
follow this line of reasoning, we will end with the same kind of global skepticism that 
Descartes found himself in, and we are likely to struggle just as much to get out of such 
global skepticism.  It is just a fact that most if not all of our methods of belief formation 
are fallible; even a priori reasoning is fallible.   Some have been inclined to conclude on 
the heels of such reasoning that knowledge is a term whose truth conditions are never 
literally met.  However, such a move seems justifiable only on the heel of failure to 
account for knowledge as consistent with fallibility.  If such an account can be given, 
                                                 
44 Perhaps we want to allow for strong knowledge and weak knowledge.  If the conclusion of skeptical 
arguments is that we often do not know in a strong sense, this does not seem problematic to me.  On such a 
view, what we would be concerned about is any skeptical argument to the effect that we fail to possess 
even weak knowledge of the external world.   
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then there is no motivation to characterize the semantics of “to know” in a way in which 
the truth conditions are never literally met.         
 
 
3.2.2: Assumptions of reliability are epistemically justified: 
If we allow skeptical alternatives as relevant, the skeptic believes we are at a 
stale-mate.   The usual evidence is consistent with both our ordinary beliefs and skeptical 
alternatives.  Thus, certain breeds of skepticism have encouraged an epistemically neutral 
stance regarding sensory experience.  This stance regarding sensory experience is 
purportedly the only epistemically responsible or rational position in light of the seeming 
stale-mate.  If this skeptical reasoning is sound, it will turn out that everyday agents have 
poor epistemic practices because they generally assume the reliability of sensory 
experience.  
In this section we must defend the idea that skeptical alternatives can be ruled out 
simply on the grounds that mere possibilities of error are not sufficient to overwhelm a 
warrant to assume reliability.  First, let’s note that the skeptic wants to have her cake and 
eat it too.  She wants to raise a skeptical hypothesis without any evidence of its 
likelihood, and, yet, wants the stricter standards of evidence for ruling out her hypothesis.  
The stricter standard would be to require evidence that speaks against the hypothesis as 
the only sufficient grounds for ruling it out.  This criterion would amount to the 
requirement that an agent must know that not-H, where H is some skeptical hypothesis, in 
order to rule it out.  However, we can ask why it is that the skeptic is entitled to raise 
alternatives on such weak grounds and expect such strong grounds for ruling out her 
96 
 
alternative.  It is not as though raising alternatives in the context of everyday life is 
without its consequences and implications for the pursuit of truth.  Thought experiment G 
demonstrated that the contemplation of an alternative uses resources with the implication 
that doing such can hamper the epistemic goal of pursuing truth.  Thus, we might 
conclude that it not only possible to be irresponsible in ruling out alternatives, it is 
possible to be epistemically irresponsible in raising them as well. 
Let us look in detail at what might follow if we were to practice a skeptical stance 
with regard to sensory experience.  If we are not entitled to assume reliability, then it will 
follow that we either violate our epistemic responsibilities or take an epistemically 
neutral stance with regard to sensory experience.  If there are problems applying or 
practicing a theory or philosophical position, it is good reason to think that there are 
problems in the theory itself.  What might follow if we are not entitled to assume the 
reliability of the senses?  First, note that if we were to do such it would amount to 
sacrificing the pursuit of truth regarding our external world for the sake of avoiding all 
risk of error.  While we are concerned with error for good reason, we are not so 
concerned as to give up the pursuit of truth.  This is so particularly in circumstances like 
those of skepticism in which there is no positive reason to think we are in error.    
Let us imagine what we might say if we were to grant the skeptic her worries.  
What concrete proposal follows in light of this concession?  Shall we stop relying on 
sensory experience?  Such a proposal seems difficult, if not impossible to follow, and, 
frankly, like quite bad advice.  Perhaps the skeptic thinks a more subtle shift is in order. 
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Perhaps we should simply stop claiming knowledge on the basis of sensory experience.45  
I find this approach somewhat inconsistent if not superficial as argued in the previous 
chapter.  Relying on sensory experience should not be a mere practical matter of doing 
what is psychologically compulsive.  The reliance itself embodies the epistemic stance 
that it is a method by which one comes to truth.   
It is the reliance upon sensory experience itself that embodies this epistemic 
stance- not the claim to knowledge.  The claim to knowledge merely comes on the heels 
of the assumption of reliability.  Relying on sensory experience to determine our beliefs 
about our environment is no small practical matter.  It is a matter of central importance in 
our epistemic lives.  What beliefs are more central and fundamental than those we form 
about our immediate environment?  We rely on sensory experience with the belief that 
we are attaining truth.  The claims to knowledge are a secondary and less important 
reflection of this more fundamental epistemic stance of endorsement.  Thus, if relying on 
sensory experience is a violation of our epistemic duties with the conclusion that agents 
who do so are irrational, then refraining from claiming knowledge does very little if 
anything at all to save agents from such epistemic failure.   
Returning now to the first possible move, the skeptic might contend that our 
dismissal of skeptical hypotheses is being made on pragmatic rather than epistemic 
grounds.  If we recall the first possible move the skeptic might make it to insist that it is 
for pragmatic reasons that we refuse to count skeptical alternatives as relevant in the 
context of everyday life.  So let us review the reasons for thinking that our dismissal of 
skeptical alternatives is grounded in the epistemic.   
                                                 
45 Such an approach would be in the spirit of Pyrrhonian skepticism.  Since we do not know whether or not 
we know, we had best suspend judgment on the issue.  Thus, neither claiming nor denying knowledge is 
appropriate on this line of reasoning.   
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Imagine the effects for attaining truths if everyday agents actually took seriously 
each and every logical possibility.  The effect of such a practice would be that everyday 
knowers would start to look a whole lot like philosophers.  Knowers would begin to feel 
as though they need to rule out and address every possibility prior to endorsing 
something.    If we imagine this practice in real life, the consequences for the attainment 
of truth are profound.  If everyday knowers did not have the entitlement to dismiss mere 
logical possibilities, it would come at the cost of the attainment of many possible truths.  
The epistemic goal of avoiding error cannot come at such a huge cost to the goal of 
attaining truth.   
The result of this deeply embedded hierarchy of epistemic values is that it is for 
epistemic reasons that we risk some possibility of error – it is for the sake of possibly 
attaining truth that we take a leap of faith.  It is for epistemic reasons that we operate with 
an assumption of reliability for most of our fundamental methods of belief formation.   A 
possibility of error is not sufficient to dislodge this assumption of reliability.  Rather, we 
will want to endorse the looser requirement that we need only question our method of 
belief formation in light of evidence that said method is in fact unreliable or in light of 
evidence the existence of which an agent should be aware of.   Of course, the skeptic has 
not met this standard. 
If this were not the case, if we did not form beliefs in the context of everyday life 
and within the very concrete parameters of our environment, we might pursue truth in a 
way that looks very different.   In fact, this is precisely what philosophers do.  It is 
philosophers who broaden the scope of what is relevant in order to take a fuller view of 
what is possible and what might be.  But we should not assume that practices appropriate 
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for the philosophy classroom are epistemically appropriate in the context of everyday 
life.46   
Notice that we need not be committed to denying evidentialism.47  Evidentialism 
is the view that if two agents possess the same evidence with regard to belief p, then they 
stand in a similar epistemic situation with regard to p.  Denying evidentialism amounts to 
claiming that two agents can possess the same evidence for p, and, yet, be on different 
epistemic grounds with regard to p.  Such divergence would need to be accounted for in 
terms of the pragmatic differences between the agents’ contexts.  If we allow pragmatic 
differences to affect epistemic standing, then we have included a distinctly pragmatic 
component into the concept of epistemic justification.   
While my view might easily seem to be arguing against evidentialism, I do not 
think it necessary that it should.  I am inclined to factor the concrete parameters of the 
everyday context in somewhere other than in terms of epistemic justification.   We need 
not claim that the evidence the everyday knower possesses is not sufficient in the 
philosophy classroom, such that the everyday knower is justified in her belief that she has 
hands but the philosopher is not so justified.  Rather, it seems perfectly plausible to claim 
that both are equally epistemically justified, but the philosopher has spent more time 
analyzing and understanding her justification. Such reflection might have other benefits 
rather than resulting in a fundamentally stronger epistemic stance.   Perhaps the result of 
                                                 
46 Since I have already engaged in a little philosophy-bashing here, we might as well go all the way.  I 
suspect that it is a very good test of a propensity for philosophy to bring up a skeptical alternative in class 
and see how students react.  Those students who are concerned and paralyzed by the skeptical hypothesis 
show a strong propensity to philosophize.  They are willing to expand the boundaries of what is relevant.  
On the other hand, those students who find it silly to spend time thinking about such wild hypotheses show 
a good dose of common sense, but would probably make for very bad philosophers.   
47 See Feldman and Conee, “Evidentialism,” 310-322. 
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philosophical reflection is added comfort and security resulting in the knowledge that a 
decision made quickly was ultimately the right decision after all. 
Alternately, we might endorse Foley’s distinction between epistemically rational 
belief and responsible belief.  Where epistemically rational belief is tied to epistemic 
justification and responsible belief involves epistemic justification as well as all other 
pragmatic issues that factor into belief.  Responsible belief, according to Foley, is belief 
that one’s procedures with respect to p have been acceptable in light of limitations on 
time, and in light of all of one’s goals.  On such a view then we might be inclined to say 
that what amounts to responsible belief for the everyday knower, who faces time 
constraints the philosopher does not, does not amount to responsible belief for the 
philosopher.  However, both the philosopher and everyday knower are justified in their 
belief that they have hands grounded in the sensory experience of seeing and feeling 
hands.  Thus we would characterize both as having epistemically rational belief. 
In Knowledge and Practical Interest Jason Stanley offers reasons to treat a 
contextualist position that treats knowledge as indexical with some prima facie suspicion.  
He argues convincingly that “knowledge” does not behave in the same way that 
uncontested indexicals do.48  For example, with classic indexicals it’s not problematic to 
shift standards within a given sentence or a brief exchange.  However, it does not seem so 
easy to shift standards for “knowledge”, and if such standards did shift in the way that 
classical indexicals do, then it would be problematic for those philosophers who wish to 
use such shifts to diagnose skepticism and offer a solution.  If it is not inappropriate to 
shift the standards in a given exchange, then the anti-skeptical conclusion of a 
                                                 
48 Jason Stanley, “Knowledge and Practical Interest,” selections in Epistemology: An Anthology, ed. by 
Ernest Sosa, et al (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 727. 
101 
 
contextualist position is lost.  Thus, if “knowledge” does behave like other indexicals. 
then a contextualist view based on such a position would have to be more concessive to 
the skeptic than previously thought.   
Largely for the above reasons, I do not wish to endorse a contextualist view of 
knowledge.   It seems that such purported shifts in the standards for knowledge would 
likely be accounted for in shifts of what counts as “adequate evidence.”  It should be 
noted on the view I am endorsing here, the standards for knowledge possession remain 
the same.  Perhaps the standards for knowledge ascriptions shift slightly when we shift 
from an everyday context into a philosophical one, or shift slightly when the pragmatic 
factors in the context shift (i.e. if we change into a context in which there is a lot riding 
on the belief in question).  However, one of the aims of this chapter is to show that even 
in the context of knowledge ascriptions, the standards do not shift easily.  The skeptic 
cannot shift standards merely by mentioning her skeptical hypothesis.  As argued, it 
seems to me that in most such contexts, people quickly dismiss that which is merely 
possible.   
Notice the brand of fallibilism about knowledge that is on the table here.  As 
Lewis notes in Elusive Knowledge it just sounds weird to state that “He knows, yet he has 
not eliminated all possibilities of error”49  One of the appealing aspects of the account 
being formulated is that while we are endorsing fallibilism in a sense, we are not 
endorsing this very counter-intuitive version of it.  At this point we want to characterize 
our everyday knower as having rejected all other contenders for epistemic reasons.  The 
agent is in an epistemic state in which she does not believe there are possibilities of error 
                                                 
49 David Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge.” Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader, ed. by DeRose et al (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 221. 
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that she has not ruled out. However, we will grant that her grounds for ruling out some 
hypotheses are not definitive or certain.  This is the element of fallibilism in the account.  
The everyday knower as we have imagined her is an agent that has looked at all serious 
alternatives and ruled them out (or, if she has not done this in practice – she could if 
called upon to do so).   
However, unlike other many other contextualist and relevant alternatives 
solutions, our agent could rule out skeptical hypotheses if called to do so.  Her defense of 
her preference for her ordinary belief is grounded in her reliance upon sensory 
experience.  The response that a mere possibility of error is not sufficient to justify a 
change in her stance regarding sensory experience is an epistemically sound response in 
light of the fact that skeptical alternatives embody error that is merely possible.  The 
skeptic is articulating an alternative approach, that the epistemically responsible stance is 
to not endorse any method that has not been proven reliable, but we are arguing that this 
alternative is not sound epistemic practice. 
The context of the first person is one in which the context dictates epistemic 
norms that emphasize speed and efficiency in order to attain a sufficient amount of truths.  
Thereby, the context of the first person is one in which hypotheses that are seen as 
probable are those that are relevant and cannot be ignored.  Therefore, it is the goal of 
attaining truth that underpins assumptions of reliability.  We cannot both pursue truth and 
entertain every error possibility; we must make a choice and sacrifice the concern for 
error that is merely possible to the goal of attaining truth.  Of course it is not as though 
we abandon the concern to avoid error all together.  Error that seems likely cannot 
properly be ignored.  Thus, error for which we have reason to believe has occurred or is 
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likely to occur cannot properly be ignored; doing so results in violating the duties 
regarding avoiding error.   
 
3.2.3: Agents are not blameworthy for relying on sensory experience: 
 Agents are not blameworthy for a number of reasons, many of which involving 
notions of moral blameworthiness in general.  If we can show that even BIVs are not 
blameworthy for relying on sensory experience, then it will follow that normal agents are 
not either.  This will go the other way as well, if BIVs are blameworthy, then so are 
normal agents.  Blameworthiness cannot turn on the luck of which world is the actual one 
in light of the fact that it is impossible for agents to tell which possible world is actual.   
Let us turn to the concern about whether or not agents are not epistemically 
blameworthy for relying on sensory experience.  Note that in the first person justification 
is largely normative in nature and our epistemic practices seem to be largely guided by 
the intrinsic value of truth.  Agents are not blameworthy for assuming the reliability of 
sensory experience because such an epistemic practice is highly conducive to the 
attainment of truths.  Clearly, we cannot sincerely accept in practice that since our senses 
have not been proven to be reliable we should not rely on them.  The value of truth, like 
all values, must be balanced against other competing values—such is the case in much of 
our moral lives and such is the case in our epistemic endeavors as well.   
The skeptic is asking to put her alternative on the table in the first person 
perspective to have us address it using first person justification (those things we can 
access via reflection alone).  Yet, we have shown that skeptical alternatives are really not 
like usual alternatives.  It is impossible to assess a skeptical hypothesis in the first person 
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because there are no indicators for or against the hypothesis.  The differences are very 
relevant and, therefore, there are important disanalogies between Scenario A and 
Scenario S.  Both Scenario S and Scenario A involve norms about belief formation, in the 
sense that certain ways of forming beliefs are seen as responsible and others are not.  The 
intuition that supports the Rule of Exclusion is an intuition about when belief is 
responsible and when it is not.   
Another way to frame the argument thus far is that there are practical matters that 
inform our epistemic attitudes and practices.  While I do not wish to go as far as some, 
the argument given here does not even require a contextualist account of knowledge, it 
does seem that practical matters have informed the general attitude we have taken 
towards sensory experience.  It seems that our endorsement of the reliability of sensory 
experience only needs to be rational and epistemically justified in light of the practical 
circumstances in which we live.  There is little that compels one to accept or endorse 
anything stronger than this.  I have argued that endorsing sensory experience, and, our 
assumption of its reliability is epistemically sound.   
 
3.3: Other Relevant Alternatives Views: 
 Other relevant alternatives views have struggled to articulate when and how 
skeptical alternatives become relevant.  The consensus seems to be that if the agents of 
the context accept the shift in standards that allowing skeptical alternatives involves, then 
the agents will shift into a skeptical context.50  So the standard view seems to be that 
                                                 
50 Such a view is seen in Duncan Pritchard’s discussion of knowledge ascriptions in Epistemic Luck, David 
Lewis’s “Elusive Knowledge”, Stewart Cohen’s “Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems,” 
Gail Stine’s “Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure”, as well as Dretske’s “Epistemic 
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someone in the context raises skeptical hypotheses, and the others tend to engage the 
hypothesis or not.  Some views make it look as though the mere mentioning of an 
alternative forces the context to become a skeptical one. This follows from the fact that 
such views tend to endorse a contextualist view of knowledge and on such a view, the 
standards for knowledge shift.  It has turned out on some views that skeptical alternatives 
are not relevant because of the happy accident that no one has raised such an alternative 
in the context.  Many contextualist views indicate that raising an alternative is as easy as 
mentioning the alternative.  Duncan Pritchard gives a contextualist reading of knowledge 
ascriptions in his Epistemic Luck and in this such views are quite vulnerable to 
skepticism and largely concessive to it.  The skeptic need only mention her skeptical 
alternatives in order to refute our claims to know.  Though it may not follow that we fail 
to know in ordinary contexts, such is the result of too much that is accident and luck.    
However, if we find epistemic grounds for treating skeptical alternatives as 
irrelevant, then perhaps we have moved away from the spirit of the relevant alternatives 
view in general.  Such might be said of the view I have offered here.  Rather than being a 
relevant alternatives view, it might be said that I am simply offering reasons for rejecting 
skeptical alternatives, thus I need not rely on a notion of relevant alternatives.  I have 
characterized my view as a relevant alternatives view because it is my sense that our de 
facto position in everyday life is that skeptical alternatives are not relevant.  They are not 
part of what we consider in everyday life.  This is the sense in which my view is a 
relevant alternatives approach.  Additionally, it has not been my goal to claim that we 
know that not –H, where H is any given skeptical hypothesis.  Instead, my claim is that H 
                                                                                                                                                 
Operators” to name a few.  Each of these views discusses the skeptical context as though it is one we get 
into by having a skeptic raise a skeptical alternative via discussing the alternative. 
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is not relevant.  Where a claim to know that not-H requires some evidence/reasons in 
favor of that specific hypothesis, a claim that not-H is epistemically irrelevant or 
inappropriate in the context is a different and epistemically weaker claim. 
 If we were to develop a full account of conditions in which alternatives may 
properly be ignored, one of those conditions would be that the merely logically possible 
is properly ignored on the straightforward grounds that the logically possible is not 
sufficiently grounded to justify the time it takes to consider it seriously.   This will follow 
from the fact that the time it takes to consider an alternative seriously is time taken from 
the pursuit of truth and the contemplation of hypotheses that are on stronger grounds. 
There are realities to the formation of belief and the attainment of knowledge in the real 
world that we philosophers have been too inclined to ignore or dismiss.  However, it is in 
these real-world considerations that a solution to skepticism lies.   
 
3.4: Assumptions of Reliability about Sensory Experience are Truth-Conducive: 
 That the above practice is grounded in the epistemic rather than the pragmatic 
results from the following:  it is for the sake of truth that we ignore error scenarios that 
are merely possible.  The argument in this section is an outline of the argument in the 
next chapter.  The argument in the previous sections of this chapter was meant to 
establish that from our first person perspective, in a subjective sense, we ignore 
possibilities of error for the sake of pursuing truth. My contention in this section to be 
filled out in the next chapter is that doing so results in the attainment of more truths.   
This will imply that assumptions of reliability are objectively truth conducive.   
Admittedly, we are forced to alter our analysis of truth-conducive from the traditional use 
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of this concept.  The details of this shift and the reasons for it are defended in the next 
chapter, but the gist of that argument is outlined below. 
Let’s imagine that agents in all possible worlds operate with assumptions of 
reliability regarding sensory experience.  If agents in both normal and skeptical worlds 
rely on sensory experience, then agents in normal worlds would attain more truths by so 
doing, while agents in skeptical worlds would attain more false beliefs.   
On the other hand, if all agents act in accordance with skepticism and endorse 
only those methods that have been proven reliable, then agents in both skeptical and non-
skeptical worlds will remain epistemically neutral with regard to sensory experience.  
The result of this practice would be that agents in skeptical worlds would have 
significantly less false beliefs, but, notice that their restraint would not result in more true 
beliefs either since they have not been provided a route to such empirical truths.  
Empirical truths are not possible truths for skeptical agents; such is the result of the 
mechanism of deception in skeptical scenarios.  Note also that agents in normal worlds 
would be missing out on their possible true beliefs because they have followed the 
skeptic’s strict standards against assumptions of reliability.  Thus, while there are less 
false beliefs in this scenario, this practice results in the loss of truth as well.  Indeed, in 
this scenario, no one is attaining truths about themselves and their environment. 
It will follow that relying on sensory experience results in more true beliefs.  
Granted, it may not result in more true beliefs over false ones, but it results in a greater 
amount of truth when compared with the skeptic’s alternative approach regarding sensory 
experience.  Additionally, notice that assuming the reliability of the senses generates truth 
in a way that refraining from doing so does not.  So we might characterize the skeptic’s 
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approach as the epistemic approach that avoids error, but it is not an approach that attains 
truth.   
This is precisely the sense I mean when I claim that we value truth more than we 
care to avoid error.  While both are important, if we have to choose, we will risk some 
error in order to attain truth, even if it is only possible truth.  Not relying on sensory 
experience dooms us to the loss of truth even if we are agents in normal worlds; it puts us 
in the same boat as the skeptic even if we are agents in normal worlds.  Such a practice 
cannot seriously be defended on the grounds that it is the only epistemically rational or 
responsible path.  That agents in skeptical worlds would have less false beliefs by not 
relying on sensory experience is of little comfort considering that their restraint does not 
result in the attainment of truth.  The avoidance of error becomes important specifically 
in contexts where avoiding a problematic method of belief formation opens the door to 
the attainment of truth.   
In summary, if our choice is to follow the skeptic and not rely on a method of 
belief formation unless it has been proven to be reliable in the most general sense, or, 
alternately, to assume reliability unless or until there is evidence to the contrary, the latter 
practice lends itself better to the pursuit of truth than the former.   The former lends itself 
to the avoidance of error, but not the pursuit of truth.  This is the sense in which we 
cannot pursue both our primary epistemic goals fully.  I contend while we are concerned 
about error, we care primarily for truth.  This hierarchy grounds assumptions of 
reliability, grounds treating skeptical hypotheses as irrelevant, and grounds the claim that 
agents are not blameworthy for relying on sensory experience.  If assumptions of 
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reliability are truth-conducive then there are no grounds for blaming agents for operating 
with such assumptions.   
I have argued that our entitlement to treat skeptical alternatives as irrelevant 
results from our entitlement to prioritize the pursuit of truth over the avoidance of error.  
This ranked priority underlies assumptions of reliability and the Assumption of 
Reliability principle that goes as follows: 
AR Principle: Agents are entitled to assume the reliability of a method of 
belief formation unless (1) there is evidence to the contrary or (2) there 
exist evidence/reasons of unreliability that a reasonable agent should be 
aware of. 
 
The AR principle results in significantly more truth than its competitors.  The competitors 
under consideration in this argument may be formulated into the following two 
principles: the skeptic’s principle, and the reckless believer principle:  
SK principle:  Agents are entitled to rely on a method of belief formation 
only if the method has been proven to be fully reliable.51 
 
Or the following looser Reckless Believer principle might serve instead: 
RB principle: Agents are entitled to rely on methods of belief formation 
despite known or easily known evidence to the contrary. 
 
The justification for AR lies in the truth-conduciveness of this principle over its 
competitors.  It turns out that in light of various limitations of the first person and the 
facts of fallibility that the SK principle results in the conclusion that no methods of belief 
formation fulfill the conditions of this principle.  The thought experiment in the next 
                                                 
51 We might formulate the skeptic’s stance in a number of ways.  This formulation does strike me as fair to 
the skeptic.  In raising a relevant alternative, the skeptic is pointing out that possibility of error that seems 
least likely to have been accounted for.  To insist that we rule it out is to demand that we have non-circular, 
non-question begging, evidence that shows the reliability of sensory experience, i.e. which shows that we 
are not brains in vats.  This is what I mean when I characterize the skeptic’s stance as one that requires we 
endorse only those methods that have been proven fully reliable. 
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chapter demonstrates how the SK principle fails as a reasonable meta-epistemic principle 
in light of these constraints.   It is clear that the SK principle fails to attain truth, because 
it fails to endorse any method of belief formation.  The Skeptic has traditionally defended 
the SK principle as the epistemically rational approach, but in this light we can see the 
skeptic’s approach is best summarized as the approach that abandons the epistemic 
project all together (this is not surprising).  The abandonment of the pursuit of truth is 
supposedly justified according to the skeptic because it involves some risk of error, but if 
it is true that a concern for error derives from the intrinsic value of truth, then we can see 
the skeptic’s approach as epistemically backwards.   
And, clearly, the Reckless Believer principle results in too many false beliefs.  
Additionally, the false beliefs that result from the RB principle are likely to cost truths as 
well.  The RB principle is liable to cost truths for a number of reasons:  reliance on a 
faulty method is likely to come at the cost of using a more reliable method that results in 
truth, and false beliefs act as filters once they become background beliefs thus increasing 
the likelihood of further false beliefs.  So both of these alternative meta-principles result 
in the loss of truth; one because it is too concerned with error and the other because it is 
not concerned enough.   
 
 
3.3: Conclusion: 
The distinction between epistemic and merely pragmatic concerns has 
traditionally been made too sharply.52  The constraints in the first person are not the result 
                                                 
52 Jason Stanley gives a detailed discussion of this issue in Knowledge and Practical Interest.  Though I do 
not wish to endorse a version as strong as the one he presents; I am contending the milder version that our 
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of prioritizing pragmatic or psychological factors over epistemic ones, as both Hume and 
Descartes claimed.  Instead, our goal in everyday life continues to be the epistemic goal 
of attaining truth.  It is this primary epistemic goal combined with various concrete 
limitations in everyday life that produces the result that if we are to attain sufficient 
amount of possible truths, we must ignore mere logical possibilities.   
It is the concrete limitations of the context that creates the scenario in which two 
fundamental epistemic values are in conflict – the goal of attaining truth, and the goal of 
avoiding error.  Thus, we must balance these two and occasionally sacrifice one for the 
other.  Thus, in everyday life we are concerned when we have evidence that indicates our 
method is unreliable, or we are concerned if there is evidence of error that an agent 
should be aware of.  However, being concerned about mere possibilities of error is to be 
concerned about error to the exclusion of the attainment of truth in a way that is not 
acceptable.   
Thus, there is more to what makes an alternative relevant than the mere 
mentioning of the alternative.  Such a criteria is simply too loose.  If this were our 
criteria, belief formation could be held hostage by any possibility someone might raise.   
The consequences of such a loose practice would again come at the cost of not having 
time enough to attain possible truths.  
I contend that the view put forward here accounts for a very prevalent intuition 
regarding skeptical hypotheses.  A common response to skeptical worries comes in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
concrete parameters should be taken into account when assessing whether or not belief is justified.  I am 
arguing strongly that parameters of belief formation must be taken into account particularly in the first 
person aspect of justification.  Nonetheless, as will be clarified in a later chapter I do not mean this to be an 
endorsement of an overly subjective view of justification.  I will ultimately aim to argue that our reliance 
on sensory experience is both subjectively and objectively justified.  We possess truth-conducive 
justification for relying on sensory experience both from the perspective of the knower and from an 
objective perspective.   
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form of the “Aw, come on!” response DeRose noted from many of his students when 
presented with skeptical hypotheses.53  Indeed, many find the contemplation of skeptical 
alternatives ridiculous even in the philosophy classroom.  The prevalence of this response 
in everyday life in which real consequences are in the balance is even higher.  This 
accounts for the lack of skeptical alternatives under serious consideration in everyday 
life.  Under the view here the reason for this response is that skeptical alternatives are 
only logically possible and the logically possible is not relevant in everyday life because 
allowing such hampers the likelihood of arriving at well founded and probable 
hypotheses in the time frames given in most everyday circumstances.  
When accounting for skepticism many think that epistemologists are required to 
provide an account of the appeal of skepticism as well as account for the possibility of 
knowledge.  It seems more is required.  Skepticism is a distinctly philosophical problem.  
It is surprisingly absent in the discourse of everyday life.  Everyday agents think nothing 
of dismissing skeptical alternatives even after they have been raised.  This is so to such 
an extreme that it is almost an embarrassment to Philosophy that we continue to invest so 
much time in warding off the skeptic.  To present the conclusion to the world that we 
have finally found reason to dismiss the worry that we are really brains in vats is not 
likely to be met with relief on the part of non-philosophers.  Most solutions to skepticism 
cannot account for how very wrong skepticism seems to most.  The view here captures 
how very backwards the skeptic’s approach is.  When we dislodge the skeptic’s “King of 
the Mountain”54 stance, and evaluate skepticism as a general epistemic approach and 
                                                 
53 DeRose, “Introduction,” 3. 
54 The “King of the Mountain” phrase is used by Keith DeRose to describe the challenge of trying to 
provide a refutation to skepticism.  His contextualist argument relies heavily on the notion that skeptical 
alternatives embody possible worlds that are remote, and, thus, are not likely and not relevant.  He rejects 
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factor in the realities of belief formation outside the philosophical context, we can see 
how crazy it seems to sacrifice the pursuit of truth simply because we might be wrong.  
When we say that it sounds odd to say “I know p, but I might be wrong about p” what we 
mean by that is that we have ruled out all relevant error-possibilities.  Claiming 
knowledge with the awareness that there may be some unforeseen, unknown, 
unaccounted for error is not counter-intuitive.   What is counter-intuitive is claiming 
knowledge with real and probable error possibilities that have not been ruled out.  Of 
course, we are not endorsing knowledge ascriptions as consistent with the latter.  
Many have given contextual analyses of standards for evidence.  On many such 
analyses the standards for adequate evidence rise when the pragmatic and non-epistemic 
consequences are high.  This sort of view accounts for the fact that our epistemic goals 
are not our only concern, and as non-ideal agents forming beliefs both our epistemic and 
non-epistemic concerns factor into the weight given each specific goal at the moment.   
However, the view under consideration here is not quite of the same variety.  The 
argument under consideration here is founded on the claim that our epistemic norms 
themselves can conflict in various contexts in much the same way that moral norms can 
conflict.  In just the same way that we cannot fully value the freedom of the individual 
and protect individuals from outside harm, we cannot fully avoid error and pursue truth at 
                                                                                                                                                 
the notion that he is begging the question against the skeptic.  However, since his position involves the 
claim that skeptical worlds are remote possible worlds, his argument involves an assumption about which 
possible world is actual (ie. He assumes we’re in a normal world), and moves from there.  In the argument I 
have given I avoid such an assumption.  My argument to dismiss skeptical alternatives is grounded in the 
claim that skeptical alternatives have no evidence or reasoning to show that they are likely, thus they are 
not sufficiently grounded to warrant the time it takes to consider them seriously.  Nonetheless, we might 
think of the argument given here as offering support for those fundamental assumptions; the assumption 
that sensory experience is in fact reliable in our world is just such a fundamental assumption.  If such an 
assumption can be shown to be epistemically advantageous, then perhaps we are not begging the question 
against the skeptic after all.  If there is a true stale-mate between the skeptic’s and non-skeptic’s positions, 
then such “small” considerations as that which is advantageous both practically and epistemically may be 
sufficient to justify the non-skeptic’s stance. 
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the same time.  Granted, there is much room to overlap both of these goals, but the 
skeptic’s stance is one of being so concerned for error to the point of excluding the 
pursuit of truth.  So it is for epistemic reasons on this view that we ignore some 
possibilities of error.  Namely, it is for the sake of raising the probability of arriving at 
truth that we ignore some possibilities of error.   
I think this is the heart of the “Aw, come on!” complaint against skepticism.  It is 
not sufficient to give a solution against skepticism that gives us a technical way out from 
its pernicious conclusions.  We need an account that not only shows us where the skeptic 
goes wrong, but also does justice to the intuition that the contemplation of every error 
possibility no matter how un-grounded is not good epistemic practice.  This is the 
intuition behind the “Aw, Come on!” response. 
As noted earlier in the chapter, there are some clear limitations to this response.  
The response is designed to articulate what values the skeptical and non-skeptical 
positions embody.    As a result of the largely normative evaluation given here, the 
discussion is not one that will yield a refutation.  Rather, it yields a discussion of the 
normative element that drives each position respectively in a way that mitigates the worry 
that the skeptic has the upper ground in her position regarding sensory experience. 
Lastly it should be noted that the argument given above is, in many ways, not all 
that surprising.  If we reject Descartes’ standard of setting aside that which admits of any 
doubt, the standard of certainty, then we are likely to find skeptical hypotheses less than 
motivating grounds for doubting or rejecting our external world beliefs.  The debate 
centers on which standard; that of fallibility or infallibility is the true standard of 
everyday life.  I contend the extent of knowledge claims made and maintained in light of 
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the possibility of error, the lack of practicing skeptics walking around, and the view of 
science as paradigmatic knowledge attainment as evidence that the concept of knowledge 
as we use it in everyday life is consistent with the possibility of error.  That is, we seem 
to endorse a view of knowledge that is consistent with fallibility and stands in stark 
contrast to the standard Descartes set for himself.  If this is so, then the challenge rising 
out of skepticism becomes to understand how such fallible knowledge is possible and 
how we are justified in claiming such knowledge in light of our less-than-definitive 
grounds.  In the next chapter, we will specifically evaluate our reasons for endorsing an 
assumption of reliability regarding sensory experience.  If assumptions of reliability are 
epistemically justified, then so too are the beliefs grounded in them.  Just as Stroud notes 
that if our sources of our beliefs are found wanting, then beliefs grounded in them are 
also found wanting.   
Such a view gives a sense of how knowledge might be fallible; if the grounds we 
have for relying on our primary methods of belief formation are only justified 
assumptions, then the possibility of error is present at the very source of our external 
world beliefs.   
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Cartesian Skepticism as Moral Dilemma 
 
“Justifying Knowledge Ascriptions in Everyday Life” 
 
4.1: Characterizing the Problem 
 Recall the meta-principles regarding assumptions of reliability articulated in the 
conclusion of chapter 3; we noted three distinct possibilities: the Assumption of 
Reliability principle (the AR principle), the Skeptic’s principle (the SK principle), and the 
Reckless Believer principle (the RB principle).  The AR principle is as follows: 
AR Principle: Agents are justified in assuming the reliability of a method 
of belief formation unless (1) there is evidence to the contrary or (2) there 
exist evidence/reasons of unreliability that a reasonable agent should be 
aware of. 
 
And the SK principle that underlies both the under-determination of the evidence and 
closure versions of skepticism is as follows: 
SK principle:  Agents are justified in relying on a method of belief 
formation only if the agent has evidence of reliability at a general level. 
 
While we took a stab at defending the AR principle over the SK principle in the last 
chapter, the aim of this chapter will be to make a stronger defense of the claim that the 
AR principle is conducive to the attainment of truth, whereas the SK principle is not.  
 In order to fend off the criticism that I am equivocating on the concept of a 
method as truth-conducive, I must defend the sense of this concept being employed 
through-out this argument.  Thus, I will argue in this chapter that the notion of truth-
conducive as truth-generating is the best analysis of a method of belief formation in the 
117 
 
context of skepticism.  This argument will turn on the fact that in light of skeptical 
worries we must evaluate reliability from a trans-global perspective, however, a notion of 
truth-conducive that is defined as more-truth-than-error introduces a notion of trans-
global reliability that is not relevant in epistemic analyses.  For this reason I will argue 
that we will want to analyze sensory experience from a trans-global perspective without 
endorsing a notion of trans-global reliability.  Some of this argument will involve 
arguments to the effect that it is global reliability that is relevant in epistemic evaluations 
and that since such assessments cannot be made in light of skeptical alternatives, the 
trans-global perspective allows us to evaluate the AR principle in general, but it does not 
motivate the move towards a notion of reliability founded in trans-global reliability.   
 The above argument is meant to go some way toward defending the original claim 
that the AR principle need only be rational in order to be justified.  We might formulate 
this claim in the following way: the skeptic insists that presuppositions or hinge 
propositions must be epistemically justified in order for the more local claims that depend 
upon them to count as justified.  Alternately, our claim is that presuppositions, or hinge 
propositions, are not directly justification conferring, and, thus, need only be  
epistemically rational in order for the  more specific knowledge claims to be justified.  
Our argument for this thus far has been that the latter standard is conducive to the pursuit 
of truth, whereas the former standard is so stringent as to come close if not amount to a 
standard of certainty regarding the evidence that underpins knowledge claims.  
Additionally, as argued in the last chapter, such a standard sacrifices the pursuit of truth 
to a concern for error to such a large extent that the standard eclipses the pursuit of truth 
in any context in which certainty is not guaranteed.  Thus, we will see in this chapter as in 
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the last that it is ultimately our desire to attain truth that underpins our fundamental 
epistemic attitudes towards error.  In the last chapter we saw that the pursuit of truth and 
the avoidance of error are ultimately epistemic values that drive our first person practices, 
and like many fundamental values the pursuit of these two epistemic goods can conflict, 
and, thus, standards must be developed and embraced that balance the pursuit of these 
two epistemic concerns.  It will be argued more strongly in this chapter that AR reflects 
the best balance between these two epistemic concerns.  Further, it will be argued and 
shown through a thought experiment that our concern for error is ultimately derivative of 
the goal for truth, and that as such it is in a sense logically backwards to sacrifice the 
pursuit of truth out of the possibility of error.   
Thus, in this chapter, as in the last, much will be made of the logical distinction 
between error that is likely (i.e.  error for which there exists evidence or reasons that 
indicate that error is actual or highly possible) versus error that is merely logically 
possible (i.e. error which logic tells us is possible but for which there exists no indicators 
that it is in fact actual error).  It will be argued in this chapter using a thought experiment 
that assumptions regarding reliability are in fact epistemically rational, i.e. which 
contrary to the skeptic’s claims relying upon sensory experience even without any 
epistemic evidence that it is in fact reliable in a global fashion is most consistent with our 
epistemic goals and concerns.  This conclusion is contrary to the skeptical position 
outlined in the introduction of our discussion.  In the introduction we noted that there is 
an implicit charge of irrationality behind many skeptical arguments, including both 
Humean and Cartesian skeptical arguments.  In fact both Descartes and Hume make the 
charge of irrationality in a way that is not so implicit.  Both note that what ultimately 
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accounts for our epistemic reliance on sensory experience is distinctly psychological 
rather than epistemic or rational.  Thus, according to skeptics our everyday epistemic 
practices lack a certain rationality.   So the argument goes that our higher reasoning 
faculties tell us that we have no reason to rely on our sensory experience, but our lower 
animal instincts drive us to ignore such reasoning.  We see in skepticism the classic 
tension between the mind and the lower instincts.  As discussed in the introduction, it is 
this specific aspect of skepticism that I am taking aim at.  Instead, I would like to suggest 
a picture of an animal not in tension with itself but one that is behaving rationally and 
coherently in the context of a contingent and changing external world.  The picture being 
given here is one that is optimistic about the consistency of fallible knowledge.  It is also 
a picture in which man is a rational creature whose everyday epistemic practices in fact 
cohere well with his most fundamental epistemic values.  Thus, I am suggesting that our 
everyday attitude towards sensory experience is one that is rational and able to stand 
against the most thorough scrutiny.  Admittedly though, in order to see this we must 
evaluate the merits of the skeptical stance on its own; we cannot try to answer the 
skeptic’s challenge because to do so is to concede the standard at which the challenge has 
been put.  Rather than meet the skeptical challenge, it seems best to show why agents 
who rarely feel the need to account for skepticism prior to proceeding with their everyday 
knowledge claims are in fact the rational agents in the whole bunch.   
  Note again that the skeptic has no evidence to persuade us that we are wrong to 
rely on sensory experience – in fact, she has no evidence that indicates that we are brains 
in vats or that we are wrong in our beliefs.  What she has, instead, is a logical possibility 
that is incompatible with our beliefs about ourselves and the world in which we live.  So 
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the question as formulated thru out our discussion is to ask what the appropriate 
epistemic response is to such logical possibilities.  As already seen earlier, we should not 
expect the epistemic rules here to be the same as they are when faced with evidence that 
our beliefs are actually false.  A scientist that ignores a hypothesis that is a possibility, but 
for which there is no evidence, is not in the same boat as a scientist that ignores a 
possibility for which there is evidence of its truth.    
 Treating sensory experience as evidence that indicates the truth of skeptical 
hypotheses is awkward because of the massive deception involved in a global skeptical 
scenario.  A skeptical hypothesis is not so much a contention that sensory experience 
indicates the skeptical hypothesis as it is a claim that sensory experience might not 
indicate an external world like the one we take ourselves to be in. So treating sensory 
experience as an indicator in a skeptical hypothesis is akin to treating lies as indicators of 
the truth.  To my mind it is this awkward connection between sensory experience and 
skeptical hypotheses that is at the heart of what is problematic and difficult in figuring 
out how to respond to a skeptical hypothesis.   
The concern at this point in our discussion becomes whether or not we are 
justified in thinking that we possess knowledge, and in ascribing knowledge to ourselves 
and to others in face of the admission to the skeptic that we could be brains in vats.  Prior 
to looking at an argument that offers further defense of the assumption that the senses are 
reliable, let us qualify the kind of solution being offered here.  In the context of everyday 
life, we rely on the senses with the whole-hearted belief that sensory experience is in fact 
reliable.  More than that, both Hume and Descartes seem to be right in thinking that such 
reliance is deeper than one that reflects merely rational or epistemic endorsement.  
121 
 
Sensory experience provides the means for connecting to our world.  Thus, it is the 
avenue of our mental, physical, emotional, and psychological connections to the people 
and world around us.  Without sensory experience of any form we would be restricted to 
the confines of our own minds.  Thus, it seems right to acknowledge that our connection 
to sensory experience is much more than epistemic endorsement.  Sensory experience is 
more than a vehicle to truth.  Its significance extends beyond the scope of the epistemic 
into the social and personal as well.  Thus, we must acknowledge that reflection of our 
reliance on sensory experience from the limited perspective of our epistemic goals will 
fail to do full justice to our dependence upon sensory experience.   
For these reasons any epistemic justification we come up with might seem weak 
in light of the depth of our reliance upon sensory experience.  Additionally, it is 
important to note that some of what is upsetting in the possibility of being a brain in a vat 
extends beyond the epistemic to the deeply emotional and psychological.  We cannot 
expect an approach that focuses on our epistemic reliance upon sensory experience to 
address all of the angst involved in the massive error articulated in skeptical hypotheses.  
Thus, we should anticipate that an epistemic approach to skepticism yield a response that 
justifies our reliance on sensory experience in an epistemic sense, but does not remove all 
of the worry involved in skeptical scenarios.  I think this consequence of our approach is 
appealing because it accounts for a continued worry about skeptical scenarios even if we 
are able to show that our reliance on sensory experience is rational.   Further, a solution 
to skepticism is not likely to come in the form of evidence that we are not brains-in-vats.  
Thus, skeptical alternatives will remain logical possibilities, and the epistemic and 
psychological worry involved in the mere possibility of being a brain-in-a-vat will persist 
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in light of any solution that might be found.  An epistemic solution to skepticism has to 
articulate how we are justified in relying on sensory experience despite the metaphysical 
possibility that we are brains-in-vats.   
This seeming stale-mate with the skeptic is articulated well by Moore.  He 
characterizes the seeming stale-mate in the following way:   
I agree, therefore, with that part of this argument which asserts that if I don’t 
know now that I’m not dreaming, it follows that I don’t know that I am standing 
up, even if both actually am and think that I am.  But this first part of the 
argument is a consideration which cuts both ways.  For, it is true, it follows that it 
is also true that if I do know that I am standing up, then I do know that I am not 
dreaming.  I can therefore just as well argue: since I do know that I’m standing 
up, it follows that I do know that I’m not dreaming; as my opponent can argue: 
since you don’t know that you’re not dreaming, it follows that you don’t know 
that you’re standing up.  The one argument is just as good as the other, unless my 
opponent can give better reasons for asserting that I don’t know that I’m not 
dreaming, than I can give for asserting that I do know that I am standing up.55 
 
Note that while Moore believed he could gain the upper hand in the seeming stale-mate 
by noting his evidence in favor of his claim that he is not dreaming, we are looking to 
gain to the upper hand by asking what reasons there are for endorsing the AR principle 
over the SK principle. 
Before moving on, let’s remember what ground we have made in defending 
external world knowledge claims thus far.  First, it’s been established that relying on 
sensory experience is conducive to attaining truth in the context of everyday life in which 
there are time restrictions on belief formation.  The result is that in such a context, the 
goal of attaining truth conflicts with the goal of avoiding false beliefs, with the 
conclusion that the two must be balanced.  The result of balancing these two epistemic 
goals is that we are epistemically entitled to assumptions of reliability.  In everyday life 
we work with a looser requirement than that of ruling out every single alternative.  
                                                 
55 See Moore,“Certainty,” in Epistemology, 32. 
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Rather, the de facto requirement seems to be that we rule out all alternatives that are 
sufficiently likely.  This practice is epistemically defensible on the grounds that it is 
conducive to the attainment of truth.  Note that this rule allows a view of relevant 
alternatives in which an agent could dismiss a skeptical alternative in a given context 
merely on the grounds that there are not enough evidence/reasons to think the alternative 
is likely.  Such was the case in though experiment G given in chapter 3.  In that example 
it was clear that because the skeptical agent’s hypothesis lacked evidence it was highly 
rational if not prudent for the counsel to ignore her hypothesis as time-wasting, and, 
therefore, destructive to the epistemic goals of the context. 
Next, remember that we are not endorsing knowledge claims on grounds that 
justify saying “I know that p even though it’s possible that not-p”.  Rather, the position 
being developed so far is that skeptical alternatives are not treated as relevant alternatives 
in everyday life for reasons like those given above and in previous chapters.  Instead, the 
position, thus far, is that our knowledge claims in everyday life are the sort in which S 
claims to know that p appropriately in contexts in which S has ruled out all relevant 
alternatives.   
Let us look at the reasoning behind the skeptical position that we fail to possess 
grounds for claiming to know.  Such reasoning would go that in order to claim to know 
that p we must have a justification for thinking that we know that p.  Such a reason will 
often be tantamount to our justification for our belief that p.   Even if such is not the case 
immediately, often, upon reflection, we will provide a claim to know that p based on 
reflecting on our justification for our belief that p.  So, the reasoning will go that in order 
to possess a justification for belief that p, we must have a truth-conducive reason for 
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believing that p.  Not any old “reason” amounts to epistemic justification.  For example, 
an agent may want to treat unreliable hearsay as reason for believing some proposition, 
but that does not make unreliable hearsay sufficient to ground a knowledge claim.  
Epistemic justification is unique in that it has a connection to truth.  This connection 
between epistemic justification and truth is one that prevents accidentally true beliefs 
from counting as sufficient for knowledge.56 
However, we should be able to see upon reflection that we do not know whether 
or not the usual justification for our ordinary beliefs about the world is actually truth 
conducive and reliable or not. At least this is true in the context of skepticism when the 
issue is the reliability of the senses in general.   We might have various reasons for 
thinking that a justification is truth conducive, and we may even possess various kinds of 
evidence that show at a local level that our justification for p is in fact truth conducive.  
However, after the skeptic raises her skeptical possibility we must recognize that we 
cannot prove that our grounds for believing that p are in fact truth-conducive.  Whether or 
not they are will depend upon externalist facts about the world in which we live and the 
mechanisms by which we form our beliefs that are cognitively beyond our grasp.  That is, 
we cannot prove that we are not brains in vats and, thereby, prove to the skeptic that 
sensory experience is in fact conducive to forming true beliefs.  Upon recognizing this, 
the skeptic will argue, we need to concede that we fail know that our justification for 
belief p is truth conducive, and, thus, it is not appropriate to claim to know that p.   
                                                 
56 I am purposely leaving the details out here.  There are many ways in which we might characterize 
epistemic justification; whether we want to treat epistemic justification as involving some defeater clauses 
that prevent Gettier cases or offer some other analysis of epistemic justification is not overly important for 
our work here.  I simply want to acknowledge that epistemic justification is of the sort that counts towards 
truth.  Thus, in the end, if our external world knowledge claims do in fact amount to knowledge it will be 
largely because of the fact that in our world sensory experience is in fact reliable, and, thus, does in fact 
count towards the truth. 
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Upon reflection we can see that this reasoning is a bit too quick.  The skeptic’s 
requirements on appropriate knowledge ascription are more stringent than initially seem.  
The skeptic requires that we not only have a reason for believing that p, she is requiring 
that we have evidence that our justification is truth conducive in the form of having 
evidence against the skeptical hypothesis in question.  She is requiring not only that we 
in fact have good grounds for our belief; she is requiring that we have a conclusive 
reason to think our justification is good as well.  Of course, this will lead to the problem 
of the infinite regress of justification.  The problem is that we must have a justification 
for our belief that p, and then we must have a justification for the belief that our 
justification is good, and so on. 
What can we say in response to the above reasoning on the part of the skeptic?  I 
think the appropriate response is to point out that such a requirement results in an infinite 
regress, and, therefore, is beyond the capacity of an everyday knower.  Knowledge 
ascriptions seem to result from a belief that one has fulfilled all epistemic obligations in 
forming a belief that p, and, thus, has developed a stronger stance toward p than mere 
belief.  We might offer rough alternative criteria:  in order for S to be justified in claiming 
to know that p, she must have evidence or reasons E for believing that p that (1) are in 
fact truth conducive (even if this fact is external to the agent’s awareness), (2) belief in p 
is rational and coherent in light of all of S’s beliefs, (3) S has a well grounded belief that 
E is in fact truth-conducive.  For our purposes in the context of external world skepticism 
(3) will amount to S’s belief that sensory experience is reliable.   As it turns out, S will 
not have any evidence that sensory experience is reliable in a perfectly general sense.  It 
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is in this sense that skeptical alternatives threaten to undermine claims to know.  It is 
unclear whether or not everyday agents fill criteria (3) in their usual claims to know.    
The general approach I have taken so far is to treat conditions for knowledge as 
externalist, and to treat conditions for knowledge ascriptions as a combination of 
internalist and externalist requirements.  An internalist type justification of the right sort 
seems to be a necessary requirement for knowledge ascriptions, but not for knowledge 
possession (at least not for all types of knowledge).  However, there is nothing in this 
account that necessitates that knowledge ascriptions must have an internalist type 
justification for which there is also an internalist type justification.  The requirement of 
internalist type justifications need not go up the entire chain of justifying reasons. As 
argued in a previous chapter the underlying assumption that sensory experience is reliable 
need not be justified with evidence of an internalist sort as the skeptic seems to require.  
It seems sufficient to justify this general stance towards sensory experience to note that 
such a stance is conducive to our epistemic goals.  It then becomes the burden of the 
skeptic to show that reliance upon sensory experience is not conducive to truth, and 
accomplishing this seems highly unlikely.  In this chapter we will continue to pursue the 
notion that only the specific claim under consideration requires an epistemic justification. 
The many presuppositions that act more generally, and higher up in the justifying chain, 
need only be rational assumptions.  Rational assumptions are those assumptions that 
make sense in light of one’s evidence, that are consistent with the values of the context, 
and for which there is no evidence/reasons to think are false.  Here I would like to 
explicitly employ the standards we use in critical thinking and informal logic.  In such 
arenas if one wishes to critique an opponent’s presupposition it is not sufficient to merely 
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point out the mere fact that it is possible that your opponent’s presuppositions could be 
false.  Nowhere in the arena of the give and take of reasons and justifications is such 
weak criticism taken seriously.  Yet, in the arena of skepticism we have allowed the 
skeptic to paralyze our claims to know simply because it is possible that they might be 
false.  As admitted in the last chapter, whose standard is more appropriate is more a 
value-based disagreement than it is an epistemic one. Standards are largely normative, 
thus we cannot produce evidence that shows that our standard is best and the skeptic’s 
inappropriate.  Instead, we are aiming to show in detail what is involved in accepting the 
skeptic’s standards.  In doing so, I am aiming to justify those of us who accept looser 
standards and pursue external world knowledge in light of the clear fallibility of the 
senses.   
So let us continue to characterize the issue as a question about whether or not we 
are epistemically justified in taking such a strong attitude towards a proposition as that of 
knowledge in light of skeptical hypotheses and our inability to rule them out in a 
definitive way.   I will argue that various philosophers have given arguments that show 
that we are so justified.  In particular, we’ll look at Bonjour’s argument to the effect that 
we are justified in preferring our ordinary beliefs about the world because they are 
simpler than their skeptical counterparts, and, therefore, more likely to be true.  
Additionally, we’ll look at a highly modified version of Henderson and Horgan’s 
argument that is essentially an epistemic Pascal’s wager.  This argument will be the 
detailed version of the one outlined at the end of chapter 3. 
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I will argue that both of these arguments as well as a number of other 
considerations provide us with reasons that make it rational for us to rely on sensory 
experience.      
Returning to the arguments above, we might recall the conclusion that sensory 
experience is not an indicator for skeptical hypotheses.  Notice, we must admit that 
sensory experience is only an indicator for our normal beliefs if skeptical hypotheses are 
false.  So admittedly, we appear to be at a stale-mate with the skeptic.  It looks as though 
we can only claim that sensory experience justifies our ordinary beliefs if skeptical 
hypotheses are false.  For it is only if skeptical hypotheses are false that sensory 
experience does indicate what we take it to indicate. 
The question becomes what reasons do we have for preferring our ordinary beliefs 
about the world in light of this seeming stale-mate?  What reasons are not grounded in the 
belief that sensory experience indicates a normal external world?  Bonjour’s anti-
skepticism argument starts from this stale-mate.  Bonjour accepts that we cannot assume 
that sensory experience indicates a normal external world in light of skeptical hypotheses, 
and asks what grounds we have for preferring our ordinary beliefs despite this 
concession.    
Bonjour argues that our grounds for preferring our ordinary beliefs about the 
world stem from the fact that our ordinary beliefs are simpler than their skeptical counter-
parts.57  Skeptical hypotheses are inherently more complicated because they require a 
mechanism that accounts for the deception.   In other words, skeptical scenarios must 
explain how the mismatch between thought and the world occurs.  Such explanations 
may be in the form of an evil demon, a mad scientist, or sophisticated computers.  
                                                 
57 See Laurence Bonjour and Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification, 95. 
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Whatever the explanation, the result is that skeptical scenarios are more complex than 
ordinary beliefs about the world.  The resulting complexity stems from the fact that 
skeptical hypotheses must explain our sensory experience and then posit a mechanism for 
deception that makes it look as though we live in a normal world when in fact we do not.  
Whereas, normal world explanations explain sensory experience by positing that things 
are largely as they seem to be. 
Bonjour argues that we are justified in preferring our ordinary beliefs simply on 
the grounds of simplicity.  The added complexity of skeptical hypotheses stems from the 
fact that skeptical scenarios must include a mechanism as Bonjour states that “mimics the 
experience that we would have if the represented world were actual and we were located 
in it, even though neither of these things is in fact the case”.58  It seems that Bonjour is 
right that skeptical hypotheses are more complicated, and I agree that such provides some 
justification for our preference of our ordinary beliefs.  However, the contentious aspect 
of this argument comes in Bonjour’s attempt to show that these grounds constitute an 
objectively truth-conducive, an epistemic, justification for our ordinary beliefs.  The 
connection between truth and simplicity might be too loose to provide much epistemic 
justification.   
While I am not convinced that Bonjour’s interesting argument provides something 
as strong as epistemic justification, it may well justify the claim that our reliance on 
sensory experience is rational.  If it generally is rational to opt for the simplest 
explanation, then it would be rational to do so in the case of skeptical hypotheses as well.  
Note another difference between skeptical hypotheses and our ordinary beliefs 
about the world; our ordinary beliefs make an assumption of reliability whereas skeptical 
                                                 
58 Laurence Bonjour et al, Epistemic Justification, 93. 
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hypotheses tend to make an assumption of deception.   That skeptical hypotheses make 
such an assumption is precisely why skepticism can be hard to practice in everyday life.  
We might wonder whether or not an assumption of truth is epistemically warranted in 
general.  Is assuming truth epistemically advantageous?  Sensory experience is not the 
only belief forming mechanism in which an assumption of truthfulness or reliability is 
our de facto position.  Indeed, in testimony and memory, for example, we often make 
prima facie assumptions of reliability.  It seems that as a matter of fact we operate in most 
areas with an assumption of reliability unless or until there are indicators to the contrary.   
The question becomes whether or not prima facie assumptions of truthfulness are 
epistemically warranted.  Do such assumptions tend to produce more true beliefs than the 
alternatives?  Our argument here is going to be that they do.  The alternative to such 
assumptions is skepticism, and an overly robust skepticism may well result in less false 
beliefs, but is very likely to come at the cost of many true beliefs.   
Thus, we might add to Bonjour’s argument from simplicity the more general 
epistemic principle that we are generally entitled to prefer assumptions of truth over 
assumptions of error.  We are epistemically entitled to the optimist’s position.  In the 
absence of evidence to guide us one way or the other, the goal of truth will entitle and 
require an assumption of reliability for all our belief forming mechanisms.  When we 
combine the above line of thought with Bonjour’s argument about the natural fit between 
ordinary beliefs and sensory experience and the simplicity of our ordinary belief 
hypotheses, we can conclude that we do indeed have epistemic reason for dismissing 
skeptical hypotheses.   
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While the above argument may seem distinct from the line of reasoning in the 
previous chapter, it is worth noting that the above argument might simply be another 
aspect of the argument given in the previous chapter.  Essentially the argument thus far 
has been that we are epistemically justified in ruling out skeptical hypotheses because (1) 
they do not enjoy sufficiently high probability to be relevant in everyday life and (2) 
taking them seriously might save us possible error but it comes at the loss of all possible 
truth.  If we combine (2) with the claim that while we want to avoid falsity, truth is the 
primary epistemic goal, we get the conclusion that the risk of false beliefs involved in 
relying on sensory experience is greatly outweighed by the possibility of attaining 
important truths about the external world.   
 
                           4.2:  Henderson and Horgan’s Pascalian Wager 
     Henderson and Horgan offer a Pascal’s wager type argument as justification for 
relying on sensory experience.  We will look at a distinct version of this argument that to 
my mind does provide us with the conclusion that it is rational to rely on sensory 
experience.  The thought experiment involved in this argument demonstrates how and 
why the SK principle is epistemically flawed.  This, in turn, will provide some measure 
of justification for knowledge claims.  It is important to note that the argument I am 
giving in our discussion here has been revised considerably from the original.   
Henderson and Horgan give the argument in the context of a discussion on trans-global 
reliabilism, and it involves the contentious claim that relying on sensory experience 
statistically provides more truths from a trans-global perspective.59  This claim is 
                                                 
59 This argument occurred as described in a manuscript titled Transglobal Reliabilism.  The manuscript is 
forthcoming with Oxford University Press and is currently titled The Epistemological Spectrum.  The 
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contentious because it requires that out of all possible worlds, there are more normal 
worlds than there are skeptical ones.  This assumption is necessary to generate their claim 
that relying on sensory experience is trans-globally reliable regardless of which possible 
world an agent is in.  This claim allows them to claim that since sensory experience is 
trans-globally reliable, we are justified in relying on it regardless of which world we are 
in.  However, it seems unlikely that there are more normal worlds than skeptical ones.  I 
will be using a version of the argument that does not rely on this assumption.     
 Additionally, even if it were true that sensory experience is trans-globally 
reliable, it is not clear what motivates the conclusion that we are, therefore, justified in 
relying on it.   We cannot ignore the relevance of whether or not the method is reliable in 
our context.  Thus, I will argue that we want a different analysis all together.  We need a 
way of analyzing the value of relying on sensory experience that does not involve a 
notion of reliability when spelled out as produces-more-truth-than-error.  Rather, we need 
to see the epistemic value of relying on sensory experience despite the inherent risk in 
relying on sensory experience.  We cannot get out of skepticism by downplaying this 
risk; we must articulate how and why we are entitled to rely on sensory experience 
despite that we might be brains in vats.  
  The argument given by the skeptic that we fail to possess knowledge rests 
on the requirement that we need to possess evidence in favor of our ordinary beliefs and 
against skeptical hypotheses.  However, we do not possess such evidence, and, thereby 
                                                                                                                                                 
argument as it appears in the forthcoming manuscript is apparently significantly altered from the one 
described here, and, due to the problem of infinities,  no longer contains the contentious aspect of the 
argument that there are more normal possible worlds than skeptical ones.  However, I have not had access 
to this new version of the argument, and do not know how the argument has been re-characterized to yield 
the same result.  Thus, the argument described here is the former argument occurring in the earlier version 
of the book.  
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fail to count as knowing according to the skeptic.  The externalist, as an example, may 
avoid the skeptic’s conclusion by arguing that it is not necessary that we possess any 
internalist type evidence in order to count as knowing, and, so, therefore need not possess 
and produce evidence that speaks against skeptical hypotheses.  What matters for the 
externalist is not what evidence we can produce, but the actual reliability of our belief 
forming mechanisms.  What the externalist can conclude is that if our sensory experience 
is in fact reliable, then we count as knowing.  Yet, as we have seen such a response seems 
insufficient in the case of knowledge claims.  It seems awkward to imagine an agent 
claiming knowledge on grounds that are external to the agent upon reflection.60 
 Further, this sort of conditionalized conclusion about knowledge may be 
seen as problematic.  And, indeed our conditionalized conclusion leaves the door open 
for the skeptic to point out that in our day to day lives we affirm the antecedent of our 
conditional.  We function as though sensory experience is in fact reliable.  Further, the 
skeptic can argue that many if not all of our claims to know rest upon the assumption that 
sensory experience is reliable.  So the skeptic can argue that even if an externalist move 
can resist her anti-knowledge conclusion, it still leaves many if not all of our first person 
epistemic endeavors vulnerable to her argument.  
The following response to the skeptic is best thought of as an epistemic version of 
Pascal’s wager and it goes something like the following: 
                                                 
60 In other words, even if it seems plausible that an agent know on grounds that are external to the agent, it 
seems implausible to say that an agent can be justified in claiming knowledge on grounds entirely external 
to the agent.  The reason is that knowledge ascriptions are the result of conscious reflection regarding the 
status of one’s beliefs, to justify these claims even for agents who have no reason to think they do count as 
knowing seems problematic.  Thus, even as externalists there remains a problem for knowledge ascriptions 
rising out of skepticism.   
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1. If we are in a skeptical world, then we have no way of getting information 
about the contingent aspects of the external world.61 
2. If we are in a non-skeptical world like the one we imagine ourselves to be in, 
then we will gain information about the contingent aspects of our environment 
via the senses.  
3. Therefore, The only possible way (that we can imagine and know of) to get 
information about the contingent aspects of our environment is via the 
senses.62 
4. We cannot tell in a non-question begging way which world we are in. 
5.  Therefore, if we are going to understand the nature of our environment, it will 
be through the senses. 
6. Therefore, since our aim is to achieve true beliefs about the external world, we 
are justified in relying upon our sensory experience regardless of which world 
we are in.   
 
 The premise claiming that we cannot determine which world we are in, premise 4, 
is important to the argument.  Without it, the more intuitive approach to the question 
about whether or not relying on the senses is a good epistemic move would be to 
determine whether or not the senses are reliable.  Premise 4 in effect states that no such 
determination of the reliability of the senses can be made, because no determination 
about which world we are actually in can be made.  Premise 4 is the core of this 
argument.  The above argument makes sense only in the context of accepting that we 
cannot determine which world we are in.  Our discussion of epistemic perspectives 
allows us an explanation of premise 4.  We are in a position to claim that such limitations 
                                                 
61 This follows from the fact that in any scenario in which deception is generalized, we have no way of 
getting accurate information about our environment.   
62 There is the issue of semantic externalism and the potential implication that we can discern contingent 
facts about our environment by reflecting on the contents of our thoughts together with the thesis of 
semantic externalism.  However, I think that this is a contentious enough issue that we need not address 
here.  I do not think that it seriously threatens this premise.  The second thing that needs to be 
acknowledged here is that I have explicitly restricted myself to the claim that we are talking about how to 
gain information about the contingent aspects of our environment.  I have restricted myself in this way so 
as to avoid the entire issue of whether or not there is a priori knowledge and the nature of such knowledge. 
The final thing that needs to be mentioned in regard to this part of the argument is that rather than claim 
that the only possible way to get information about environment is via the senses, I have restricted myself 
to the claim that the only way we might be able to get information about the environment is through the 
senses.  I have restricted myself in this way because we can surely imagine worlds in which agents are 
reliably “hooked up” to the world but they are hooked up some other way.   
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are inherent to our first person perspective and that the norms governing the first person 
need to fit the possibilities of the first person.   
Note that shifting to the third person will not help us determine the issue in 
premise 4; the issue of which possible world we are actually in.  Third person 
perspectives address issues involved in stipulating criteria and knowledge from the 
perspective of an outsider, and premise 4 deals directly with the question of what our 
specific position is.  It’s the difference between having a map that tells you how to get 
from point A to point B, and knowing where you currently are.   
As noted, there are some differences between the argument I have given above 
and the argument that Horgan and Henderson present in their book.  They argue that 
since we cannot determine which methods of belief formation are globally reliable, it is 
good epistemic practice to rely upon those methods of belief formation that are trans-
globally reliable.  Their argument goes that since there are more normal worlds than 
skeptical ones, sensory experience is trans-globally reliable.  Further, since we cannot 
determine which methods of belief formation are globally reliable, relying on those 
methods that are trans-globally reliable is most likely to yield true beliefs.  However, as 
mentioned, it is not clear mathematically that there are in fact more normal possible 
worlds than skeptical ones.  Without this part of the argument, Henderson and Horgan 
have no reason to claim that sensory experience is trans-globally reliable, and, thus, no 
reason to think that sensory experience is likely to yield truth.   
I have avoided this particular version of the argument because I think it is 
unnecessary to get the desired conclusion and it rests upon the claim that there are more 
non-skeptical possible worlds than there are skeptical possible worlds.  The claim about 
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the trans-global reliability of the senses allows Horgan and Henderson to generate the 
conclusion that the senses are a trans-globally reliable method of belief formation.  Thus, 
in any world, relying on sensory experience is epistemically justified because from the 
trans-global perspective the senses are known to be a truth-conducive method of belief 
formation.  So in their version, the argument is that since there are more non-skeptical 
worlds than skeptical worlds, in most possible worlds, relying upon sensory experience 
will be a reliable way to form beliefs.  Thus, we can reason that if we are aiming at true 
beliefs, we are justified in relying upon the senses.   
An additional reason for avoiding their version of the argument is that it rests on 
the notion that trans-global reliability is an epistemically relevant property.  However, 
notice that if we are concerned about attaining truth, then we must necessarily be 
concerned about what works in our world. It is not as though methods of belief formation 
that are trans-globally reliable will attain truth in our world; such will depend on the facts 
of our actual world.  Just because a method of belief formation is not trans-globally 
reliable (perhaps it is reliable in a more local or global way) does not constitute a strike 
against that particular method.  If a method is reliable in a given context, then it is a good 
epistemic tool for that context.  Admittedly, if a method is very locally reliable, it might 
raise the worry that a small shift in context or circumstance will result in the use of a 
method that is no longer reliable.  For example, let’s imagine one lives in a town in which 
the clocks generally don’t tell time accurately; let’s imagine the clocksmith is lousy at his 
job.  Let’s also imagine that Jane who just moved to this town just so happens to own the 
only reliable clock in town.  She uses the method of looking at her clock to tell the time.  
This method is reliable for her because her clock, unlike the other clocks in town, is very 
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reliable.  Thus, her method of telling time regularly gets her to the truth.  However, she 
lives in a context in which her method is very locally reliable.  That is if she takes her 
method of telling time (looking at the clock) to the neighbor’s house, her method will 
yield error.  Thus, I will agree that methods that are very locally reliable can be 
problematic because a small shift in context raises the likelihood of error significantly.  
However, if Jane were aware that she had the only reliable clock, then there is nothing 
wrong with her method.  What this shows is that very local reliability might be 
concerning, but there is very little chance that we will shift into another global context.  
Thus, there is very little reason to prefer trans-global reliability to global reliability.   
Thus, Henderson and Horgan have a good case for arguing that global reliability 
is preferable to merely local reliability; it does not ground an analogous argument 
concerning global reliability versus trans-global reliability.  Concerns about very local 
reliability motivate awareness of when and how an epistemic tool is reliable; such 
concerns do not motivate alternative analyses of reliability.  We should not infer that 
trans-global reliability is better than global reliability because there is little risk of 
moving out of our possible world and into another one (this, of course, is quite an 
understatement).   
Therefore, while Horgan and Henderson are right to move to a trans-global 
perspective in light of skepticism, we do not want to shift our grounds for epistemic 
analysis to a notion of trans-global reliability.  What we need is to shift our perspective 
while retaining the global reliability criteria in analyzing a method of belief formation.  
What continues to be relevant is whether or not sensory experience is reliable in our 
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world, and we are concerned with whether or not we are justified in assuming reliability 
in the event that no such global assessment can be made in a non-question begging way.     
 Lastly, while it is unlikely that ordinary agents go through the reasoning involved 
in the Pascal’s wager, it does seem that the argument reflects a leap of faith that everyday 
agents do make.  There is a strong sense that relying on the senses and assumptions of 
truthfulness in general, are appropriately considered epistemic leaps of faith.  While it is 
important to avoid false beliefs, and it is important to be mindful of error, it is also true 
that if we are faced with a choice between error and truth, we are well justified in opting 
for the attainment of truth despite a risk of error.   
The skeptic’s position is not one, nor can it be, that allows us to avoid error and 
pursue and attain truth at the same time. In fact, the latter position is exactly the position 
we are defending in our defense of AR.  AR is mindful of error, but it is mindful of error 
that is sufficiently grounded.  The skeptic is overly mindful of even merely possible error.   
The skeptic’s position merely avoids error.  This is what the Pascal’s wager argument 
brings to light in a clear and explicit manner.  While this is not a surprising implication of 
skepticism, and it may even be one the skeptic is happy to endorse, our conclusions here 
should reassure those who are concerned about their reliance on sensory experience in 
light of the skeptic’s argument.  
 
4.2.2: Grounding Assumptions of Reliability as Rational: 
 The conclusion of the above argument is that it is an epistemically sound practice 
to risk some possibility of error in order to attain possible truths.  Such a practice need 
not be grounded in the claim that such error is unlikely.  Rather, the claim is grounded in 
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the importance of attaining truth over avoiding error.  This is particularly so in light of 
the fact that the error in skeptical hypotheses is unusually innocuous.  This is not say that 
error and deception are not upsetting for a number of reasons; it is merely to point out 
that the error involved in skeptical scenarios is not of the same kind as error in regular 
scenarios.  Error in regular scenarios is (1) the kind that comes at the cost of truth, (2) has 
pragmatic problems associated with it, and (3) is often the result of bad epistemic 
practices.  None of 1-3 holds of the error found in skeptical scenarios. 
  Whenever possible we want to make determinations about the reliability in 
a local and global sense.  This assures that we are using methods that are in fact reliable 
in our world, thereby maximizing truth.  However, such determinations cannot be made 
with regard to skeptical scenarios.  Thus, once we allow skeptical alternatives to become 
relevant we must make an assessment of reliability on other grounds.  At such a point, we 
might do as above and look at the results of assuming reliability in all possible worlds.   
Lastly, it is important to note that the resulting justification from the above 
arguments is not overly subjective.  I have talked in a largely subjective manner because I 
have been focused on the first person perspective.  Thus, I have claimed that agents may 
reject skeptical hypotheses because the goal of truth outweighs the avoidance of error in 
this particular case.  However, notice that the result of our Pascal Wager argument is a 
justification that is actually truth conducive.  Agents that rely on sensory experience will 
attain more possible truths; that is they are attaining more truths out of the set of possible 
truths than agents who endorse the SK principle.  External world truths are not possible 
for agents in skeptical worlds; these truths are not relevant for them.   The lesson of 
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skepticism is that if it is truth we seek then we must ignore some possibilities of error; we 
must seek truth despite the possibility of error.   
The above holds because the agents in the skeptical scenarios cannot attain truth 
regardless of what they do.  Thus, if brains in vats rely on sensory experience, it will not 
decrease the amount of truths attained in all possible worlds.  If all agents in all possible 
worlds abstained from forming beliefs for the sake of avoiding error, then the number of 
true beliefs would fall dramatically (in addition to the number of false beliefs decreasing).  
On the other hand, if all agents (where applicable) rely on sensory experience, the 
number of false beliefs may increase due to the beliefs of the brains in vats, but the 
number of true beliefs will also increase dramatically.   
Thus, we need not characterize our justification in an overly subjective way.  We 
can conclude that if we rely on sensory experience we have a greater chance of attaining 
true beliefs about our world.   Granted we may also have a greater chance of attaining 
false beliefs about our world, but the alternative to such false beliefs is not truth, the 
option for BIV’s is to remain epistemically neutral with regard to their sensory 
experience – such does not enlighten the BIV to the nature of her world.  If you consider 
that the BIV does not have any way to know if she is a BIV, we should conclude that it is 
epistemically irrational even for the BIV to abstain from relying on sensory experience.  
For all she knows, she is sacrificing truth because she might be a BIV.   
If we were to create a matrix assigning value to the various possibilities in the 
above thought experiment it would turn out that the negative value of the false beliefs 
incurred should we turn out to be BIVs is less than the positive value incurred if it turns 
out that we are agents in a normal world.  Let us spell out why it is being suggested that 
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these values are the rational values.  The argument boils down to the claim that the 
pursuit of truth is worth the risk of error.  Of course we could argue that all important 
endeavors have risk, but instead we may focus on the particulars of the thought 
experiment.  Let’s remember that the thought experiment contemplates two possible 
courses of action: to trust our sensory experience or not.  There are two possible worlds 
articulated for each possible action: relying on sensory experience in a normal and in a 
BIV world, and not relying on sensory experience in a normal world and in a BIV world.  
We might boil down our thought experiment into the following possibilities: 
AR principle: Relying on sensory experience (mitigated skepticism): 
 Scenario 1: We are in a normal world: Knowledge gained from sensory  
                                                                   experience 
 Scenario 2: We are BIVs: many false beliefs generated by relying on  
                           sensory experience.  
 
SK principle: Not relying on sensory experience (standard of certainty): 
 Scenario 1: We are in a normal world: ALL TRUTH LOST 
 Scenario 2: We are BIVs: error stemming from relying on sensory  
                   experience is avoided 
 
 I am suggesting that it is rational to assign values in such a way that the overall 
positive value for relying on sensory experience significantly outweighs the overall 
negative value for relying on sensory experience in the event that we are BIVs.  
Additionally, I am suggesting that the lower negative value associated with not relying on 
sensory experience is outweighed by the fact that the skeptical stance of not relying on 
sensory experience has no positive value associated with it; this stance involves the loss 
of truth if we are BIVs.  This is the clear and explicit sense in which these two values 
conflict, and we have to make a choice between pursuing truth and risking error or 
sacrificing truth and not risking any error.   
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Let me say a little more why I think the loss of truth in the scenario that involves 
the skeptical stance is worse than the error incurred in the AR stance if it turns out that 
we are BIVs.  The difference here lies in the distinction between the two possible worlds: 
the BIV world and a normal world.  In a BIV world truth is lost to the agents who exist 
there.  Such agents have not been given any method that reliably yields knowledge about 
their environment.  The pursuit of truth in skeptical contexts is entirely frustrated by the 
mechanisms of deception.  The negative value of error in such a context is not the same 
as error in a context in which truth was possible and somehow lost.  The epistemic efforts 
of the BIV do not yield knowledge or truth no matter what the BIV does or doesn’t do.  
She might sacrifice her epistemic agency and remain epistemically neutral with regard to 
all that she was not absolutely certain about (which of course will be everything), but 
doing so does not gain her anything.  She is as lost to the nature of self and world as she 
ever was.  The value of being epistemically cautious, the value of trying to avoid error 
lies in the resulting maximization of truth.  The BIV world is epistemically hopeless, and 
it is so regardless of what the agent does or does not do.  The negative value we place on 
the error of the BIVs beliefs results from our sense of loss about the truth.  But the BIV 
who relies on sensory experience has not lost any truth, for truth was not possible for her. 
We assess the negative value of the BIVs state from our assumption that we are in a 
normal world and we find her situation very unfortunate.  This unfortunate reality of the 
BIV has nothing to do with her epistemic practices.  The only lesson to be learned here is 
that the methods we think are reliable may not be, but what of this?  This does not imply 
that we should not rely on them.  Skeptical scenarios are not like the movie the Matrix in 
which there was an avenue to the truth; one could take a pill and “descend down the 
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rabbit hole” and wind up with the knowledge of who you were and what the world was 
really like.    
 Perhaps it would help to give some examples.  Let us try to imagine what 
upsets us about false beliefs.  Imagine a scenario in which an agent has lied to her spouse 
for many years claiming fidelity while carrying out multiple affairs.  Why would the 
spouse of said agent have a right to be angry, and what would he be angry about?  First 
he may feel betrayed, let us set that specific issue aside and focus on the lies she told him.  
He may rightly feel manipulated by her lies in important ways.  This sentiment reflects 
the sense that he was entitled to the truth, it was possible for him and should have been 
his and she intentionally and knowingly took that from him in order to manipulate his 
behavior and his choices.  Thus, he feels that something of importance was taken from 
him by her for selfish reasons.  Next, he may feel that the loss of truth had important 
pragmatic implications for his decision making; having been robbed of the truth, he 
stayed in a marriage that was not what he thought it was.   
Notice that in skeptical scenarios the mechanism of deception insures that truth is 
not possible for agents in those scenarios.  They can’t figure out the truth regardless of 
what they do.  But that implies that much of the negative value we associate with error is 
not involved in skeptical scenarios.  There is no sense in which the BIV who relies on  
sensory experience and lands in error has been robbed of the truth, she has not lost truth 
by relying on sensory experience, for it was not possible for her.  Second, she has no 
pragmatic implications associated with her error.  There is no conflict between perception 
and belief that happens when an agent has false beliefs in a normal world.  Thus, a BIVs 
false beliefs cohere with everything she experiences, they cohere with what in effect is 
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her world.  This coherence is not everything but it negates a lot of what is negative about 
false beliefs.  None of this is to say that there is no negative value associated with the 
error involved in relying on sensory experience in the event that we are BIVs.  If truth has 
intrinsic positive value, then the flip side of that is the intrinsic negative value of falsity.   
The purpose of taking a trans-global perspective is not to establish that sensory 
experience is trans-globally reliable.  Rather the purpose is to evaluate assumptions of 
reliability versus the SK principle regarding sensory experience.  From the trans-global 
perspective, we can see the value of AR as an epistemic principle: it entitles those who 
can attain truth to attain it.  And it does no epistemic harm to those who cannot (i.e. 
those in skeptical worlds).  Relying on sensory experience does not prevent BIV’s from 
attaining truths.   
However, it is at this point that we recognize the greater value of truth combined 
with the innocuous status of the brain in the vats’ false beliefs.  False beliefs are generally 
problematic because they divert us from the goal of truth, they potentially infect our other 
beliefs, and they have concrete, functional, problematic consequences associated with 
them.  However, none of these apply to the BIV’s false beliefs.  The BIV’s epistemic 
state is depraved because she cannot attain truth and because her beliefs are false.  There 
is some intrinsic negative value on possessing false beliefs and it is this that defines the 
BIV’s state as epistemically impoverished.  However, much that is functionally 
problematic about false beliefs is not present in the BIV scenario, because the BIV’s 
beliefs match her sensory experience.  Thus, it is perfectly fine to reason that we are 
risking unfortunate but innocuous error to gain the possibility of attaining truth.  Such is a 
fine Pascal’s wager.  And such a wager substantiates the position that relying on sensory 
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experience is epistemically rational rather than the irrational and irresponsible move the 
skeptic takes it to be.   
At this point something needs to be said about the appeal of skepticism.  Many 
find skeptical scenarios inherently disturbing and upsetting, and I am dismissing them 
and the proposed epistemic practices in light of them as epistemically irrational, though 
not obviously so.  First, much that is disturbing about skeptical scenarios is articulated in 
the possibility that we could BIVs, or dreaming, or at the mercy of an evil demon.  I have 
not denied such possibilities and the resulting distress seems well founded.  Notice too 
that I have not denied the skeptic’s claim that we do not know which world we are in.  
Rather, I have argued that skeptical alternatives are not relevant in the context of 
everyday life for epistemic reasons, and I have argued that even if we allow skeptical 
alternatives as relevant as we have done in this chapter, we can see that relying on 
sensory experience is still epistemically justified.   
 
4.3: The Pyrrhonian Objection: 
The Pyrrhonain skeptic might object at this point.  Such objection would go along 
the lines that the Pyrrhonian both pursues truth and acknowledges the possibility of error.   
Such a position, it might be thought, avoids the choice between pursuing truth and 
avoiding error that I have claimed is an inherent part of everyday contexts.   There may 
be two distinct versions of Pyrrhonian skepticism that we might consider: (1) the position 
in which one withholds all judgment including that of belief and (2) a position that 
involves withholding judgment in the form of refusing to claim that ordinary beliefs 
about the world amount to knowledge.  The one position withholds judgment by 
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refraining from belief, the other refrains from knowledge ascriptions.  The traditional 
view captured by Sextus Empiricus in Outlines of Pyrrhonism advocates withholding 
judgment as a means of attaining peace of mind.  This withholding of judgment regards 
all attempts at pursuing truth and would seem to fit best with the first characterization of 
Pyrrhonist position. 
The first position fits clearly the charges that I have made against the skeptic in 
this chapter; such a person is refusing to pursue truth in light of the possibility of error.  
The failure to form belief on the basis of sensory experience is the position that fits most, 
according to the skeptic, with the epistemic realities of our fallibility.   
The second position, however, might seem like an alternative that offers the best 
of both the SK principle and the AR principle.  If we form beliefs, then we are still 
engaging in the epistemic goal of pursuing and attaining truth.  If we fail to claim 
knowledge of such beliefs, then we are acknowledging our fallibility.  Such a position 
might be thought to be the epistemic ideal between the AR and SK principles.  
However, position (2) does not cohere as well as we might initially think. Note   
that the AR and SK principles regard belief formation, rather than knowledge ascriptions.  
Belief is as much a subject for epistemic norms and the verdict of rationality as is 
knowledge.   Whatever epistemic “irresponsibility” could be charged of someone who 
claimed her external world beliefs amount to knowledge could also be charged of 
someone who formed such beliefs in the first place.  The AR position is involved in the 
kind of Pyrrhonian skepticism articulated in position (2) just as much as it is involved for 
the agent who claims knowledge on the grounds of endorsing AR.  The question of 
ascribing knowledge seems to come on the heels of endorsing AR rather than the other 
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way around.  It is not as though the agent who does not claim knowledge, but only belief 
fails to endorse AR on the exact same grounds as the agent who claims knowledge.   
Part of the reason for the above is that the AR or the SK principles are issues 
regarding belief formation.  Thus, the issue at this stage is deeper than that of knowledge 
ascriptions.  Beliefs are the primary subjects of epistemic norms.  If an agent fulfills the 
obligations of responsible belief formation and they possess reasons to believe that are 
accessible via reflection, there is no clear reason to deny the rationality of a knowledge 
claim.  Whatever line of reasoning that might attack a knowledge claim will undermine 
belief as well.   Once AR is endorsed, then belief based on the method in question is 
justified, and knowledge claims are simply a reflection of that endorsement.  As counter-
intuitive as it might seem to claim knowledge in light of the possibility of error, it is 
equally counter-intuitive to believe but to refuse to claim knowledge.   In other words, it 
seems that any epistemic norms violated by AR occur at the level of belief formation, not 
at the level of claiming knowledge.  The knowledge claims that follow on the heels of 
AR merely reflect the endorsement of sensory experience embodied in accepting AR in 
the first place.   It is not as the Pyrrhonian skeptic might wish it to be- that knowledge 
claims are the bearers of epistemic norms, but beliefs somehow are not.  Belief can be 
rational or irrational, responsible or irresponsible, well founded or not.  Knowledge 
ascriptions and the practices of giving and accepting reasons in the first person, primarily 
center on attempts to discern well-founded versus un-founded beliefs.    
  There are some aspects of Pyrrhonian skepticism that we can endorse.  The 
difference will be that the Pyrrhonian finds the following as grounds to suspend 
judgment, whereas I find them an inherent part of the pursuit of truth and the attainment 
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of knowledge.  In his “How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond” Peter Klein argues in 
defense of some of the classic Pyrrhonian arguments.  Klein characterizes an argument 
from Sextus Empiricus on the issue of the infinite regression of justifications as “we 
discover… the general Pyrrhonian claim that arguments that end, end either arbitrarily or 
commit the fallacy of begging the question”.63 Klein notes that “Either foundationalism, 
coherentismn, or infinitism is the appropriate method of responding to the regress of 
reasons”.64   The conclusion of this argument is that reason cannot settle such matters and 
the result is the suspension of judgment.   
 The argument given here can be thought of as a kind of foundationalism.   The 
classic problem that foundationalism either lands in arbitrary assumptions or in basic and 
self-evident beliefs is an issue somewhat sidestepped in our approach.   The latter option 
for a foundationalist seems appealing because it avoids the arbitrariness of the former but 
its’ problems stem from how such slim and few self-evident beliefs can support the whole 
of our knowledge.   DesCartes faced just such a problem when he was faced with the 
deriving the whole of our knowledge from the Cogito.   
 If AR acts as the foundation of our knowledge based in sensory experience, then 
it is relatively easy to see how it can act as such a strong foundation.  If we are entitled to 
endorse the reliability of sensory experience in a general way, then such a substantive 
belief might well serve as the foundation for knowledge of the external world grounded 
in the senses.  However, the tricky question for us is whether or not AR is epistemically 
arbitrary. 
                                                 
63 See Klein 2003 pg 81. 
64 See Klein 2003 pg. 78-79. 
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 On this particular issue we are going to concede to a certain extent, but note that 
our position is not quite as problematic as it might first seem.  First, let’s note why 
arbitrariness is epistemically problematic.  To say that a belief is arbitrary implies that 
one could either way on the issue; the epistemic factors do not sway one way or the other.  
Believing in an arbitrary manner is akin to believing on grounds that are merely lucky.  If 
your grounds are epistemically arbitrary, then there is no more connection to the truth 
than if you had guessed and just so happened to get lucky.  It has long been thought that 
knowledge excludes such kinds of luck, and that knowledge excludes arbitrariness.   
 If it is determined that AR is truly arbitrary then it cannot act as the kind of 
foundation that can confer epistemic justification.   However, I am also going to reject the 
strongly internalist notion that we need to possess some kind of reasons accessible via 
introspection for thinking that AR is in fact true.  I have explicitly argued against this 
criterion and characterized it as the heart of the SK principle.  Nonetheless, our reasons 
for endorsing a meta-principle like AR should be substantive and epistemic. 
 Part of what has been argued so far is that our grounds for endorsing a meta-
principle like AR are largely epistemic.  It’s just that our grounds reflect the normative 
element of first person practices rather than the classic requirement that justification 
“counts towards truth”.65  There is a sense in which endorsing AR counts towards truth- 
as a meta-principle it facilitates the attainment of truth.  Since it is a meta-principle rather 
than any particular belief about the world or any state of affairs in the world, it need not 
be justified in such a way that our justification “counts towards truth”.  Rather, our 
justification is driven by the foundation of all epistemic endeavors; it is grounded in the 
                                                 
65 This phrase is borrowed from Audi’s Structure of Justification. 
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intrinsic value of truth, the pursuit of knowledge, and a reflection upon which sorts of 
meta-principles are most conducive to those goals.   
 While the skeptic notes that a general belief in the reliability of the senses 
underpins our particular external world beliefs, if we reflect on what underpins such a 
general stance towards this particular belief forming mechanism, we find a general 
epistemic attitude towards belief forming mechanisms in general.  That general stance is 
reflected in the AR principle, the principle that we are epistemically entitled to assume 
truth, to assume reliability.  It seems common sense that such an entitlement is conducive 
to the pursuit of truth and the attainment of knowledge.  While it’s true that the Achilles’ 
heel of such an assumption is the kind of massive and general deception articulated in 
skeptical hypotheses, such only counts against AR if we began with the assumption that 
knowledge requires certainty, or that our epistemic endeavors ought to be immune from 
even possible error.  Skeptical hypotheses have not a single shred of evidence in favor of 
them, they articulate the worry that we might be wrong and nothing more.  While it might 
be upsetting to have it pointed out to us how we could be in error in a way that even the 
most thoughtful could never detect is psychologically upsetting, it is not the epistemic 
death sentence it has often been thought to be.   
 That our foundation is largely driven by the intrinsic value of truth is a good sign 
for the quasi-foundationalist view I have endorsed here.  Values need not be underpinned 
by reasoning or justification in that classic sense of epistemic justification.  Here we 
might recall Mill’s defense of the fact that happiness is valuable; it is in fact valued.  That 
truth is valuable is shown in the fact that we value it, and we often tend to value it for its 
own sake.  That such a value foundation might drive our meta-principles regarding 
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responsible versus irresponsible epistemic behavior might not be so surprising after all.  
Such a foundation and such meta-principles do not stand in need of the classic sense of 
epistemic justification; not because we have stepped outside the realm of the epistemic, 
but because we have hit its’ foundation.  
 If we were not driven by the extent to which we are by the pursuit of truth, what 
else would drive us, and how else would we account for the clearly normative aspect of 
first person epistemic endeavors?  If such epistemic norms, such views about responsible 
belief formation did not stem from such fundamental epistemic values where would they 
stem from?  Why should it surprise us to discover that in the real world, our fundamental 
epistemic values can conflict in such a way that we may not be able to fill two or more 
epistemic obligations in a particular context?  There are notorious and well worn 
examples in ethics about such moral dilemmas.  In fact it seems that many moral 
dilemmas can be characterized by a conflict between distinct values, and the conflict 
requires that we prioritize one value to the detriment of others.  I have suggested that the 
skeptical problem is an example of just such a conflict in values.  If this is so, then we 
should expect there to be no logical refutation of skepticism.  Such moral dilemmas are 
decided and solved by choosing which value takes priority.  Thus, we should expect that 
a solution to skepticism lies in pronouncing truth as having priority over avoiding error 
and defending such a choice as consistent with our most fundamental epistemic values.  
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4.4: A Thought Experiment: The SK principle versus the AR principle: 
 
As previously noted, the skeptic does not think it is likely that we are BIVs 
anymore than the agent in thought experiment G sincerely believed aliens were planting 
evidence with the purpose of causing strife on Earth.  The skeptic believes the force of 
her concerns lies in the philosophical implications for knowledge.  She seems sincerely to 
believe that knowledge is not possible if such a claim involves any risk of error, even 
error that in her own mind seems far-fetched.  One of the things I have suggested is that 
there is more to such a stance than sacrificing knowledge claims.  Reliance on sensory 
experience can only be rational if it involves an assumption of reliability, an assumption 
that one is getting truth via sensory experience.  To admit that sensory experience cannot 
ground knowledge is to admit that one ought not to rely on it.  This is particularly so if 
knowledge claims need not involve implicit claims of absolute certainty.   
It is rational to claim knowledge while implicitly stating that one does not believe 
any other alternative to hold.  To claim knowledge of p and say in the same breath, “I 
might be wrong about p” is counter-intuitive because the claim “I might be wrong about 
p” is tantamount to an admission that there p is believable or plausible or likely.  The 
agent who claims knowledge while admitting the kind of error that is merely logically 
possible is not involved in the latter much more contentious knowledge claim. 
The question becomes, as we have framed it here, are we justified in weakly 
ruling out skeptical alternatives, i.e. ruling them out despite that we cannot claim to know 
that they do not hold.  I have argued the answer to that is yes on the grounds that allowing 
mere logical hypotheses to hijack our knowledge is tantamount to allowing skeptical 
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hypotheses to hijack our pursuit of truth.  Additionally, I have argued that the possibility 
of attaining truth outweighs the possibility of falling into error.  Relying on sensory 
experience is more than an irrational stance driven by instinct and psychology.  Rather, 
an assumption of reliability regarding sensory experience allows us to pursue the truth 
that may be available to us.  The skeptic’s approach is so cautious that it epistemically 
cripples normal agents and BIVs alike.  
Let’s do a quick thought experiment to drive the point home.  The skeptic has 
used her skeptical scenarios to make vivid the possibility of relying on sensory 
experience only to be caught in a massive deception carried out by some evil demon or 
mad scientist or what have you, but what of the alternative scenarios?  The skeptic herself 
admits that we do not know with any certainty which world we actually inhabit, but she is 
anxious to use her possibilities of error to encourage the most extreme caution.  So before 
moving on, let’s do a quick thought experiment of the non-skeptical variety to help us 
assess whether the skeptic’s or the non-skeptic’s overall approach to the senses is best.   
 Let’s imagine agents who are in a perfectly normal world.  By a “perfectly 
normal” world, I mean a world much like the ones we take ourselves to be in; a world in 
which the senses convey reliably about the environment in which the agents live.  Let us 
also imagine that this world is full of agents who have been skewed by skepticism.   
Now the skeptic may want to claim that such a world would be like ours with the 
exception that no one would claim knowledge on the basis of her senses.  While I have 
rejected this possibility because it dwarfs this deeply epistemic issue to a minor 
philosophical debate about the semantics of the verb to know, I will briefly play along.  
On the Pyrrhonian skeptic’s version our world would be one in which agents refrain from 
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making a judgment about whether or not what the senses tell them amounts to 
knowledge.  First, let’s be picky and point out that such restraint should come in at the 
level of belief itself.  Thus, agents in this world ought to refrain from acting on the 
information provided by the senses.   
However, let’s grant the Pyrrhonian a break and allow the possibility that it is a 
coherent position to form beliefs on the basis of sensory experience while refraining from 
judging whether or not such beliefs amount to knowledge.  Let us note that in such a 
world it is highly questionable whether or not the agents would survive.  So first, we’re 
going to make an evolutionary point, and then we’ll make an epistemic one.  What it 
takes to run from a bear, to fight in a war, to hunt for food, etc. is not to be found in these 
lukewarm convictions.  I doubt the Pyrrhonian agent will have what it takes to fight a 
bear that she believes may or may not be there.  In normal worlds, sensory experience 
provides a link to the outside world, and this link that keeps agents informed about 
outward threats.  The Pyrhhonian agent that seriously entertains higher order doubts is 
not likely to survive a normal world.  While this may seem like an overly pragmatic 
objection, it is unapologetically so.  While epistemologists have long been inclined to 
distinguish the epistemic and the pragmatic, and while such distinction is theoretically 
useful, we are beings who cannot discern the value of the epistemic from the value of the 
pragmatic.  That is, we are not so easily able to compartmentalize in real life as we are in 
theory.   
Next, let us note a few epistemic things about our hypothetical Pyrrhonian 
skeptics.  Note that our belief that the senses can ground knowledge is the foundation of 
every science and technology driven practice that we engage in.  A world filled with 
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skeptics would be a world without science, such agents would not be motivated to 
explore, experiment, and discover in the way that we have.  Such a skeptical practice 
would have implications in the natural sciences, health sciences, testimony, and 
knowledge from authority would all be impacted by the cautious reservation of the 
skeptic.  The skeptic who does not believe knowledge is possible would not seek it out.   
History is full of figures not only willing to risk the possibility of being wrong, 
but also willing to risk their lives for the possibility of advancing human knowledge.  A 
world of skeptics would be devoid of the benefits of such individuals.  If we imagine 
additionally that these skeptics do in fact live in a world where their senses are generally 
reliable, we must only decide that these agents are experiencing a loss that is significant 
and that they are doing so merely because they are not guaranteed certainty in their 
endeavors amounts to more than an epistemic failure, it seems to amount to a grave moral 
failure as well.   
Surely, I will admit that when we have in mind the possibility of being a BIV, or 
of dreaming when we believe ourselves awake, the massive error that results is 
unfortunate in such a scenario.  But if the question we are asking is, what is the prudent 
approach for the everyday knower, then we cannot look only at such skeptical scenarios.  
We must also consider the possibility of being normal agents in a normal world with 
sensory experience that is generally reliable.  Further, we must decide which risk we 
prefer to take, do we risk the error involved in being in a skeptical world and relying on 
sensory experience, or do we risk being skeptical agents in a normal world?  I have 
answered that it is, at the very least, perfectly epistemically defensible to choose to risk 
error rather than choose to risk truth.  If this is so, then the description of the everyday 
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knower as one whose position is only driven by instinct is simply neither accurate nor 
fair.  The view that the everyday knower is simply philosophically unenlightened about 
the error of her ways is not a fair representation of the everyday knower.  Granted, it does 
seem that the everyday knower simply embraces sensory experience, but we ought to see 
that this is a defensible epistemic position upon reflection.  The everyday knower is not 
driven by ignorance.  Rather, it seems to me that she is simply driven by her pursuit of 
truth, and this pursuit of truth is defensible even after one has fully considered the 
skeptical argument. 
 
4.5: Conclusion: 
 
To summarize the Pascal’s wager, we are either in a skeptical world or not.  If we 
are in a skeptical world, then we have no method for attaining truths about our 
environment.66  On the other hand, if we are not in a skeptical world, then we will gain 
knowledge of the contingent aspects of our environment through our senses.  Since 
agents in either kind of world might ponder skepticism, they may follow the above line of 
reasoning to the conclusion that the attainment of truth if they are in non-skeptical worlds 
outweighs the possibility of false beliefs generated by relying on sensory experience in 
skeptical worlds. 
Notice that we do want to frame the discussion in terms as black and white as 
those above.  If what we are really worried about is how and when to trust our sensory 
experience, then the skeptical problem is less pernicious than the above formulation of 
                                                 
66 This will hold unless the methods of belief formation or the circumstances of the scenario radically 
change, ie. they BIV’s “wake up”, or the evil demon decides to tell everyone the truth, etc. 
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the skeptical argument.  This more specific and local skeptical worry starts from an 
assumption about the overall reliability of sensory experience.  Notice that in order to 
begin with the claim that sometimes sensory experience is reliable and other times not, 
we must generally be trusting of the information given to us through sensation.  If I found 
out, for example, that despite thinking there was a tree in the distance I discover, upon 
closer inspection, that what I thought was a tree was in fact a horse, then I have made a 
choice between two conflicting pieces of sensory information (x is a tree and x is a 
horse), and I have decided that sensory experience of seeing a horse is the more reliable 
information.  This kind of skeptical worry is less epistemically disconcerting because it 
allows us to assume that sensory experience is generally reliable and requires that we be 
cautious and develop a sense of the parameters of the reliability of sensory experience.  
Thus, we have in general developed a sense of such limitations on the efficacy of 
perception.  If a prosecuting attorney puts an eyewitness on the stand that was drunk at 
the time of allegedly witnessing the crime in question, she is likely not to sway the jury as 
much as she might like to.  Such an eyewitness is not particularly credible because we 
generally have found sensory experience to be less than reliable when one is under the 
influence of mind altering substances.  
Again, we have an argument founded the view that the attainment of truth 
outweighs the possibility of error.  This is particularly so for an alternative and error that 
is merely possible error.  The argument in chapter 3 was that the time constraints in 
everyday contexts are such that the attainment of truth and the avoidance of error conflict 
in such a way that we must choose which goals have priority; we must choose which 
norm to deviate from.   The stalemate that Moore characterized has been reconceived as a 
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problem of conflicting epistemic norms.  The skeptic represents the position of 
preserving the goal of avoiding error and in doing so sacrifices her pursuit of truth; even 
the Pyrrhonian skeptic who refrains from judgment has given up the epistemic game of 
trying to attain truth.  The reckless believer position characterized in chapter 3 represents 
the position of pursuing truth while not paying enough mind to concerns about avoiding 
error.  The assumption of reliability position is the middle ground it grants us the right to 
pursue truth despite that it may not be available to us if we in fact are BIVs.  However, 
the AR position also recognizes the negative value of error by requiring that we pay 
attention to error that is likely, i.e. error for which there exists evidence or reasons to 
believe is likely or plausible.   
 The scope of this argument is such that it will justify assumptions of reliability for 
any method of belief formation if the following conditions are met: (1) there are no local 
indicators that the method is unreliable, and (2) the error possibilities articulated are 
merely logically possible.  That the above argument will justify such methods follows 
from the fact that for such methods, it will result that the methods are reliable in some 
possible worlds and not others. The reasoning that we are justified in attempting to attain 
truth will kick in at this point. Thus, for all methods of belief formation if there are no 
indicators that the method is unreliable, then we are justified in relying on it.  This 
argument will pertain to all methods of belief formation regarding skeptical alternatives 
in which error is occurring without any means for detecting, verifying, or refuting the 
possible error.   
While I am not particularly fond of evolutionary arguments because they tend to  
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apply one and all – let’s go ahead and briefly note the advantage of AR from an 
evolutionary perspective.  From a practical and survival oriented point of view it would 
not serve well to endorse the SK principle.  Refraining from relying on sensory 
experience because it might be faulty would result in very bad consequences for those 
agents who are in normal worlds.  Admittedly, it does not even seem rational for BIV’s to 
refrain from relying on sensory experience given that they too have no idea which world 
is actual.  But this merely shows how strong the justification is for relying on sensory 
experience.   
Reliance on sensory experience is far short of the epistemic foul the skeptic 
claims it to be.  It is only a foul if we endorse the idea that any possibility of error is 
inconsistent with the possession of knowledge.  We should remember that entertaining 
skeptical scenarios in everyday life is as time-wasting and destructive to our epistemic 
goals as entertaining the hypothesis that aliens are trying to create strife on Earth in 
thought experiment G.  Many share this intuition about the relevance of skepticism, but 
often they are not the sort to enter the ranks in philosophy.  It is worth drawing out and 
remembering the grounds for such attitudes towards skepticism.   
Chapter 3 aimed to show that the issue of skepticism boils down to a choice 
between avoiding all error, and pursuing truth.  In this light, it seems defensible to pursue 
truth.  Admittedly, the stalemate remains.  The skeptic can charge that in endorsing AR 
we open ourselves to the possibility of error.  We, however, can charge in turn that 
endorsing SK the skeptic gives up the pursuit of truth.  Rather than solve this stalemate, I 
have sought to disarm the skeptic’s criticism that reliance upon sensory experience 
without evidence of its reliability is epistemically irrational and unjustified.     
160 
 
This chapter aimed to show something more substantive; it aimed to show why 
the AR principle is epistemically preferable to the SK principle.  In this chapter, the 
version of Henderson and Horgan’s argument we discussed shows how endorsing the AR 
principle allows those for whom truth is attainable to pursue and attain those truths, 
whereas the SK principle epistemically handicaps one and all regardless of circumstance.  
And it does so in the name of avoiding error.  I have argued that as a result the SK 
principle cannot be defended as the only epistemically responsible approach as might be 
argued by the skeptic.   
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Cartesian Skepticism as Moral Dilemma 
 
“Skepticism and Shifting Epistemic Perspectives” 
 
Chapter 5.1: Introduction 
 
 What emerged in the last chapter is that we may block skepticism by noting that 
there are relevant distinctions between the scenarios in which the Rule of Exclusion 
legitimately applies and skeptical scenarios.  One of the biggest differences we noted 
between usual cases involving the Rule of Exclusion and skeptical alternatives is that 
skeptical alternatives are merely logically possible. Even the skeptic herself has no reason 
or evidence to think her hypothesis true.  This difference is significant enough that it 
warrants treating skeptical alternatives differently than one would be required to treat 
alternatives raised on significantly stronger epistemic grounds.    
 If we acknowledge that fallibilist knowledge is possible, then we admit that some 
possibility of error is consistent with knowing.  Embracing fallibilism will involve 
balancing the pursuit of truth with the possibility of error without sacrificing either 
epistemic good entirely to the other.  Is it possible to convince the skeptic herself that 
knowledge is consistent with some possibility of error?  Probably not.  Our aim here 
though is to defend the epistemic practices of the everyday knower.  And the everyday 
knower is entitled to reject skeptical hypotheses for the exact same reasons the agents in 
thought experiment G reject skeptical hypotheses; they are not sufficiently likely to 
justify time spent on them.   We have all heard the phrase “time is money”, well it turns 
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out that time spent on error scenarios comes at the cost of something else, and, therefore, 
the common sense driven and prudent knower will be wary of dallying time on the 
merely logically possible.  Might she dream about and contemplate the merely logically 
possible in the Philosophy classroom?  Certainly.  However, that does not mean doing so 
is prudent in real life.  In the Philosophy Classroom we allow that which is not practical 
in everyday life; we set aside time constraints with the specific purpose of exploring 
issues of all stripes with the kind of depth our normal lives do not afford us.  If the 
skeptic wants skeptical hypotheses to be taken seriously beyond the realm of Science 
Fiction or Philosophy, then she must show that we have real and legitimate reason to be 
concerned and worried about the error scenarios she frets over.  Thus, the burden of proof 
rightly lies in her hands and the standards for raising error scenarios in everyday life are 
not as loose as she imagines them to be.   
 In addition to larger questions regarding epistemic theory, a number of concrete 
questions raised in the last chapter need answering in this one.  Specifically, the 
following issues need addressing:  the issue of warranted assertability, the issue of 
closure in relation to the view being developed here, and the details of a relevant 
alternatives position as articulated in chapter 3. 
 
5.2: The Bigger Picture: How might a Theory of Knowledge Look? 
 Skepticism has shown us that we need to accord justifications occurring in the 
first person perspective a more limited epistemic role than they have historically been 
given.  Traditionally, our reasons for our beliefs and the evidence that we have that leads 
us to claim knowledge has been expected to be more tightly connected with truth than it 
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seems is actually the case.  On the Cartesian view of justification, one’s evidence for a 
given belief needed to imply the truth of that belief in order for it to count as knowledge.   
And, yet, when we look at skeptical scenarios, such as the dreaming hypothesis, our 
evidence does not support our ordinary beliefs over their skeptical counterparts to any 
degree.  Unfortunately, the problem is not as simple as the worry that our evidence does 
not rule out skeptical scenarios with certainty, because our evidence does not rule them 
out at all.  Thus, skeptics such as Hume have argued that our reasons for preferring our 
ordinary beliefs over the skeptical hypotheses must be non-epistemic.  If they were 
conducive to truth, then we would have evidence that spoke against skeptical hypotheses 
to at least some degree.   
Still, it seems intuitive to say that people can count as knowing even if they are 
not certain about what it is they claim to know.  If, for example, someone forms a belief 
on the basis of sensory experience that is in fact reliable, it is not implausible to claim 
that such a belief amounts to knowledge.  Admittedly, both skeptics and internalists 
might disagree with such a claim if the agent lacks any reason to think that her sensory 
experience is reliable. We know, additionally, that the skeptic will claim that none of us 
has a general and justifying reason for relying on sensory experience.  We noted in an 
earlier chapter that this intuition to accord knowledge despite fallibility is mistaken 
according to the skeptic because it requires that we have some degree of evidence in 
favor of our belief (over the skeptical alternatives).  
 What we need is a sense of justification that allows evidence to have epistemic 
value and weight despite that it does not rule out every alternative.  I will urge that the 
limitations of evidence in the first person perspective stem from the inherent limitations 
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of the first person perspective itself.  The relevant alternatives position is an account of 
knowledge upon which fallibility is cashed out in terms of knowing that p as opposed to a 
set of relevant alternatives, whereas an infallibilist account of knowledge might 
characterize knowledge as ruling out each and every error possibility. 
Since the skeptic employs what we have been calling the Rule of Exclusion, the 
skeptic gets her conclusion by attacking our evidence.  What the skeptic gets via the Rule 
of exclusion is that we need some reason to prefer our ordinary beliefs to her skeptical 
alternatives (this is generally the case in our everyday epistemic practices).  So a 
tempting response is to claim that the skeptic requires certainty, but there is no clear 
assessment of where she deviates from our everyday epistemic practices, and it will 
follow that there is no clear sense about which of her premises is flawed.   
 If we abandon the idea that internalist justifications are the primary mark of 
knowledge, then we may be left with a way to accord them epistemic value while at the 
same time conceding to the skeptic that they do not, indeed, speak against skeptical 
scenarios.  Such a view will account for the fallibility inherent in the first person 
perspective by noting the de facto limitations of the first person.  Indeed, it would make 
sense if the justifications that we operate within the first person are limited in just the 
same way in which our first person perspective itself is limited.   Our project here is to 
understand in terms of epistemological theory how knowledge is possible in light of such 
limitations. 
 Let me begin by noting that the view I have in mind is largely externalist in 
nature.  The view is externalist in the sense that internalist type justifications are not 
required in order to count as knowing.  My reasons for this are independent of the 
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discussion here and it seems unnecessary and not relevant to our specific discussion to 
defend externalism generally here.  It may not be essential to my solution that a theory of 
knowledge developed around the idea of epistemic perspectives be externalist.  It seems 
plausible that internalist views that incorporated a notion of epistemic perspectives could 
be developed as well.   I suspect that the view I will develop here fits my solution in the 
most ideal way, but it seems somewhat irrelevant to our discussion here to try and defend 
this view.  Instead, my aim here is to fill in the notion of epistemic perspectives in a way 
that allows us to explore some of the claims made in the previous chapter.   Part of the 
issue is that any theory that acknowledges epistemic perspectives in Bonjour’s sense will 
incorporate both an internalist and externalist aspect.  The debate, then, will be centered 
on whether or not knowledge requires an internalist justification.  So the view being 
developed here is one that denies the necessity of internalist justifications for the 
possession of knowledge.  However, internalist justifications are involved in the first 
person perspective and, thus, will be necessary for knowledge ascriptions.   
Since a first person approach involves concerns about whether or not our beliefs 
are justified, theories that focus on the first person perspective tend to offer guidelines 
and norms about what it is for beliefs to be justified in the first person. Both perspectives 
are unavoidable and important; the result is an epistemology that credits both 
perspectives as relevant, and the kinds of justification stemming from them important.  
Additionally, it will seem a brute fact that many externalist criteria for knowledge are 
more important than the first person conditions for knowledge ascriptions.  For example, 
one criterion essential for knowledge based on sensory experience we can see is that 
sensory experience is a reliable way of forming beliefs in our world.  Or we might phrase 
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the condition as the requirement that if we are going to attain knowledge via sensory 
experience, we must be “hooked up” to our world in the appropriate way.   
 What we need now is some sense of how internalist type justifications function 
epistemically in light of the various externalist elements involved in knowledge.  To put 
it most intuitively, the view we need is one in which internalist type justifications 
function against the background of the reliability of other various means of belief 
formation.  In this instance, we will be looking at how sensory experience functions as an 
internalist justification against the background of the reliability of the senses.  It may be 
noticed already that this view has great similarities to others put forward.  In Pritchard’s 
Epistemic Luck he talks about Wittgenstein’s use of the notion of hinge propositions; 
propositions that function as necessary and given within a particular context.67  He sees 
various propositions about the reliability of the senses functioning as hinge propositions 
in most everyday contexts.   
In everyday contexts, asserting knowledge is often just fine according to 
Pritchard.  However, in skeptical contexts concerns about skeptical alternatives have 
made it so that various assumptions about the reliability of the senses are no longer 
allowed, and thus it may be inappropriate to assert knowledge.   
 The idea I’ll be outlining is somewhat akin to the above view except that it is 
meant to also offer an explanation as to why certain propositions about the reliability of 
the senses are hinge propositions.  Sensory experience and the reliability of the senses is 
just an example of this.   In order for sensory experience to have any epistemic value it 
must be against or in the context of the reliability of the senses.  So propositions or 
assumptions about the reliability of the senses have an epistemic priority.  Because they 
                                                 
67 See Pritchard’s Epistemic Luck, p. 226-229.   
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have epistemic priority we cannot call them into question when discussing issues 
involving sensory experience.   
Once we call the reliability of the senses into question, we are at a loss for a way 
to resolve the debate.  This is why, unlike most everyday cases in which people put 
forward alternatives to be considered, the skeptic has no evidence for her hypothesis.  She 
cannot have evidence for her alternative; indeed, she has no reason to even suspect that it 
might be true.  In such contexts, we have hit the point that the first person perspective 
cannot go beyond.  
What the skeptic has pointed out is not that we fail to know what we think we 
know.  Indeed, she is mistaken to infer that from her argument.  What she has gotten a 
hold on, though, is the limits of the first person and the gap between first person 
justifications and truth.  Those essentially externalist requirements cannot be addressed in 
the first person perspective because everything that occurs in the first person is dependent 
upon those inherently externalist criteria.  On the traditional internalist approach to 
knowledge, internalist type justifications were taken to be a stronger marker for truth than 
they actually are.   
.  If we really are agents who are connected up to our environment via our senses 
such that we fairly reliably get information about our environment through our senses, 
then we possess knowledge of the external world, and will often possess internalist type 
justifications that will give us good reason to think we possess knowledge of the world.  
That our sensory experience, characterized in a subjective and first person way, does not 
speak against skeptical hypotheses does not detract from the fact that agents in such a 
scenario have internally justified beliefs and are warranted in claiming such knowledge.   
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So our response is to own much of what the skeptic argues, but to deny her 
conclusions on the basis of the argument that she is mistaken about the role of sensory 
experience.  We can see that internalist justifications have a vital but limited epistemic 
value because they are not connected that closely with the truth.  But it is not arbitrary 
which propositions function as essentially externalist criteria for knowledge, nor should 
we concede to the skeptic that we should not assert that we possess knowledge of the 
external world.  Though the standards for the possession of knowledge might be high 
enough to require that we in fact formed our beliefs in a reliable way and that they are in 
fact true, it is possible for us to allow that knowledge ascriptions reflect the first person 
perspective in which we are largely attempting to determine whether or not the criteria 
for knowledge possession has been met.  First person justifications are our measure of 
whether the standard has been met, not the standard itself.   
The last point is worth drawing out a bit.  I urge that an externalist solution to 
skepticism that is along the lines of Duncan Pritchard’s in his Epistemic Luck should not 
concede to the skeptic that it is inappropriate to assert knowledge of the external world.  
Rather, our knowledge claims are grounded in (1) our justified assumption of the 
reliability of the senses and (2) the relevant sensory experience.68   
Indeed, it is my sense that this is why, when confronted with skepticism, many 
respond with the feeling that the skeptic has performed some kind of trick and that she is 
almost ridiculous to demand that our evidence rule out her alternative hypotheses.  Our 
appropriate response about knowledge assertion is that if our first person justifications 
indicate knowledge to the best of our ability it is appropriate to assert knowledge.   This 
                                                 
68 See Pritchard, Epistemic Luck, 227. 
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is so even if the skeptic points out that our evidence, and, thereby, our assertions of 
knowledge do not imply knowledge.    
Let us remember that the skeptic’s principle regarding reliability amounts to an 
unwillingness to pursue knowledge in light of the possibility of error.  Contemporary 
paradigms of knowledge are fraught with fallibility and possibilities of error with much 
concrete success, and, yet, we philosophers have struggled to accommodate such views in 
theories of knowledge.  We continue to feel overly persuaded by the skeptic that without 
some proof of reliability regarding sensory experience we fail to be justified in relying on 
it.  The fundamental working assumption in this argument is that such is simply not the 
case and that it is worth bearing out such views.   
If we follow Pritchard’s argument in Epistemic Luck, we ought to conclude that it 
is not right to assert knowledge in skeptical contexts because, doing such will often 
generate the conversational implicature that we have evidence that speaks against rival 
skeptical scenarios.69  But this is precisely the move that is mistaken.  While this rule 
often does hold in our everyday practices, it does not hold in skeptical scenarios. Even if 
we were agents in a normal world, we would not possess that kind of evidence.  Yet, this 
does not imply either that we fail to know (given an externalist account of knowledge) or 
that our sensory experience has no epistemic value.  To see that the latter is so, again, 
reflect on the fact that even the sensory experience of agents in a “normal” world will not 
speak against skeptical alternatives and, yet, their sensory experience does indeed reliably 
indicate the truth, and does so despite that it fails to speak against skeptical alternatives.  
Knowledge ascriptions should only incorporate the standard that we count as knowing in 
                                                 
69 This is what Duncan Pritchard claims in his discussion “Epistemic Angst” from his Epistemic Luck. 
170 
 
light of our evidence and our background beliefs.  Thus, we might formulate the truth 
conditions for knowledge ascriptions as follows: 
S’s claim to know that p is true iff: 
1. S does in fact know that p. 
2. S has reasons or evidence to believe that she has met the conditions to 
count as knowing that p. 
 
Alternately, we might also be interested in characterizing warranted assertion as 
reflecting the conditions in which someone is justified in claiming to know that p: 
 S is justified in claiming to know that p iff: 
1. S has reasons or evidence to believe that she met the conditions to 
count as knowing that p. 
 
Skepticism can be seen as a criticism that agents fail to meet the conditions for justified 
or warranted assertion. The skeptic wants to argue that in light of skeptical alternatives 
we cannot continue to see ourselves as meeting the requirements to count as knowing that 
p.  Somewhere in the skeptic’s beliefs is the assumption that in order to count as knowing 
one must be able to definitively rule out all error possibilities.  Thus, there is one more 
way to think about the conditions of warranted assertability in the relevant alternatives 
camp:             
S is warranted in claiming knowledge of p provided that she has ruled out 
all relevant alternatives to p. 
 
  The limitations of first person justifications do not prevent us from knowing.  
Skepticism does not even imply that sensory experience has no epistemic value.  Agents 
in normal worlds, who are hooked up to their environment in the right way, are gaining a 
good deal of information from their sensory experience.  Indeed, they are able to tell that 
they have hands; they can tell when they are in the presence of trees, chairs, where to 
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step, when they might fall, etc.  They achieve a good deal of truth via their sensory 
experience.  Thus, it has epistemic value provided that one is in a normal world.    
The mistake that the skeptic makes is that she demands that we be able to tell 
from our first person perspective that we are hooked up properly.  If we cannot tell from 
the first person, then we cannot rule out her hypotheses.  If we cannot tell from the first 
person which possible world we are in (a skeptical or non-skeptical world) then our 
sensory experience, as characterized subjectively and used as an internalist type 
justification, is not sufficiently connected to truth according to the skeptic.  When we fail 
to acknowledge the various external requirements for the possibility of knowledge then it 
falls to sensory experience (when used as internalist type justification) to show things that 
it cannot show.    
Given these considerations, our diagnosis of the various intuitions regarding 
skepticism would go as follows.  I have long noticed that people often have conflicting 
intuitions regarding skepticism.  There is a strong sense when presented with a skeptical 
argument that there is something about it that is undeniably correct.  Namely, the fact that 
our evidence is consistent with whatever skeptical alternative is mentioned.  When this is 
combined with the general concession that we usually need to be able to rule out 
competing alternatives in order to be justified in accepting our preferred hypothesis there 
is a strong sympathy toward the skeptic’s argument.  However, I have also noticed that 
despite these two concessions there is often a very strong reluctance to accept the 
skeptic’s conclusion.  This reluctance is often accompanied by the feeling that the skeptic 
has performed some kind of parlor trick and that she has made a mistake somewhere but 
that we cannot tell where. 
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 What we can say at this point is that the skeptic’s argument is compelling because 
she employs rules that usually apply in the context of warranted assertion.  In order to be 
justified in asserting knowledge, one generally has to rule out all competitors.  Because 
these rules are correct and do apply in the first person, we feel compelled to follow them 
and are sympathetic to their employment.   
The skeptic’s own lack of evidence or reason for thinking that her possibility is a 
genuine possibility is independent evidence that something is not right in this dialectic.  
While it is the case that a person is generally required to have an epistemic reason for 
preferring one alternative over another in order to be epistemically justified in doing so, it 
is also the case that it is generally true that the one proposing the alternatives to be 
addressed has at least some reason for counting the contending alternative as one that 
should be taken seriously.  Hence, this entire dialectic starts with the skeptic’s foul and 
ends with what seems to be a foul of our own.  However, I have urged that our lack of 
evidence is merely a symptom of the skeptic’s own foul.  Indeed, we might think of the 
skeptic as committing a fallacy of accident.   The accidental features of skeptical 
alternatives are such that the Rule of Exclusion does not apply in this instance.  To 
endorse the Rule of Exclusion for skeptical hypotheses (1) conflicts with our usual 
response to alternatives deemed insufficiently grounded, and (2) amounts to endorsing a 
requirement of absolute certainty for knowledge.  
We might point out to the skeptic that our reasons and our evidence are best 
treated as indicators and that we have strong epistemic reasons for prima facie reliance on 
sensory experience.  Such strong prima facie warrant is not dislodged by the mere 
possibility of error.  In this dialectic we can see that what the skeptic really wants is 
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certainty.  She does not demand that knowledge imply truth.  Her requirements are 
significantly stronger than that; she requires that our grounds for our beliefs show 
definitively that we do indeed possess knowledge.  She requires that our grounds for 
knowledge assertion imply truth and rule out all possibilities of error.  She requires not 
only that knowledge imply truth, but that knowledge ascriptions do as well.  In this light 
we can see how stringent the skeptic’s requirements are, and we have pushed the 
skeptic’s argument into that earlier formulation in which the skeptic simply demands and 
stipulates that knowledge, and, thereby, knowledge ascriptions require certainty.  There 
are no clear grounds for accepting this standard.  On this standard what it means to rule 
out an alternative is that an agent knows definitively that the alternative does not hold, 
and, yet we do not have clear reasons for endorsing this view.  In the next section, we 
will look at alternative criteria for what it means to rule out an alternative. 
 
 
5.3: Relevant Alternatives Conditions and “Ruling Out”: 
The argument in chapter 3 presents different criteria for what it takes to “rule out” 
an alternative.  What is often considered ruling out an alternative is to count as having 
good evidence against that alternative.70  It should be made explicit that I have endorsed a 
different concept for what it means to rule out an alternative.  On the view endorsed by 
Smith, for example, to rule out a skeptical alternative we must possess “good” evidence 
against the incompatible alternative.  I have not argued that we have such, nor does such 
an argument seem likely.  Thus, relevant alternativists must either endorse different 
criteria for ruling out an alternative or be largely concessive to the skeptic.  In chapter 3 I 
                                                 
70 Joshua Allen Smith endorses such a view in his “Relevant Possibilities,” Philos Stud (2008) 138: 55-71.   
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argued that the skeptic’s alternatives should not count as relevant because treating them 
as such detracts significantly from the pursuit of truth in a way that seems unacceptable.  
Thus, chapter 3 largely aimed to establish the conclusion that we are justified in treating 
skeptical alternatives as irrelevant in the context of everyday life.  However, such an 
argument only gets us so far given that there are clear contexts in which skeptical 
alternatives are treated as relevant.  Since I do not wish to argue that such contexts violate 
epistemic norms and that the consideration of skeptical alternatives is never appropriate, 
we will want a sense of how to handle skeptical alternatives in contexts in which they are 
treated as relevant. 
  Given the arguments in chapter 3 the contexts in which skepticism can be taken 
seriously are not merely those contexts in which someone has merely mentioned a 
skeptical alternative.   Rather, it also needs to be the case that the context is such that the 
contemplation of a skeptical alternative is not destructive to the immediate epistemic 
goals of the context.  The agent in thought experiment G that proposes a mere logical 
possibility to explain the activities of a rival nation has acted in such a way that the 
raising of that hypothesis is destructive to the epistemic goal at hand; namely, the goal of 
arriving at a well-founded hypothesis in the time allowed.  So contexts in which skeptical 
alternatives can be relevant are likely to be philosophical contexts.  Philosophical 
contexts are distinct in that we purposely set aside time to reflect further on our beliefs 
and our grounds for our beliefs.  Thus, it may not be surprising that in philosophical 
contexts the contemplation of skeptical hypotheses does not disrupt the immediate 
epistemic goals of the context because the goal is to engage in deep inquiry.  
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 Once a skeptical hypothesis becomes relevant; if we apply a notion of ruling out 
that requires evidence against the alternative we may well be at a loss for how to rule out 
a skeptical alternative.  There are two things to say about this situation:  (1) it seems that 
when we move to a philosophical context we explicitly employ higher standards for 
adequate evidence than are employed or are practical in everyday life, and (2) it remains 
even in a philosophical context that “ruling out” need not involve evidence against the 
hypothesis.  The criteria that in order to rule out an alternative one must have good 
evidence against it is tantamount to the criteria that in order to rule out an alternative one 
must be justified in claiming to know that the alternative does not hold.  If one has good 
evidence against the alternative, then one would be justified in claiming to know not-H 
(where H is some incompatible alternative).  The worry here is that such a standard 
implicitly endorses or comes close to endorsing a standard of certainty for knowledge.  
This is of concern not only because such a view will wind up in skepticism, but it is also 
worrying because such a view fails to account for knowledge as consistent with the 
possibility of error.  As noted earlier, it is a challenge of contemporary epistemology to 
develop accounts of knowledge that validate and legitimate current paradigms for 
knowledge.   
 Next, it is worth noting that this particular standard for ruling out an alternative 
does not seem consistent with actual practices regarding competing alternatives.  Unless 
we wish to undermine all such practices, we had best re-think this standard.  It seems that 
our actual practice is to treat the criteria for ruling out a hypothesis as on par with the 
grounds for raising the hypothesis.  The better the grounds are for an opponent’s theory 
or hypothesis or criticism, the higher the standard for meeting the criticism or rejecting 
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the alternate theory.  Likewise, when someone raises an alternative to our current belief; 
the better the grounds for raising the alternative, the more that is required in ruling it out.   
It is not clear what the intuition or motivation is for thinking that a hypothesis that 
is not well grounded needs to be ruled out with “good evidence”.  The intuition behind 
such a view might be that knowledge is such that it should speak against all error 
possibilities, even those that are not well founded.  However, in this light it seems that 
our worry that such a standard is coming close to insisting on a standard of certainty for 
knowledge is well founded.   If possessing knowledge means that one can rule out all 
error possibilities, then we are coming close to a view of knowledge that requires 
certainty.  However, as has been noted such a view of knowledge seems inconsistent with 
our actual practices and inconsistent with such paradigmatic knowledge as scientific 
knowledge.   
Instead, I am proposing a criterion for ruling out that has more intuitive appeal.  It 
seems to me that knowledge claims are consistent with acknowledging but not endorsing 
error possibilities.  I have granted that it does seem inconsistent to say “I know that p but 
it could be that q” (where q is an incompatible hypothesis).  This is not what I am 
endorsing.   On my view agents assert knowledge with the belief that all error 
possibilities have been sufficiently ruled out.  However, the grounds for ruling out some 
of the error possibilities are not definitive.  Thus, on such a view an agent would claim to 
know, but acknowledges that it is possible that some error possibility is in fact actual.  
The difference between the two is that on the first reading of the fallibility of knowledge 
the agent has no grounds for thinking that q does not hold.  On my view I allow agents to 
rule out alternatives even if the grounds for ruling out the alternative are not sufficient to 
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ground a knowledge claim.  Many knowledge claims that scientist make occur against the 
background of alternatives that have not been “strongly” ruled out.  Thus, they could not 
appropriately claim to know that the alternative does not hold.   
Given these considerations we may be inclined to endorse a view of what it means 
to “rule out” an alternative in which what it takes to rule out an alternative is on par with 
the grounds for raising the alternative in the first place.  We might formulate this idea 
into the following criteria: 
S counts as ruling out an alternative H iff: 
S’s reasons or evidence against H are epistemically stronger than the 
grounds or evidence in favor of H. 
 
I think that the above concept of ruling out is appealing not only for its’ role in an anti-
skepticism epistemology, it is also intuitively appealing on its own grounds.  The practice 
of giving and accepting justifications is one that is a give and take process.  We should 
not conceive of a competing alternative as existing in some de-contextualized manner. 
Allowing a view in which there are no conditions for raising an alternative beyond the 
mere mentioning of the alternative, but endorsing a rigid standard for ruling out 
alternatives stacks the deck against those making knowledge claims in a way that does 
not seem fair or intuitive.  Such a view does not seem consistent with our actual practices, 
and clearly stacks the deck in favor of the skeptic.  An alternative for which there is not a 
shred of evidence, such as skeptical alternatives, can be ruled out on grounds that do not 
warrant a knowledge claim.  This intuition accounts for why many quickly dismiss 
skeptical alternatives.  Skeptical alternatives are mere logical possibilities; they reflect 
possible error, not likely error.  If we think of knowledge as consistent with fallibility 
then this should be reflected in allowing ruling out to occur on grounds that are indeed 
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epistemic but not sufficient to warrant a knowledge claim that not-H.  This reflects the 
fallibility of knowledge; the existence of error possibilities that we do not believe to hold, 
but might in fact be actual.   
 
 
5.4: Lewis’s Rule of Actuality and BIV’s: 
 Attempting to address criticism that relevant alternative theories are vague, Lewis 
offers a number of criteria for when an alternative may not properly be ignored.71  One 
such criterion is the criterion that the actual may never properly be ignored.  This 
criterion is highly intuitive and it should be noted that I am not endorsing a view in which 
this criterion is violated.  However, it should also be noted that in the context of 
skepticism this criterion has to be formulated carefully otherwise it will turn out that 
skeptical scenarios are never properly ignored.  This will particularly hold if we combine 
his rule of actuality with his rule of resemblance which holds in the event of one 
possibility saliently resembling another, in such a case Lewis maintains “if one of them 
may not be properly ignored, neither may the other.”72  Lewis himself acknowledges a 
problem with the rule of actuality and resemblance; when taken together they effectively 
imply that no skeptical hypothesis is properly ignored.  Lewis admits this is problematic 
when he states, where W is some alternative: 
 Plainly, we dare not apply the Rule of Actuality and Resemblance to 
conclude that any such W is a relevant alternative – that would be 
capitulation to skepticism.  The Rule of Resemblance was never meant to 
apply to this resemblance!  We seem to have an ad hoc exception to the 
                                                 
71 See Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge,” in Skepticism, 227-232 
72 See Lewis “Elusive Knowledge” in Skepticism,  227-232. 
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Rule, though one that makes good sense in view of the function of 
attributions of knowledge.73   
  
The argument we have put forward before may be able to help make some sense of the 
issues here.  First though we must take note that Lewis is articulating a relevant 
alternatives position that acts as conditions on knowledge, whereas we are concerned 
with relevant alternatives as a straightforward way to characterize knowledge ascriptions 
in the context of skepticism.  Nonetheless, we might be able to avoid some of the ad- 
hocery in Lewis’s account if we maintain that all alternatives that are merely logical 
possible may properly be ignored.   
The justification for ignoring the logically possible lies in embracing a view of 
fallible knowledge.  On such a view, those claiming knowledge need not address every 
single error possibility because such a requirement is tantamount to requiring certainty in 
order to be justified in claiming knowledge.  Instead, those claiming knowledge need to 
have grounds for rejecting plausible or likely error scenarios.  On this view, those 
claiming knowledge must have reasons to believe they have avoided what we take to be 
likely error; error that there is some reason to believe may hold.   
We might say something like the following in light of such considerations: what 
we want is not resemblance of any sort, but a notion of the right kind of resemblance.  
Scenarios that resemble actuality, or what we take to be actual, need to be well founded 
in order to be relevant.  If not, then we risk setting a standard of certainty for knowledge.  
This is a standard we are blatantly trying to avoid in exchange for justifying a fallibilist 
approach as a rational and coherent approach to knowledge.   
                                                 
73 See Lewis page 228. 
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On such a fallible-knowledge view, skeptical scenarios for which there is some 
reason to believe hold will count as relevant, whereas those for which there is no 
evidence or reasons will not count as relevant.  Thus, the well-worn Fake Barn scenario 
would turn out to be relevant provided that there is some evidence to indicate that fake 
barns are likely in the area.   However, let us imagine that fake barns are common in the 
area but that the agents in the example have absolutely no reason to think so.  In such a 
scenario the possibility that the “barns” they are looking at are only barn facades is not a 
scenario that the agents must address in order to be subjectively rational.  However, if 
such is the case, then it certainly has an impact on whether or not they count as knowing.  
This is precisely the sense in which luck does in fact play some role in a fallibilist 
account of knowledge.   
 Thus, the straight rule of actuality is fine for knowledge conditions.  If it turns out 
that a skeptical scenario is in fact actual, then one cannot count as knowing.  This 
conclusion would fit well with what we have said so far, because our grounds for treating 
skeptical hypotheses as irrelevant are that they are merely logically possible.  However, if 
the skeptical hypothesis in fact holds then it is much more than logically possible; it is 
actual.  We might say of agents who are completely unaware of a skeptical scenario that 
is actual that they are subjectively rational but that they fail to count as knowing. 
The rule of resemblance needs to be modified in order to be consistent with a 
fallibilist view of knowledge. Resemblance is only relevant provided that the resembling 
scenario is sufficiently grounded.  This is not as ad hoc as it might appear at first glance.  
If we recognize that we cannot entertain every single alternative and pursue truth 
sufficiently, then we must have some guidelines for treating alternatives that are not 
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sufficiently grounded as irrelevant whether or not the agents in the scenario can produce 
some reasons for treating them as irrelevant.  To ask them to produce reasons is to ask 
them to treat the scenario as relevant, which has the effect of derailing the pursuit of 
truth.  The argument given in the previous chapter is meant to demonstrate the extent to 
which the skeptic is asking us to derail our pursuit of truth in order to avoid error.   
 
5.5: Epistemic Perspectives and Closure: 
 The solution I have pursued in the last two chapters raises some issues regarding 
Epistemic Closure.  Relevant alternatives views generally involve re-characterizing 
closure.  However, as with many other relevant alternative views we will be able to save 
some version of the closure principle.  If knowledge ascriptions are made in the context 
of a set of relevant alternatives, then closure will fail in instances in which the set of 
relevant alternatives shifts between premises.  Alternately, we might claim that closure 
holds provided that the set of relevant alternatives remains fixed through-out the 
argument.  There are different kinds of cases regarding closure and closure seems to hold 
in some while not in others.  The cases of interest in the context of skepticism, cases like 
Dretske’s zebra example, are cases in which closure seems counter-intuitive.   These 
cases are cases in which the entailment under question is a skeptical alternative, and I will 
argue that Dretske is right to think that closure fails on the grounds that the evidence that 
grounds p is not sufficient to ground belief in q.    
 Closure can be articulated as the following argument form: 
  Closure:  S knows that p 
      S know that p entails q 
      Therefore, S knows that q 
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 I have challenged lines of reasoning like the above when they involve shifting 
from a third person line of reasoning into a first person context. It is important to note 
that in the above argument, the first premise is a knowledge ascription.  I have argued 
that knowledge ascriptions have distinct criteria from the actual possession of knowledge.  
So whether or not closure holds depends largely in the way in which the first premise is 
made.  The mistake in the McKinsey paradox, for example, is not necessarily in the form 
of the reasoning from semantic externalism to knowledge of the contingent aspects of the 
external world.  The mistake is made if an actual person uses such a line of reasoning to 
assert the first premise.     
Dretske grounds his anti-closure argument in the zebra example that serves as 
counter-example to the closure principle:  
Something’s being a zebra implies that it is not a mule… cleverly disguised by the 
zoo authorities to look like a zebra.  Do you know that these animals are not 
mules cleverly disguised?  If you are tempted to say “Yes” to this question, think 
a moment about what reasons you have, what evidence can produce in favor of 
this claim.  The evidence you had for thinking them zebras has been effectively 
neutralized, since it does not count toward their not being mules cleverly 
disguised to look like zebras.74 
 
Peter Klein argued that Dretske’s argument fails because he makes an 
unnecessary assumption regarding evidence and closure.  Indeed, Dretske’s argument 
against closure is grounded in his claim that our evidence for x being a zebra does not 
“count toward their not being mules cleverly disguised to look like zebras”.  Klein’s 
argument is essentially that if this assumption is not necessary for closure, and it seems 
not to be in several cases, then the assumption is unmotivated and Dretske’s argument 
against closure fails.   Klein argues that Dretske’s counter-example holds only if “the 
closure principle entails that the very same evidence that justifies S in believing that the 
                                                 
74 Fred Dretske, Epistemic Operators, 138-139. 
183 
 
animals are zebras must justify S in believing that they are not cleverly disguised mules 
because, it is presumed, that it is the only evidence we can be sure S has”. 75 
 Closure holds as a fine form of reasoning as long as the first premise is asserted in 
a third person way of some potential knower.  If asserted in a third person perspective the 
reasoning clearly holds.  However, there are concerns if the first premise is asserted of an 
actual knower in a first person way.  The concern stems from the fact that knowledge 
ascriptions are asserted because a knower exhibits the indicators for knowledge 
possession.  The indicators, however, do not guarantee the possession of knowledge.  
Thus, there can be instances in which using the above kind of argument may be 
epistemically problematic in the first person because it involves an assumption that the 
knowledge ascription implies knowledge when such does not appear to be the case.   
 For example, there may be tempting to give arguments like the following: 
  Example: P1: I know that X is a zebra 
       P2: If X is zebra, then X is not a cleverly disguised mule. 
       C1: Therefore, I know that X is not a cleverly disguised mule. 
       C2: Since I know that X is not a cleverly disguised mule, I am  
           entitled to ignore any evidence to the contrary. 
 
What is problematic here is not the externalist line of reasoning that allows us to 
conclude that p entails q and that if we know that p, then we know that q.  The problem 
lies in the tentative first person knowledge ascription that I know that p.  If my 
knowledge ascription itself is tentative, closure can be problematic if one is tempted to 
use it as described in the example above.  In the above example, such an agent would be 
prone to dogmatism in the first person in a way that is problematic.  The tentative nature 
of knowledge ascriptions requires that we continue to be sensitive to error.  However, an 
                                                 
75 Peter Klein, How A Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond, 38.   
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overzealous application of deductive closure may incline one towards dogmatism in a 
way that violates important norms regarding belief formation.  
 So in this sense, we can say that deductive closure holds in a third person way, 
and holds in first person contexts as long as the agent’s application of deductive closure 
does not result in the violation of important first person epistemic norms.  Namely, if the 
evidence that grounds a knowledge claim of p is sufficient to ground a knowledge claim 
of q, then there seems to be no problem.  If such is not the case, then closure amounts to a 
form of reasoning that allows the conclusion to be on significantly stronger epistemic 
grounds than the premises.  Where does such increase in epistemic strength come from if 
not passed through the premises?  The only grounds for the conclusion of any argument 
are to be found in the grounds for believing the premises.  This is why Dretske is 
absolutely correct to identify a problem with closure in the Zebra example.  The rest of 
the reasoning for the argument beyond the grounds for P1 only applies in the instance in 
which S knows that p.  Therefore, the entire line of reasoning is ultimately grounded 
upon S’s claim to know that p.  It is therefore, absolutely pertinent to think that the only 
grounds S has for believing that q are the same grounds that S has for believing that p. 
 So in this light we may characterize the problem with the McKinsey paradox in 
the following way.76  The first premise is a knowledge ascription.  Knowledge ascriptions 
are made on the basis of indicators for knowledge possession that do not imply 
knowledge possession.  However, the deductive nature of the closure argument requires 
the actual possession of knowledge.  If closure is based on a knowledge ascription that 
does not entail knowledge, then we have opened the door to the possibility of true 
                                                 
76 For a full discussion of the McKinsey paradox see Martin Davies, “Externalism and Armchair 
Knowledge,” in New Essays on the A Priori, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 384-414. 
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premises and a false conclusion; such is the nature of shifting the principle from one that 
is formal to one that is informal. 
Thus, the McKinsey line of reasoning holds in a third person way, but is not 
something that any real knower can actually make use of.  My sense is that the 
application of such a line of reasoning actually violates requirements regarding 
justification in the first person.  To assert that we know contingent things about our world 
based on a knowledge ascription about the meaning of our words, combined with a 
tentative philosophical theory, does not amount to justification in the first person.  In a 
philosophical sense it may be an interesting argument, but we have standards for 
justification regarding beliefs about the external world that such an argument will not 
meet.   
 We might put the concern in the following way:  knowledge implies truth, but 
knowledge ascriptions do not.  To claim that ascribing knowledge of p to S implies the 
truth of p is tantamount to claiming that we know with certainty that S knows that p.  
Such might be fine in instances of knowledge grounded in a priori reasoning.  However, 
those are not the cases that concern us here.   Here we are concerned with external world 
knowledge and claiming infallibility of knowledge and knowledge ascriptions seems 
highly contentious in this arena.  In fact it seems that such a claim would be tantamount 
to the claim that our external world beliefs are grounded in such a way that we can rule 
out in a definitive sense all other alternatives, including skeptical hypotheses.   
 If knowledge ascriptions require an internal justification, then we cannot claim to 
know that X is not a cleverly disguised mule because we have neither reason nor 
evidence to ground such a claim.  Dretske is right to ask us how we might defend such a 
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knowledge claim.  The alternative would be to allow knowledge claims in cases in which 
an agent has neither reason nor evidence in favor of her belief.  Making the case for such 
an approach regarding knowledge ascriptions would be difficult in light of the fact that 
such an approach conflicts with our practices regarding knowledge ascriptions.  Our 
practices are generally such that claims to know not grounded in some way are thrown 
out.  If someone claimed to know that p, and when asked them how they know that p, 
they reply “I don’t know”- it would be consistent with common practice to treat such a 
knowledge claim as false. 
 In general, the deductive nature of the closure principle will require that the 
conclusion drawn is somehow contained in the premises already given.  In cases in which 
q is included in p already, even in cases involving external world matters, closure does 
not seem problematic.   Consider a slightly modified version of one of Klein’s examples: 
If S knows that water is present, then S knows that a clear, odorless, liquid is present.  
Such a case is not problematic because the justification for knowing that water is present 
is sufficient to ground the knowledge claim that a clear, odorless, liquid is present.  The 
entailment in this last case is contained in p itself.  Thus, the evidence in favor of p will 
be sufficiently in favor of q as well.  However, that x is not a cleverly disguised mule 
steps beyond what is claimed in “x is a zebra”.  That this latter point is so may well act as 
straightforward evidence that knowledge claims are made against a set of relevant 
alternatives that does not include each and every alternative possibility there might be. 
 It is clear that this is not a full treatment of this issue, but having said the above 
we might be able to conclude a couple of things about the view I have developed here 
and closure.  Closure will hold on my view in a third person way and it will hold in 
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Dretske’s sense of closure; it will hold when S’s evidence for p is sufficient for q.  
Otherwise, closure seems to fail. 
 
5.6: Other instances of mistakes in shifting perspectives: 
 If it is right to urge that we need an epistemological account of both perspectives, 
it will also require guidelines in navigating those perspectives.  Such guidelines will be 
the sort of thing that agents when in the first person perspective will rely upon and use as 
a way of avoiding epistemic mistakes.  A little reflection reveals that such mistakes are 
possible (and, again, I have argued that skepticism is just such a mistake).  Both 
McKinsey’s paradox and Putnam’s anti-skepticisim argument are possible examples of 
mistakes in shifting perspectives. 
 Putnam’s argument that utterances of skeptical hypotheses, such as “I am a brain 
in a vat” are self-refuting is another example of moving from a third person line of 
reasoning to a first person justification in a way that is epistemically problematic.  
Putnam’s argument runs along the lines that any actual brain in a vat cannot refer to 
brains and vats and therefore cannot truly utter that statement.  In the brain in a vat’s 
world the terms “brains” and “vats” will refer to whatever usually causes the internal 
sensory experience associated with brains and vats, but in a brain in the vat world it will 
not actually be brains and vats that typically cause utterances of “brains” and “vats”.  So 
his argument rejects the problem of skepticism on purely semantic grounds.    
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   Let’s take a more detailed look at a Putnam type argument.  Ted Warfield defends 
a seemingly plausible version of anti-skepticism via semantic externalism.77  Warfield 
characterizes his anti-skepticism position in the following argument: 
 P1. I think that water is wet (or, I know that I think that water is wet). 
 P2.  No brain in a vat in an otherwise empty world can think that water is wet. 
 C1.  So, I am not a brain I a vat in an otherwise empty world. 
 
So this argument relies on an application of the closure principle.  Since thinking about 
water implies that one is not a brain in a vat, Warfield moves from his claim to know that 
he is thinking about water to the claim that he knows he is not a brain in a vat. 
This kind of move serves as further example of either problematic instances of the 
application of closure or of problematic instances of shifting epistemic perspectives.  
Notice that premise P1 is a knowledge ascription.  However the closure principle 
underlying this argument requires the actual possession of knowledge, not a mere 
knowledge ascription.  Let’s look at it this way.  Knowledge ascriptions, even of the 
contents of our thoughts will not entail knowledge possession, at least in instances in 
which the contents of our thoughts are determined by externalist conditions as 
characterized in semantic externalism.  As a quick example of this we might imagine that 
a brain in a vat has water like thoughts and says to herself “I am thinking that water is 
wet”, and yet, she is not thinking that water is wet.  Thus, the ascription of knowledge 
will not imply knowledge.  However, the closure principle requires knowledge in order to 
be plausible. 
 To see the above let’s imagine the closure principle as it actually occurs in the 
above anti-skepticism argument.  Closure is occurring above as follows: 
                                                 
77 See Ted Warfield, “A Prior Knowledge of the World,” in Skepticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999) 76-92. 
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 Instance of Closure: 
 P1.  I claim to know that p. 
 P2.  p implies that q. 
 C3. Therefore, I claim to know that q.  Or, in other words, my justification for  
                  claiming knowledge of p transfers to a claim to know that q. 
 
This is closure as it is actually applied, or it is an example of an instance of closure.  An 
instance of closure is actually based upon knowledge ascriptions.  Knowledge ascriptions 
are generally made in the first person and based on knowledge indicators.  However, as 
we have seen, knowledge indicators will not imply or entail knowledge.  There is nothing 
wrong with the instance of closure argument.  However, focusing on the fact that any 
instance of closure is grounded in a knowledge claim allows us to see that the knowledge 
claim gained at the conclusion is no more decisive than the justification for the other 
knowledge ascriptions made thru-out the argument. 
Perhaps it has traditionally been thought that knowledge ascriptions of contents of 
thoughts do imply the possession of knowledge.   We can see from the example above 
that such is not the case.  However, this gets tricky with semantic externalism.  It is 
difficult to capture how the brain in the vat is wrong about her thoughts on an externalist 
view of the contents of her thoughts.  Thus, perhaps we should concede to the Putnam 
camps that even the brain in a vats’ knowledge ascriptions do imply knowledge.  On this 
view it becomes impossible to articulate or capture in the utterances of the brain in a vat 
how she is wrong about the nature of her environment.  And, yet, it seems so clear that 
she is massively deceived and wrong.  This massive deception is at the heart of skeptical 
scenarios.  The brain in a vat thinks she has a body, and she does not, and she thinks there 
are trees, lakes, grass, and there is not.  Yet, it is impossible to characterize this epistemic 
error in utterances or in the thought contents of the brain in a vat on an externalist 
190 
 
account.  Yet, it seems that even on the externalist account the epistemic problem of 
skepticism remains.  It is undeniable that the brain in a vat suffers from a state of extreme 
epistemic poverty about her environment.  So, admittedly it becomes somewhat difficult 
to characterize the skeptical problem in the context of semantic externalism.  It is not 
quite correct to say that the brain in a vat thinks there are trees, lakes, hands, and she is 
wrong about such things. 
While I do not want to lobby major criticism in a quick or off-handed way we 
might make some notes about the implications of the above view.  If it is true that the 
brain in a vat’s beliefs are in fact true, such a view may well imply that brains in vats do 
in fact possess knowledge of their external world.   
Yet it seems counter-intuitive to ascribe external world knowledge to beings who 
could not accurately describe their external world.  Brains in vats have no real 
understanding of the nature of their world.  It just so happens that their beliefs are true 
because of how semantic externalism ascribes content.  But the truth of the brain in a 
vat’s beliefs seems accidental in exactly the way that is inconsistent with knowledge.  In 
fact these implications seem to embody the worst criticism against externalist positions in 
general because it is not possible to capture how deprived the BIV is despite the fact that 
she has no real understanding of her environment.  Such worries are the embodiment of 
the concern that externalism allows knowledge even when the internal state of the agent 
is epistemically lacking.   
Notice even further, that semantic externalism may well imply that a brain in a 
vat’s sensory experience is reliable.  Even in skeptical scenarios, sensory experience 
consistently produces true beliefs because on many such views content is assigned 
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according to whatever typically causes such utterances.  Thus, sensory experience is 
reliable in the sense that it regularly produces true beliefs.  There becomes this strong 
sense in which the semantic externalist is actually denying the metaphysical possibility of 
massive deception.  Massive deception is impossible because whatever triggers our 
utterances will determine content, thus it seems impossible to be wrong in the sense of 
having a mismatch between content or thoughts and the causes of the thoughts.   
However, such a mismatch is exactly the possibility that skeptical scenarios aim to 
capture.  If these concerns do not amount to outright reductios of this brand of semantic 
externalism, then such implications at least show strong prima facie concerns about the 
implications of semantic externalism in epistemology.  Such concerns might be so strong 
that they must be worked out for the theory to be viable.   
So in light of this dilemma we might try a different look at the Putnam type 
argument.  Notice there is a slight circularity built into Warfield’s argument.  His first 
premise is a knowledge claim about thinking about water, which implies that he is not a 
brain in a vat.  However, notice that not being a brain in a vat is a necessary precondition 
for the truth of the first premise.  In order to think about water, he cannot be a brain in a 
vat.  Thus, he derives one of the necessary preconditions of his first premise as 
conclusion.  This works only if the truth of the first premise is so apparent as that it does 
itself imply the conclusion.  But what are the grounds of the first premise?  Having water 
like thoughts?  Surely it is not impossible for the brain in a vat to have water like 
thoughts.  Is it transparent from water thoughts which environment one is actually in?   
To my mind the crux of the problem here is the shifting of epistemic perspectives 
without any sensitivity to the nature of those perspectives.  The philosopher here moves 
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from a highly externalist line of reasoning about the conditions that determine the 
contents of thoughts and then combines that with an assumption that all of those 
conditions are transparent from the first person perspective.  It seems that if we are going 
to be externalist about the contents of thoughts we may well have to accept that at least 
some of the conditions that determine the contents of our thoughts are beyond the 
perspective of actual thoughts.  Indeed, such external conditions on content are very 
similar to external conditions on knowledge.  If such is true, then closure may well be a 
valid argument in the third person, but potentially problematic in the first person.   
Closure in the first person becomes a transfer of justification or a transfer of 
warrant.  The result is that the knowledge claim at the end of an application of closure is 
justified if the warrant that transferred from the first knowledge claim is sufficient 
justification for the consequent.  So if p implies q, this will not matter if the warrant that 
justified the assertion of knowledge for p does not justify the assertion of knowledge for 
q.  So in many instances closure will be acceptable because the justification for p serves 
as sufficient justification for q as well.  However, in other instances the justification one 
has for p will not serve as the kind of justification that supports a knowledge claim of q. 
It seems to my mind that it is remarkably important that we keep in mind that 
knowledge ascriptions function differently than knowledge.  As we have mentioned, 
knowledge may not require an internalist type justification, but, on the other hand, it 
seems highly plausible that knowledge ascriptions do.  If one claims knowledge, surely 
one must have a reason to think she in fact possesses knowledge, and such a reason 
should be accessible to the agent via introspection.   
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5.7: Conclusion:  
So we have reached a point where I have conceded to the skeptic that we function 
on the assumption of the reliability of the senses in our first person endeavors.  The 
skeptic, as we know, would claim that such a justification is not warranted.  Since our 
assumption is unwarranted, beliefs justified in a way that relies on this assumption fail to 
amount to knowledge.  It was argued in the previous chapter that our assumptions of 
reliability regarding sensory experience are justified for the sake of pursuing truth.  I have 
framed the skeptical argument as a reflection of the value of epistemic goals, and I have 
argued that the goal of pursuing truth outweighs the value of avoiding error.  This 
argument is aimed at undermining the skeptic’s central claim that agents who rely on 
sensory experience are somehow epistemically blameworthy or deficient.  The classic 
skeptical charge is that agents who rely on sensory experience are somehow epistemically 
naïve.  We have seen, however, that skepticism can be construed as a choice.  The choice 
is between the pursuit of truth with the possibility that we will get it wrong, or to avoid 
all possibility of error and forsake the pursuit of truth.  There really is no way to avoid 
this choice.  One either relies on and endorses the information given to us via sensory 
experience, or not.   
Granted, there may be fine grained distinctions about how full bodied the reliance 
on sensory experience should be, but I have argued that such fine grain distinctions are 
merely splitting hairs.  The epistemic debate comes at the level of whether or not we have 
justification to assume the reliability of sensory experience in the first place, and it has 
been argued that we do in fact possess such justification.   
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However, our justification for relying on sensory experience is not classic 
epistemic justification; our justification does not count toward the truth of our assumption 
in any way.   I have defended position on the grounds that what justifies our reliance on 
sensory experience is a meta-principle regarding the pursuit of truth in the context of 
fallibility.  This meta-principle allows us to endorse methods of belief formation for the 
sake of pursuing truth.  The AR meta-principle is looser than the skeptic’s requirement; 
the AR principle says we are justified in relying on methods of belief formation until 
there are indicators of unreliability.  This meta-principle maximizes the attainment of 
truth while minimizing the most pernicious and likely error.  However, we must admit 
contrary to the skeptic that our principle and our stance does not provide certainty; 
instead, it allows us to pursue truth despite fallibility.  Thus, a boiled down version of the 
defense of AR is that our reliance on sensory experience is grounded in the value of and 
pursuit of truth.   
This justification is not pragmatic in the traditional sense.  The traditional 
pragmatic versus epistemic division has been made between that which involves the 
pursuit of truth and that which does not.  Epistemic justification has traditionally been 
that kind of justification which counts towards truth.  And pragmatic justifications have 
generally been those regarding our non-epistemic goals.  Thus, our justification is not 
clearly epistemic or pragmatic in the traditional sense of this distinction.  However, I 
have argued that since AR results in the attainment of more truth that it should count as 
an epistemic justification.  Does the justification for relying on sensory experience 
provided indicate that our sensory experience is in fact reliable?  No, clearly it does not.  
Rather, it indicates that a reliance on sensory experience results in more truth.  The nature 
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of this justification seems acceptable in light of the fact that the skeptic’s approach 
excludes the attainment of external world truths for all agents, even those who could 
attain truth if they followed AR.  This is the sense in which knowledge and the pursuit of 
truth does involve some element of luck after all.   
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Cartesian Skepticism as Moral Dilemma 
 
 “Remaining Questions and Concluding Remarks” 
 
Chapter 6.1: Summary: 
  
 I have argued that in many everyday contexts we have good reasons for ignoring 
skeptical hypotheses.   The simplest version of the argument I have given is that if we are 
going to attain truths about the environment in which we live, we can only do so by 
relying on sensory experience.  Thus, the pursuit of truth requires us to accept sensory 
experience as reliable.  Granted, we need not, and should not, have blind faith in sensory 
experience, or any method of belief formation for that matter.  However, we cannot sit 
back and wait for the proof the skeptic seeks without severe epistemic consequences.  
The skeptic’s position involves the loss of truth even for those agents for whom external 
world truths are possible.  So the pursuit of truth itself involves some possibility of error, 
but this should not surprise us.  We have long been aware of the fact that we are highly 
fallible knowers.   
So we may sum up the argument in the following way.  First, we have focused 
along with Bonjour on skepticism as it relates to the first person perspective; as it relates 
primarily to applied knowledge ascriptions.  Secondly, I have argued that first person 
practices regarding relevant alternatives are epistemically justified rather than merely 
pragmatically justified.  This conclusion allows us to dismiss mere logical possibilities in 
the context of everyday life.  This will include dismissing skeptical hypotheses.   
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The crux of this argument has been that our first person practices are largely goal 
and value oriented.  One of the primary values is truth.  This creates strong first person 
norms governing the attainment of truth and avoidance of error.  The result is that we 
must balance these competing concerns in the first person.  If we are overly cautious we 
are likely to sacrifice many truths.  If Descartes had not found a way to come out of the 
skeptical hole he dug for himself, he would have missed out on much knowledge and 
many truths.  Clearly, such an example is not epistemically ideal.  Thus, our leap of faith 
is really an epistemic one, and one that is not merely the result of undeniable 
psychological or practical forces. 
Admittedly, my argument rests on a number of claims that should be made 
explicit.  First, I am relying on an analogy between moral values and epistemic ones.  In 
ethics the well worn example of the refugees hiding in the attic and the Nazis knocking at 
the door illustrates that moral obligations can conflict in such a way that any action we 
choose will land us in violation of a moral obligation in the context.  In the 
aforementioned example, agents in such circumstances must choose between telling the 
truth and saving innocent lives.  In much the same way, I have claimed, epistemic values 
conflict.  The circumstance of this conflict forces a choice that aligns either with the 
pursuit of truth or the avoidance of error.  Granted, perhaps there are very subtle and 
nuanced positions in the middle, but, as argued in the Introduction and elsewhere, these 
nuanced positions do little to avoid this choice.  The nuances and subtleties to be found 
that may be lacking in this dichotomous choice embody subtly that does not avoid the 
basic tension and conflict as I have characterized it thru out our discussion.   
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It seems safe to conclude that if we are discussing skeptical hypotheses seriously 
we are in a philosophical context.  I have argued that the epistemically important 
distinction between philosophical contexts and everyday life has to do with the difference 
in epistemic perspectives between these two contexts.  Since there are important 
epistemic differences between philosophical and everyday contexts, we have some non-
question begging grounds for taking skepticism seriously in a philosophical context but 
dismissing it in the context of everyday life.   
To my mind, this conclusion fits our intuitions regarding skepticism very well. 
There may be times in which we seek as in- depth an inquiry as possible. In such a 
context alternatives are raised more easily than in other contexts in which depth is not the 
primary focus.   Everyday contexts are such contexts in which the standards for raising an 
alternative are stricter.  This is appropriate given the fact that the contemplation of an 
alternative takes time and energy.  Everyday contexts are often contexts in which depth 
conflicts with the pursuit of truth in the time given; thought experiment G in chapter 3 
shows what such a context might look like.    
 Lastly, this view allows us a stronger relevant alternatives position than 
previously thought.  It is not as though we are ignoring skeptical hypotheses simply on 
the grounds that no one has mentioned one, nor is it the case that we are ignoring 
skeptical hypotheses for ad hoc reasons.  It is not as though we make an exception to the 
Rule of Exclusion for skeptical hypotheses on arbitrary grounds.  Our reason for 
dismissing a skeptical hypothesis is at the very heart of all our epistemic endeavors; our 
reason is for the pursuit of truth.  As we saw in the Pascal Wager argument, it is not as 
though brains in vats are taking a leap of faith at the expense of potential truth.  Unless 
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the epistemic situation of the brain in a vat changes, she is not capable of gaining truth 
about the contingent aspects of her environment.  Thus, it is not as though being cautious 
to avoid error when regarding skeptical hypotheses gives us an avenue to truth.  Thus, 
such alternatives are properly ignored for the sake of pursuing and possibly attaining 
truth.   
 
6.2: Skepticism in a Philosophical Context: 
  
 Because we are often in a first person perspective in our everyday lives, and that 
in this perspective we have to balance the goal of truth with expediency and efficiency, 
we are often justified in rejecting skeptical hypotheses.  By arguing such we have some 
epistemic reasons for dismissing skeptical hypotheses in most everyday contexts.   
Further support for this position is offered by the Pascal wager type argument we 
evaluated in the last chapter.    
 The question of skepticism in a philosophical context remains to be answered.  I 
have largely conflated the third person perspective with a philosophical one.  While this 
is not crucial to my argument, I have done this because a third person perspective is 
concerned with such uniquely philosophical questions as: what is it to possess 
knowledge, what is constitutive of justification, when are knowledge ascriptions 
appropriate, etc.  So let us briefly look at how we might respond to skepticism in a 
philosophical context in light of our argument thus far.  
 The first thing to note is that the response to skepticism developed thus far will 
not pertain to issues of skepticism in a philosophical context.  As the dialectic has been 
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construed, the solution offered here is effective for the issue of knowledge ascriptions, 
since they are primarily carried out in the first person.  Thus, skepticism in a 
philosophical context concerns questions about how knowledge is possible in general, 
how it is possible in light of the fallibility of sensory experience, and how knowledge is 
possible in light of skeptical hypotheses, etc.   
 While it is not my aim to offer an answer to these questions, there are two things 
that are worth mentioning.  First, a response to philosophical skepticism should occur in 
the context of a full epistemology.  Pritchard’s externalist response serves as a good 
example of ways in which we might handle philosophical skepticism.  My own sense is 
that externalist type responses do well against skepticism precisely because they require 
less in terms of transparency of evidence in the first person.  As previously discussed 
though, such a view has correctly been seen as failing to answer the first person issue of 
whether or not our actual ordinary beliefs about the world are in fact justified.  So it has 
been this issue that I have focused on in our previous discussion.   
 The second thing that I want to mention about this issue is that there is a large 
sense in which skepticism raised in a philosophical context poses significant challenges 
to anyone articulating a theory of knowledge in which knowledge is a regular occurrence.  
To my mind, this is an appropriate stance to have toward skepticism.  The mistake lies 
not in thinking that skepticism has immense philosophical interest, but in assuming that 
the philosophical difficulties translate into our everyday lives in a way that is not 
epistemically problematic.  Philosophers, perhaps not surprisingly, have been insensitive 
to the important epistemic differences between philosophical contexts and everyday life. 
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 In this latter sense, the argument given here does address some of this 
philosophical skepticism.  The argument under consideration here is one that gives some 
idea of how knowledge might be seen as fallible in ways that are not overly counter-
intuitive.  As discussed previously, the view articulated here need not be a brand of 
highly counter-intuitive fallibilism.  The fallibilism considered is one in which agents 
claim knowledge with the belief that there are no other serious and relevant error 
possibilities that are un-eliminated. 
 In his “Epistemological Realism” Michael Williams characterizes the 
ways in which we might dissatisfied with possible responses to skepticism.  Even if we 
avoid skepticism in the first order, he notes, we find various way in which we might 
continue to be dissatisfied: “We may have knowledge of the world, but we will never be 
able to explain to ourselves how we do.  We may know things about the world, but we 
will never know that we know them.”78  How does the solution proposed here stack up 
against these concerns?  In a straightforward sense I think we can see how knowledge of 
the external world is possible.  The second question is more pertinent for the response I 
have suggested.  Without endorsing the standards he seems to evoke, it seems he thinks 
of knowing that we know as having some conclusive reason to think we count as 
knowing.  However, if we are fallibilist about knowledge, we may well want to be 
fallibilists about second order knowledge as well.  I have endorsed a view in which we 
are justified in claiming that we know because we possess reasons to think we have filled 
the first order criteria necessary for knowledge possession.  Yet, I have claimed such 
despite the fact that some of the criteria at the first order level, some of the criteria we 
must fill in order to possess knowledge, is essentially externalist in nature.  Specifically, 
                                                 
78 Michael Williams, “Epistemological Realism,” 54. 
202 
 
if we are to count as knowing it must turn out that are senses are in fact reliable; that we 
are not brains in vats.   
  Whether or not we want to endorse Williams’ more stringent standards, we 
might ask whether or not the solution I have suggested meets this standard, and we must 
note that it does not.  In the sense Williams seems to endorse, knowing that we possess 
knowledge of the external would seem to require knowing that we are not brains in vats.  
However, despite our endorsement of AR we do not know that we are not brains in vats.  
In fact, I have argued that we are entitled to endorse AR as a meta-principle, and as such 
we can endorse it despite that we fail to know which possible world is actual.  Since I 
have argued that we are warranted in asserting knowledge, since we seem to have met the 
criteria for knowledge possession, it will follow that on the view I have put forward, 
warranted assertability is not the same as knowing that you know as Williams seems to 
characterize it.   
 
6.3:  Moore and Skepticism: 
 I have largely characterized the argument I have given as a relevant alternatives 
argument.  However, it also seems proper to treat our defense as in the spirit of the 
Moorean response to skepticism.  Moore’s common sense rejection of skeptical 
hypotheses is exactly the attitude of the everyday knower that I have sought to defend as 
epistemically sound.   
 Moore’s grounds for dismissing skepticism lie in how poorly skeptical hypotheses 
and arguments are supported.  Moore questions the skeptic’s contention that we ought to 
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abandon that which we are sure of (such as having hands) in favor of that which we are 
not (fancy philosophical argument).   
 In “Proof of an External World” Moore notes that skeptics do not seek proof of 
statements such as “I have hands”, but, instead, seek a more general proof of how such 
statements can be known at all, or proven at all.79  Moore admits on this score that “I 
have conclusive evidence that I am awake: but that is a very different thing from being 
able to prove it.”  Much of what has been argued here is grounded in a notion that we 
have evidence in favor of our sensory experience, but not the kind of evidence that speaks 
against skeptical alternatives.  
 At this point it might be worth noting why it might be that the skeptic does not 
count any of the evidence that ordinary believers would count in favor of the reliability of 
sensory experience.  Many of us have experiences involving the confirmation of our 
sensory experience; it is often confirmed by those around us, when relied upon its’ 
veracity is often demonstrable, etc.  Yet, we must admit, as Moore had to admit, that this 
kind of evidence is not of the sort the skeptic seeks.  However, there is a bit of a slight of 
hand on the part of the skeptic.  The skeptic operates with a standard of certainty 
embodied in the requirement of ruling out the various skeptical hypotheses.  
 As we have previously discussed, skeptical hypotheses are merely possible error.  
The skeptic has no evidence to ground the claim that we are dreaming, that we are BIVs, 
or that sensory experience is systematically unreliable.  Thus, skeptical alternatives do not 
express the worry of likely error; they express the worry of possible error.  In the 
                                                 
79 See Moore, “Proof of An External World,” in Epistemology, ed. Ernest Sosa et al, (Malden: B;ackwell 
Publishing, 2008) 26-28. 
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skeptic’s mind knowledge involves certainty, how can one know if one is not certain the 
skeptic wonders?   
 However, much like the distinction between the concept of formal validity and 
that of logical strength, if the skeptic’s standard is certainty and we fail to meet that 
requirement, then according to her we have no grounds for preferring our ordinary beliefs 
or for relying on our sensory experience.  Yet, this is a bit fast.  The formal concept of 
validity is a black and white concept that involves a precision stemming from the 
standard of certainty in formal logic.  Thus, if an argument does not provide certainty, 
then in formal logic it is invalid.  The concept and the standard it embodies does not 
admit of degree.   
If we reason with the skeptic then we have to admit that we have no evidence and 
no epistemic grounds for preferring our ordinary beliefs about the world.  However, if we 
do not embrace the standard of certainty and the black and white concept of validity that 
it entails, we can admit of degree.  We can admit that we have much evidence and good 
reasons to rely on sensory experience, but they are grounds that do not provide certainty.  
Thus, it can be that on the skeptic’s view of knowledge, we have no grounds for 
preferring our ordinary beliefs, but on a fallibilist view of knowledge we indeed have 
grounds that provide some likelihood of truth.  Whatever those grounds may be, they will 
not compel the skeptic.  The skeptic gets her conclusion that we have no grounds for 
preferring our ordinary beliefs because we have no evidence against skeptical hypotheses 
and in favor of our ordinary beliefs, but this requirement embodies a standard of certainty 
and it is only on that standard that we fail to possess any reasons to ground our ordinary 
beliefs.    
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The above is the sense in which the approach I have taken towards skepticism 
cannot provide a refutation of skepticism anymore than Moore’s arguments provided a 
refutation of skepticism.  And, yet, there is something undeniably appealing in Moore’s 
response.  One has to work themselves into a skeptical philosophical context in order to 
find the skeptic’s argument compelling; this seems true even for the skeptic.  I have 
wanted to do justice to the de facto practice of relying on our sensory experience that we 
all engage in and find impossible to deny.  If we find it impossible to do justice to these 
practices in a philosophical way, in a way that engages the skeptic’s demands, such may 
be as much an indication of a deficiency in theoretical epistemology as it is in the 
practices everyday agents engage in.  
 
6.4: Sensory Experience, Knowledge, and Luck: 
 We might wonder at this point, though, whether or not I have really defended the 
everyday attitude towards sensory experience.  I have presented the endorsement of 
sensory experience, particularly so in the context of the Pascal’s Wager, as though it 
occurs in the spirit of a bet.  However, this cannot possibly be right.  We believe that 
sensory experience is reliable in a much stronger way than as a tentative and rational bet 
given our circumstances.  I have to admit such criticism would be well founded.  It is not 
as though we are tentative in our reliance on sensory experience.  However, we have 
evaluated the assumption of the reliability of sensory experience in a much more detailed 
and philosophical light than is common in everyday life.  Additionally, as talked about 
earlier, we have approached relying on sensory experience as an epistemic issue only, 
when, clearly, our reliance on sensory experience extends beyond the epistemic. 
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 It has been convincingly argued that belief grounded in sensory experience is not 
the product of some rational process reflecting conscious endorsement of the given 
content.  Beliefs grounded in sensory experience, seem, as a matter of fact, to arise 
spontaneously with experience.  However, the skeptic has asked us to step back from this 
process and determine whether or not this endorsement of sensory experience is in fact 
justified.  The skeptic has argued that without some reason to rely on sensory experience 
we have no reason to prefer ordinary beliefs over skeptical rivals.  Thus, we too have 
stepped back from whatever process may in fact take place to evaluate said process from 
an epistemic point of view.  Having done such, I have argued that despite that we are in 
some sense “blind” we are justified in relying on sensory experience.  We have granted as 
much as might be reasonable to grant the skeptic and found that even in light of such 
concession we still have reason to prefer relying on sensory experience over doubting it.   
 
 
6.5: Contextualism, Relevant Alternatives, and the Rule of Exclusion: 
I have branded the argument I have given as a sort of Relevant Alternatives 
position.  The argument given has the features of a relevant alternatives argument.  I have 
treated skepticism as an argument stemming from the fact of skeptical alternatives, and 
the skeptic’s claim that we fail to possess sufficient evidence to rule them out.  I have 
argued, on the one hand, that it is the concrete contextual features of first person belief 
formation that rule out skeptical alternatives as relevant contenders.   Alternately, I have 
argued beyond the above brute-fact to the conclusion that it is for compelling epistemic 
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reasons that skeptical hypotheses should not be treated as relevant alternatives in most 
everyday contexts.   
 Despite the contextualist nature of the argument given, it should be noted that my 
argument is not grounded in a claim that the standards for knowledge change.  Nor is it 
the case that my argument is grounded in some implicit claim that there are weak and 
strong kinds of knowledge.  Additionally, I do not think my argument need be construed 
as one in which the standards for evidence shift according to context.   
It might be easy to read my argument as one in which it happens that in everyday 
life our standards for evidence are low because of the concrete aspects of belief formation 
in the context of everyday life.  Alternately then, it would be easy to think that in the 
philosophy classroom we raise the standards for evidence and produce some stronger 
version of knowledge grounded in such reflection.  I think such a reading mistaken and 
unnecessary.  The consequent of such an interpretation is that the product of such deep 
reflection stands on significantly stronger epistemic ground.  This consequent stands in 
conflict with the primary thesis of my argument- that everyday knowers are on perfectly 
sound epistemic ground.  Instead of attaining some kind of strong knowledge after 
philosophical reflection on our beliefs, we attain some kind of relief and comfort in the 
knowledge that our practices regarding sensory experience and our usual dismissal of 
skepticism is indeed justified.  
Let me offer an interpretation that avoids the above implications.  First, the 
standards for knowledge are not shifting on my view because they remain consistent 
across an everyday and philosophical context.  I have agreed with the skeptic that in order 
to claim to know our ordinary beliefs, we must have reason for ruling out the skeptical 
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alternatives.  I have disagreed with the skeptic in her implicit claim that the ruling out of 
skeptical hypotheses must occur on the basis of evidence that speaks against skeptical 
hypotheses.  Instead, I argued that the concrete aspects of the first person are such that 
alternatives generally have to be on stronger epistemic ground than merely logically 
possible.   
It should be noted that I do not want to ground my position in the claim that 
standards for evidence shift when we move from an everyday to a philosophical context.  
Admittedly, the concrete parameters of belief formation, such as time constraints, shift 
when we move contexts, and, admittedly, we shift perspectives and focus on more 
general questions surrounding knowledge and justification when we move into 
philosophical contexts.  However, this should not be construed as a shift in the standards 
for evidence.  Rather, it seems what actually occurs is that we must make decisions and 
form beliefs under time constraints in everyday life, and while we make what we take to 
be well founded decisions, we occasionally long for a more thorough and in depth 
evaluation of our justifications, beliefs, and reasoning processes.  Thus, what I see as 
different between everyday life and a philosophical setting is that we remove the concrete 
parameters of everyday life and shift our focus to more general questions.  We ask the 
questions we often do not have time for, and we review decisions made quickly.   
A philosophical context allows us to evaluate in detail whether or not we are 
justified in neglecting skeptical hypotheses the way that we do.  It allows us to open a 
door we had closed in order to determine whether it really is best that it stay shut.  What 
we come to at the end of such reflection on the justification we possess for our ordinary 
beliefs is that we are in fact well grounded in our epistemic practices, they are both 
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rational from a subjective view point and justified from the objective requirement of 
truth-conducive.  If after philosophical reflection we come to doubt that we are justified 
in our ordinary beliefs it is only because we have consented with the skeptic that not only 
do we have to rule out skeptical hypotheses, we must do so in light of evidence that 
speaks directly against them (skeptical hypotheses) and in favor of our ordinary beliefs.   
The only sympathy I can garner for such a view is founded in our usual practice 
regarding the Rule of Exclusion.  Since contending alternatives are usually ones that are 
on stronger grounds than mere possibility, it is usually the case that we require, or 
strongly prefer, evidence that rules out contenders.  Given that skeptical hypotheses 
themselves are on weak ground it seems difficult to motivate such a strong requirement in 
order to rule them out.  They are merely logically possible, and as such it seems perfectly 
reasonable to rule them out on concerns about attaining possible truths.  It seems fine if 
we are willing to allow skeptical alternatives that we rule them out on the basis of a 
cost/benefit analysis.  If we know that relying on sensory experience is an epistemically 
sound practice regardless of which world we are in, then our ordinary beliefs grounded in 
sensory experience are well founded.  That there is a possibility of error only shows that 
knowledge is fallible and that there is some element of luck involved in epistemic 
endeavors after all.  Knowledge is not attained solely on the grounds of the subjective 
efforts of the agent herself.  No matter her efforts, if the tools she has to work with are, 
unbeknownst to her, faulty, then she cannot attain knowledge.  Skepticism is worrying or 
upsetting only because it articulates a scenario in which something of tremendous 
intrinsic value, namely truth, is inaccessible.  It is upsetting because deception is always 
an upsetting prospect.   
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6.6: Other Solutions to Skepticism: 
The project here has been to do justice to the intuition that the everyday knower is 
motivated by deep epistemic concerns rather than mere psychological ones in a way that 
allows us a philosophical defense of our first person practices.  While there are hints of 
this kind of response thru out the literature on skepticism, there has been very little 
serious endeavor to articulate how our everyday epistemic practices are in fact justified in 
an epistemic way, rather than in a merely pragmatic way.    
There are advantages the approach articulated here has over its competitors.  Let’s 
first think about the basic contextualist view of the sort Keith DeRose describes as 
allowing for a powerful attack of the skeptic, while still allowing for the persuasiveness 
of the skeptical argument.80 Such a contextualist view, in simple outline, maintains that 
the standards to count as knowing shift from context to context.  On such a variantist 
position it will turn out that in some contexts the standards to count as knowing are 
relatively low while the standards are much higher in other contexts.  Such a view thus 
allows the contextualist to maintain that we count as knowing in everyday contexts in 
which the standards are relatively low but fail to count as knowing in skeptical contexts 
in which the standards have been raised significantly. 
First, let me note what seems to be right in the basic view outlined above.  The 
contextualist seems right about the fact that the standards employed by those in everyday 
life are different than those the skeptic employs.  The skeptic’s demand that any agent 
claiming to know must handle all and any error scenarios seems tantamount to requiring a 
standard of certainty in order to count as knowing.  It also seems that we generally do not 
employ such high standards in everyday life.  However, what the contextualist sees as a 
                                                 
80 See DeRose, “Introduction,” 17-18. 
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mere difference in context strikes me as more blatant disagreement between the skeptic 
and the everyday agent about the nature of knowledge.   
Notice that in a theoretical sense the contextualist has in somewhat skirted the 
skeptical problem by assuming that all various standards are acceptable.81  The skeptic 
would maintain that the lower standards of everyday life are not examples of true 
knowledge and that we are wrong to count them as such.  To this criticism the 
contextualist has no immediate response.  The skeptic would simply note that in order to 
count as knowing an agent must possess some evidence against skeptical hypotheses but 
she has none whatsoever.  The general contextualist response has done little to motivate 
the infallibilist (and variantist) view of knowledge being endorsed in the contextualist 
solution.  While some have tried to motivate the variantist aspect of knowledge in 
contextualism via arguments about indexicals, there has been little real work to motivate 
the infallibilist aspect of knowledge.  Also, it is the infallibilist view of knowledge in 
contextualism that does the much of the anti-skeptical work.  I have made some effort 
here to motivate an infallibilist view of knowledge rather than merely embracing it as 
brute fact.  Notice that the contextualist has a largely concessive response to the skeptic.  
She has to admit that in skeptical contexts we have no response other than to concede to 
the skeptic.  There is something counter-intuitive about making such a concession that we 
do not in fact know that we have hands, for example, while maintaining a short while 
later in another context that we do in fact know that we have hands.  It seems the blatant 
contradiction here ought to be unsettling particularly considering that our evidence has 
not changed from one context to the next.  
                                                 
81 Of course, though, this is too strong and not something the contextualist is literally committed to. 
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The motivational argument provided here lies in acknowledging the epistemic 
value of what we seek in our epistemic endeavors and the recognition that the skeptic’s 
high standards do come at an epistemic price.  I have tried to motivate the view that in the 
face of fallibility we still have ample motivation to seek truth, and doing such requires 
that we jump in with both feet.  I have suggested that the assumptions of reliability that 
lie underneath our pursuit of truth are rational assumptions, and that such assumptions are 
conducive to the pursuit of truth.   
Notice too that I have picked up where Duncan Pritchard’s work leaves off.  He 
leaves us in his Epistemic Luck with a level of uncertainty regarding first person 
endeavors and skepticism.  He argues that our first person endeavors are filled with a 
certain amount of epistemic angst; he likens us to tightrope walkers who assume but do 
not know that the safety net has been erected below.  This description inevitably leaves us 
wondering why we are justified in assuming the safety net is there in the first place.  
What justifies this assumption?  There are many solutions to skepticism, and many 
interesting solutions at that, but very few of them directly address the question about why 
we are justified in assuming sensory experience is reliable.  The typical skeptical 
explanation would be that we assume sensory experience is reliable because we are either 
so psychologically compelled or we are irrational and unenlightened.  The argument I 
have given here shows that such is not necessarily the case.    
The assumption that sensory experience is reliable is both epistemically efficient 
and epistemically warranted.  Such assumptions make sense in light of the fact that we do 
not know which world we inhabit and that we must, in a simplistic way, choose between 
caution to avoid error and recklessness to pursue truth.  While I have encouraged the AR 
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position that strikes a balance between our two competing concerns, that of avoiding 
error and that of attaining truth, the AR position cannot entirely mediate the fact that in 
everyday life the pursuit of one goal has to come at a cost to the other.   
The above epistemic reality should not surprise us too much.  It is often the case 
in morality that the promotion of one moral good comes at a cost to another good.  The 
pursuit of economic growth based on consumption, for example, is a good of a sort that 
may inherently involve a cost to the environment, a good of another sort.  However, such 
is the nature of real life; it is messy and the parameters of real decision making force us to 
make choices we might not recognize theoretically.  Thus, it might seem in a 
philosophical context that the avoidance of error is being recklessly ignored by the naïve 
everyday knower, when in reality the situation is more complicated than that.  The 
everyday knower, aware of it or not, is in a circumstance in which epistemic goods 
cannot fully and simultaneously be pursued as we might wish to be the case in a 
theoretical context.  Thus, one of strengths of the discussion here is that it aims to address 
these first person skeptical worries in a way that openly addresses the question of what 
justification we have for assuming sensory experience is reliable, and why we might want 
in a theoretical epistemology to embrace infallible knowledge.   
 
6.7: Concluding Remarks: 
 My project has been in line with Bonjour’s claim that at the heart of skepticism is 
a concern or worry that is generated about first person knowledge ascriptions.  I have 
concurred with this assessment on the grounds that third person questions raised by 
skepticism are largely handled well by an externalist account of knowledge.  However, in 
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concurrence with philosophers as different as Bonjour and Pritchard, such an approach to 
skepticism does little to handle those pertinent first person issues.  However, unlike 
Bonjour and others, it seems that if we are concerned with our everyday beliefs and our 
everyday knowledge ascriptions, it is very important to approach the defense of these 
practices in a way that is consistent with actual everyday knowledge claims and actual 
everyday knowers.  Fancy philosophical arguments do not defend the actual practices of 
everyday knowers who do not in fact defend their ordinary beliefs with such arguments.   
The question is whether or not the practices we engage in a non-philosophical 
context are truly epistemically justified.   My answer to this has been yes.  And I have 
attempted an argument that is perfectly consistent with the practices of actual knowers, 
and aims to justify their practices without requiring such everyday knowers to appeal to 
any of the arguments contained within this paper.   
Admittedly my goal has been to do justice to two strong and prevailing intuitions 
regarding skepticism.  The first intuition is that the many people who respond to 
skepticism with annoyance, the many that are put off by such off-the-wall-hypotheses as 
brains in vats, are right.  The second intuition is that it is a deep epistemological issue to 
understand how knowledge is possible in light of skeptical hypotheses.  We are too quick 
to assume that our philosophical difficulties with skepticism translate into our everyday 
lives.  This is the very concern that Bonjour raises regarding skepticism.  His approach to 
skepticism centers on concerns over the status of our actual, everyday, ordinary beliefs 
about the world.  I have argued that our everyday lives are governed by different 
epistemic norms than philosophical contexts are.82 There is a large body of evidence that 
                                                 
82 This is probably too quick.  As clarification, the norms in the first person are different because of 
concrete aspects of belief formation in everyday life.  Factors such as time, efficiency, and import in terms 
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indicates that knowledge is possible in everyday life (i.e. our many claims of knowledge, 
etc).  And there is a large body of evidence that indicates that the contemplation of 
skeptical hypotheses is not always epistemically appropriate.   
The approach I have taken to skepticism is in the spirit of Moore’s response to 
skepticism.  Instead of rejecting skeptical argument on the grounds of a lack of evidence, 
the position given here rejects skeptical alternatives on the grounds of a lack of evidence.  
The standard of taking seriously and ruling out, where ruling out is equivalent to knowing 
that the skeptical hypothesis does not hold, each and every possibility of error is 
tantamount to denying the formal and informal distinctions in reasoning.  Descartes 
wanted the precision of formal reasoning and the power of informal reasoning; yet, we 
have seen through skepticism that such a combination is not possible.  The power of 
informal reasoning comes at the price of inherent fallibility.  Skeptical alternatives 
embody the limits of this kind of reasoning.  Such a possibility of error cannot be refuted 
even with the best kind of evidence we might have for the knowledge in question.  Yet 
this is not as counter-intuitive as some think.  Claiming knowledge of p while admitting 
that it is possible, but not likely, that one might be wrong does not seem problematic.  It 
would be a very different matter if skeptical hypotheses were grounded in evidence in 
one way or another.  It seems much more counter-intuitive to claim knowledge while 
admitting a possibility of error that is likely.   
Unless Epistemologists wish to undermine the very subject of our study, it is 
important that we develop a concept of knowledge that fits all that which is properly 
informal.    I have argued that the skeptic has no prima facie grounds for ruling out 
                                                                                                                                                 
of consequences all affect the resulting epistemic norms.  However, this does not mean that the epistemic 
values are any different.  The primary epistemic values in both contexts are the attainment of truth. 
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fallible knowledge, and we have no clear reasons to reject the possibility of such 
knowledge.  Rather, we seem to have much evidence that many, if not most, endorse and 
embrace a fallibilist position regarding knowledge in many epistemic arenas.   
The skeptic relies on the Rule of Exclusion, and our psychological attachment to 
sensory experience to make her skeptical alternatives seem more epistemically powerful 
than they really are.  Philosophers often talk as though many find an appealing argument 
in skepticism.  However, this does not really seem to be the case.  Most students in a 
philosophy classroom do not worry about skepticism after hearing the skeptic’s 
argument; they dismiss it as far-fetched and often have the attitude that it is ridiculous to 
demand that we rule out such hypotheses.  An inability on the part of Philosophers to 
clarify the theoretical concept of knowledge in such a way as that it and knowledge 
ascriptions are consistent with the fallibility articulated in skeptical hypotheses is not 
necessarily a sign of a deficiency on the part of everyday knowers.   
Rather, the above failure on the part of epistemologists might be an indication of a 
tradition that has been overly influenced by standards of certainty when it comes to 
knowledge.  Thus, while it may not be possible to knock down the skeptic when she is 
playing “King of the Mountain”, we have offered some reasons for thinking that her long 
held stance as “King of the Mountain” is not warranted.83    So while we might admit to 
the Descartes of the first meditation that we do not know for sure that we are not 
currently dreaming, we will also maintain that we do not have sufficient reason to worry 
that we are in fact dreaming to warrant even a cease- fire in our epistemic endeavors.  
The cost of endorsing Descartes’ standard for knowledge is extremely high, and is 
                                                 
83 As mentioned in Chapter 3, this phrase is borrowed from Keith DeRose, and articulates that requirement 
for defeating skepticism in which one provides a refutation that would knock the skeptic down. 
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particularly so when we consider that we have little motivation for endorsing this high 
standard for every kind of knowledge.   
What I have aimed to show is that we do in fact possess evidence that grounds our 
ordinary beliefs; and Moore seems right to characterize that evidence as conclusive. In 
order to engage skepticism I have conceded to the skeptic that our sensory experience can 
only confer epistemic justification if the general assumption of reliability (AR) that 
underlies it is justified.  So the debate on skepticism generally moves from our particular 
beliefs about the external world, to the more general question of the reliability of the 
senses.  The skeptic wants us to try to show that we have grounds for thinking sensory 
experience in particular is reliable.  However, assumptions of reliability for belief 
forming mechanisms seem to be grounded in the meta-principle AR rather than in any 
particular evidence that demonstrates the veracity of any particular method.  Thus, I have 
shifted the general question of reliability that stems out of skepticism into a defense of 
AR as an appealing meta-principle in light of our pursuit of truth.   
The sense in which Cartesian skepticism in the first person can be seen as a moral 
dilemma stems from the fact that the pursuit of truth and the reliance on sensory 
experience go hand in hand.  Thus, the question about our reliance on sensory experience 
is really a question about whether or not the pursuit of truth justifies relying on a method 
that may or may not be reliable.  Certainly an answer in the affirmative is an epistemic 
answer and does provide some epistemic justification in some sense of that term.  
However, we must admit that by relying on sensory experience we are also introducing 
not only the possibility of attaining truth, but also the possibility of falling into error.  
That is the dilemma, and that is the sense in which we can see fully that it is right to see 
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skepticism as a stalemate between the optimists on the one hand and the pessimist on the 
other.   
While this final position may not be as satisfactory as we might like, it seems 
clear that it is the best possible response and that it is genuinely defensible in many ways.  
In light of the above arguments it seems, at least to my mind, that the skeptic’s stance is 
no more defensible than the individual who refuses to run a race because in doing so she 
might lose rather than win.  Such an attitude is no more admirable in the epistemic arena 
than it is in any other.   It seems as though this first person question of skepticism boils 
down to an age old, common-sense truth that all things worth having involve both work 
and risk.  In this light it seems surprising that philosophers ever thought that truth, as 
valuable as it is, is something we can and should attain without assuming any risk in the 
pursuit of it.     
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